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Abstract
Open, embedded multi-agent systems have applications in sensor and opportunistic net-
works, and in cloud and grid computing. Features of such systems include: no centralised
control, competition for resources between autonomous agents, (un)intentional errors,
and a speed and complexity of decisions beyond human capabilities. Moreover, there
is a requirement to optimise performance with respect to multiple, possibly conflicting,
criteria, for example longevity, occupancy and fairness.
This thesis addresses the problem of engineering self-organised resource-allocation man-
agement schemes for open, embedded systems. Based on the theory of institutions for
collective action as defined by political economist Elinor Ostrom, we define a formal
model for self-organised resource-allocation, using the computational framework of dy-
namic norm-governed multi-agent systems.
Our model of an electronic institution encapsulates a first-order logic axiomatisation
of the principles for enduring institutions. An experimental platform for an abstract
common-pool resource management situation has been developed, and the experiments
show the importance of all principles in order to achieve longevity, appropriate behaviour
and the right balance of membership. The results furthermore suggest that the mecha-
nisms to design institutional rules should be made available to the system components
themselves. In order to successfully self-organise, the system has to be aware of its
internal state and externalities.
To represent and reason about awareness, some aspects from the field of organisational
justice have been formalised in the same framework. Agents will not only follow a
collectively decided allocation procedure but will execute the allocation according to
their own notion of fairness, and also use this notion to judge the perceived behaviour of
others. Further experiments show that the ability for introspection and reflection on the
perceived environment leads to an improved management profile and further enhances
the system’s performance.
Adaptive institutions are a key factor in dealing with resource distribution. Self-aware
agents using electronic institutions in socio-technical systems could be a significant in-
novation in reducing the current lag between institutional and environmental change,
and make an important contribution to the sustainability agenda.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
Open systems, from sensor networks and virtual organisations to urban transportation
and smart grids, face a common challenge. They consist of heterogeneous and competing
components, are resource constrained and decentralised. The system components, often
referred to as agents, form opportunistic alliances and need to collectivise and distribute
resources without a centralised controller. They depend on mechanisms to self-organise
despite malfunction or intentional disruption, without the intervention of the designer
at runtime.
In this work, we address the problem of adaptation and self-organisation in open systems
with respect to resource allocation. If such systems involve human actors, they are often
privatised or placed under governmental administration, as a game-theoretic analysis of
strictly rational actors predicts the depletion of a resource that is governed by private
actors, such as in a commons. Elinor Ostrom however, showed that depletion is not the
inevitable outcome when leaving people to self-organise the process of resource alloca-
tion [85]. In most cases where the resource is sustainable, the actors have formed an
institution, i.e. a set of rules, that governs their behaviour with respect to appropriating
from the common pool. These rules are conventionally agreed by the concerned actors,
are mutable, mutually understood, monitored and enforced, and are nested within each
other. They also define what role an actor has to fulfil to be permitted (or obliged)
to perform specific actions. Furthermore, the rules are organised in different levels to
address the different nature of issues arising when taking collective action. These are the
operational, collective-choice and constitutional level. She observed that despite form-
ing an institution, there were still cases when the resource did not sustain continuous
appropriation. Comparing these cases to examples of successful self-governance, she for-
malised a catalogue of eight principles for long-enduring common-pool resource (CPR)
management. We use Ostrom’s theory on institutions for collective action as a starting
point for designing electronic institutions for self-organising open systems.
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1.2. Methodological background
In order to implement a theory from social sciences within a computing context, we
apply the methodology of sociologically-inspired, based on work by Steels [111], that
we previously presented in [93]. The basic structure of that methodology is shown in
Figure 1.1. Given some phenomena and appropriate (research) tools, a preformal theory
can be constructed, typically in natural language. That language is then represented
in a calculus of choice, in order to attach computational meaning to the theory. Then,
the represented theory is embedded into a computational environment and can include
the implementation of individual agent behaviour and the environment. Finally, the
computer model is used for experimentation and the obtained results allow us to draw
conclusions about the accuracy of either preformal theory, calculus or computer model.
Formal
Characterisation
Calculus
Calculus
Calculus
Calculus
Theory
Construction
Controlled
Experimentation
Principled
Operationalisation
evaluate evaluate evaluate
Preformal
Theory
Observed
Phenomena
Observed
Performance
Computer
Model
Figure 1.1.: Methodology for sociologically-inspired computing (SIC)
Given that we use preformal theories created by sociology-related sciences, there remain
three steps for us to apply from this methodology. They are the formal characterisation,
the principled operationalisation and the controlled experimentation.
In the first step, the formal characterisation, we characterise the theory of institutions
for collective action in the open computing systems context. To this end, we use a com-
putational framework for specifying electronic institutions [8], and part of this framework
is the specification of a norm-governed system1 including the permissions, obligations
and institutionalised powers [59], and a protocol stack for defining how to change the
specification. This allows the agents to modify the rules (or protocol) of the institution
at runtime. To formalise the norm-governed system, we will use a rule-based reasoning
engine that efficiently matches rules and facts.
1The norms in the norm-governed context are stated in explicit form, which we typically refer to as
rules.
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The formalisation of principles represents what is explicitly expressed with the institution
(the rules), but we also have to consider their implicit meaning (the norms). The implicit
meaning makes assumptions about the actors’ internals, that is that people are able to
reason about the social or organisational context they are in. For agents in open systems
this entails that the principles should not just be implemented by the system designer
but their specification has to be made available to the system components themselves.
We therefore endow the agents with some notion of awareness and self-awareness, which
enables them to reason about the rules with respect to the state of the environment, and
in particular about their own and other agents’ behaviour.
In the second step, the principled operationalisation, we integrate the formal character-
isation into a testbed, using a time-driven simulation platform. We define the functions
for agent behaviour, the institution and the environment for different types of CPRs and
bring everything together with a control loop.
In the third step, the controlled experimentation, we test the performance of principles
on a resource-allocation scenario where the resource is supplied by the environment.
We assume an economy of scarcity, meaning that there is neither an overabundance of
resources available, nor is there so little resource that the system is in constant crisis.
Under these conditions, the agents have to apply the rules of the institution. They
decide on a policy that defines how the resource is distributed and by whom, and they
monitor the appropriation phase and sanction any noncompliant behaviour.
We use objective and subjective evaluation methods for judging the longevity, occupancy
and fairness of the system. In a first set of experiments, we optimise the choice of
principles from the designer’s perspective with respect to enduring system operation,
high membership and a well-known fairness measure. In a second set of experiments, the
components of the open system optimise occupancy and fairness from an agent’s view,
the subjective system perspective. To evaluate the fairness of procedures, the agents
use self-awareness. This constitutes one aspect that human actors regularly consider
when designing rules for resource allocation. Here, the agents compare the outcome of
an allocation procedure to their internal fairness norm and draw consequences, such as
reassigning the role of the distributor.
1.3. Thesis outline
The body of work is divided into five chapters and follows the sociologically-inspired
computing methodology. Figure 1.2 shows in what order these chapters correspond to
the individual steps of the methodology.
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Figure 1.2.: Chapters following the SIC methodology
Chapter 2 firstly presents different types of open systems and reviews several ap-
proaches to the problem of resource allocation within these systems from a computer
science perspective. Then, we present common approaches to CPR management in the
physical world, including institutions for collective action and self-governance of CPRs,
and the following question arises:
Q1 Can the problem of resource allocation in open systems be addressedby modelling an institution for self-governance?
The theory of institutions formalised by Elinor Ostrom represents the first step of theory
construction from the SIC methodology. We describe the problem of defining rules of
an institution and conclude with eight principles [85, p. 90] that serve as guidelines for
designing those rules.
Lastly, we include relevant background from computational social choice, fair divisions
and an example from game theory, that deals with the problem of resource allocation.
Chapter 3 is a first step towards integrating Ostrom’s principles into the decision-
making process of open systems. We start by revisiting the methodology of sociologically-
inspired computing and present possible frameworks for that integration. In order to
express required, permitted or prohibited actions that can be performed within an in-
stitutional context, we chose to specify the open system using a framework of norm-
governed systems [8] and answer the question:
Q2 Can Ostrom’s design principles be encoded in norm-governed systems?
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In the remainder of the chapter, we address the second step of the methodology, i.e.
the formal characterisation, and the calculus (or rather formalism) used. We describe
how the nesting of rules is realised in both frameworks, create roles and specify the
methods2 that are used to govern the resource-allocation process in an open system. We
then instantiate a formal model of the open system as a basis for the computer model
and present the formalism we use for expressing the institution. Finally, we formally
axiomatise the first six principles using the chosen formalism.
After positively answering the second question, the following question remains:
Q3
Is it possible to use the formal axiomatisation to specify and implement
a testbed that ascertains the sufficiency of these principles for enduring
open systems?
Chapter 4 addresses the steps of principled operationalisation and controlled experi-
mentation of the SIC methodology. For the principled operationalisation, we first specify
the testbed using a time-driven simulation platform. We then introduce the classes that
define the different roles, the institution and the environment, and the control loop that
defines what rules are applied when and in what order. We explain in detail what ac-
tions the agents perform occupying a specific role, and the individual agent behaviour,
including components that allow each agent to deviate from the prescribed behaviour.
For example, the agents can decide not to comply with the rules regulating the appro-
priation of resources and also change this behaviour in subsequent steps.
For the step of controlled experimentation, we describe the parameters that we ma-
nipulate. These include parameters that influence the environment, e.g. the resource
replenishment or factors that lead to unforeseen errors upon resource appropriation,
and the agent population. Further parameters specify what principles are used during
experimentation to find out what set of principles is sufficient in what environmental cir-
cumstances. To this end, we analyse three categories of experiments. The first one uses
the first three principles on a compliant agent population and shows the manageability
of resource allocation in open systems. The second one uses the next three principles on
a noncompliant agent population and where unintentional appropriation errors occur,
in order to show the protectability of the resource. For the third category, we use two
sets of experiments to test the effect of changing the parameters of a single principle
on a compliant and a noncompliant agent population. These experiments show from an
objective perspective that it is important to implement the principles with respect to
the prevailing environment.
2A method is a group of rules that address a specific issue, such as conflict resolution or access control.
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After evaluating the results we can positively answer the third question, but the results
also raise another one:
Q4 Can we equip the agents with mechanisms to evaluate the self-organisation?
Chapter 5 tries to answer this fourth question. To do this, we re-evaluate and extend
the preformal theory, formalism and computer model by performing a second iteration of
the SIC methodology where we complement Ostrom’s theory with subjective mechanisms
of evaluating the institution, system and agent behaviour.
The preformal theory we used for self-organising resource allocation in open systems
are Ostrom’s design principles for sustainable resource management. These principles
express the explicit requirements on an institution for self-governance, i.e. the rules.
However, there is an implicit expectation on the behaviour of human actors that is not
mentioned explicitly.
This expectation is that the actors reason about the individual, sociological or organ-
isational context they are in and use this perception in their internal decision-making
process. The degree to what such a perception is accurate influences the behaviour of
the actor itself and its judgement of other actors’ behaviour, which in turn depends on
the norms that an actor perceives to be the standard. In short, the explicit requirements
lead to long-enduring CPR management, based on the assumption that human actors
create rules of the institution based on (to them) satisfying and fair procedures.
For agents in open systems however, the implicit assumptions have to be made explicit.
As there is no human intervention at runtime, it is necessary that the agents are able to
reason about the environment and consequences of their own and other agents’ actions.
We therefore endow them with the capability of exhibiting (self-)awareness. We will
explain several levels of awareness that are used by humans and relate to equivalent
mechanisms used in artificial societies.
On the example of organisational fairness, we test the impact of self-awareness by using
an agent that judges other agents’ behaviour in relation to its internalised norm. This
category of fairness influences the motivation for compliance with the rules, and the effi-
ciency and satisfaction within an organisation [32]. In open systems, the functionality of
measuring fairness from within the system (using the agents’ perspective) is particularly
important, as it is meaningless for a system’s operation to objectively measure fairness
from an external perspective.
We complement the formal characterisation from Chapter 3 with the two remaining
design principles. These principles give the agents an opportunity to apply their self-
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aware capabilities by seeking alternatives to current allocation procedures, should they
perceive them as unfair. The following question arises:
Q5 Does a qualitative evaluation of processes enable the agents to makemore informed choices with respect to self-organisation?
Chapter 6 contains the second round of principled operationalisation and controlled
experimentation. The agent model is extended with the capability of self-aware fairness
evaluation, and the functionality for this method is integrated into the corresponding
agent class. The control loop of the resource allocation process is extended with rules
that initiate the fairness evaluation process and rules for actions that the agents are
permitted to take in response to that evaluation.
Again, we define several parameters for experimentation that specify the principles
present in the institution, particular agent behaviour and the resource replenishment
of the environment. Furthermore, we introduce five measurements for evaluating the
data obtained from experimentation. We experiment with different parameter modula-
tions on the last two principles, and identify several factors that positively or negatively
influence the satisfaction of the agent population. The results suggest that the subjective
evaluation mechanism works well and we can positively answer the fifth question.
Chapter 7 summarises this work by drawing conclusions from the testbed and its
extension. With these findings, we argue that the choice of parameters has to be made
available to the agents themselves. We then recapitulate the answers to the five questions
asked in previous chapters. Afterwards, we present several limitations of the testbed and
the design decisions that were made when applying the methodology of sociologically-
inspired computing. We conclude this work with suggesting several lines of research,
such as assisted resource allocation or alternative methods for fairness evaluation.
We have presented several parts of this work in previous publications. In a journal
paper called “Axiomatization of Socio-Economic Principles for Self-Organizing Institu-
tions: Concepts, Experiments and Challenges”, we address the problem of engineering
electronic institutions that can self-organise the resource allocation process in open sys-
tems. The concepts we mention in this paper are revisited and elaborated in Chapters 2,
3 and 4. From a further publication, called “A tripartite analytic framework for char-
acterising awareness and self-awareness in autonomic systems research”, we adopt parts
of Chapter 5 on self-awareness in open systems.
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1.4. Contributions
The contributions of this work are threefold. It contains the first formal characterisation
of Ostrom’s design principles for creating institutions for resource management in a
rule management system. The second contribution is the design and implementation of
a large-scale, reusable experimental testbed, where we transform design principles into
policies or procedures that can be directly executed. And thirdly, two sets of experiments
have been made with this testbed. The first set of experiments shows that Ostrom’s
principles are sufficient conditions for creating electronic institutions for self-organising
and enduring resource management. The second set shows that these principles can
be complemented by heuristic fairness theory for optimising individual and collective
performance, which provides the means for the system to operate in the best interest of
its components given only their subjective opinions and interactions with which to work.
In total, this thesis shows how theories of collective action can be formalised and lever-
aged for engineering solutions to resource-allocation problems that are frequently en-
countered in the deployment of open systems and networks.
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2.1. Introduction
In this chapter we discuss types of open systems that are subject to the problem of
resource allocation, such as wireless sensor networks, vehicular ad hoc networks, virtual
organisations, or systems for demand-side infrastructure management. The nature of
the resource in each of these systems is different, and there are different ways that a
resource can be replenished and different ways to manage its distribution. We will discuss
exogenous and endogenous resource replenishment as well as a hybrid approach, and how
resources are commonly managed in human societies, either top–down or bottom–up.
We elaborate on a specific example of bottom-up approaches, the evolution of institutions
for common-pool resource management. This example is chosen to manage resources in
the types of systems considered in this work. Lastly, we address related concepts from
the literature for dealing with resource-allocation problems, such as computational social
choice, including examples on voting and fair division, and a game-theoretic approach.
Sections 2.4.1 and 2.6 are based on our work presented in [93].
2.2. Features of open systems
Open systems are a conglomeration of autonomous components that interact with them-
selves and the environment in order to achieve individual and common goals. These
systems offer substantive advantages over centralised or closed solutions with respect to
scale, opportunity and generativity. The success of open systems is based on the as-
sumption that the components cooperate and coordinate their behaviour. As we stated
previously in [93], this makes the system tolerant to heterogeneity, resource conflicts and
unforeseen events.
Applications of open systems include swarm robotics, cloud computing, infrastructure
management, and so on. In all these applications, the components have to share infor-
mation and resources to achieve their goals, though complete information is not usually
available. Reasons for that are manifold: the heterogeneity of the components and their
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unknown provenances; the mutable and unpredictable environment that the system is
embedded in; and the involved numbers of components that can lead to reasoning with
only partial information, depending on the components’ configuration.
Typically, the decision-making processes in those applications are far too fast and too
frequent for manual operator intervention. This means the system has to operate au-
tonomously, i.e. it needs a mechanism to coordinate individual behaviour without an
external decision-making authority.
Without uniform goals, no common knowledge and no central controller, the decisions
that the components are taking individually are subject to uncertainty, and conflicting
opinions and requirements. This is complicated by the fact that the systems have to
operate even in conditions when resources get scarce and the components have to priori-
tise individual and common goals. In some cases, a complete depletion of the resource,
such as battery power or server space, is the most undesirable outcome and can lead to
a collapse of the open system as a whole.
Further problems arise when the assumption of cooperation is void, and the compo-
nents exhibit selfish behaviour and deliberately disrupt the system to achieve conflicting
goals. Therefore, the system must be able to operate under conditions of intentional and
unintentional error, in order to recover from suboptimal states.
The components of an open system are also referred to as agents. Artikis et al. [12] name
three characteristics that allow us to consider a (multi-agent) system as open, if present.
Firstly, the internal architecture of the agents in the system is not publicly known;
secondly, there is not necessarily a global utility function that is shared by the agents;
and thirdly, the agents’ behaviour and interactions cannot be predicted in advance. Or
as Hewitt [55] states it, open systems are “always subject to unanticipated outcomes in
their operation”.
2.3. Examples of open systems
Our main concern with open systems is how open systems handle sharing resources.
In the following we name a few applications where components (possibly developed
by different parties) or agents form opportunistic alliances and depend on pooling and
sharing resources.
Wireless sensor networks A wireless sensor network (WSN) consists of a collection
of typically resource constrained sensor nodes that are distributed in the environment.
Their purpose is to sense events like temperature, speed or particle density. They process
this information via the (ad hoc) network [33], for example for data collection purposes or
28
2.3. Examples of open systems
to autonomously perform actions, such as intervention in a production line. The specifi-
cations of how to process the sensed information depends on the use case. Sensors can be
mobile or stationary, alert or sleeping, and the node hierarchy can be pre-determined or
revised constantly. An example of resources in sensor networks is the electricity needed
for (multi-hop) communication or data processing.
Vehicular ad hoc networks Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANets) support traffic man-
agement, passenger safety and driver assistance. Therefore, sensors are installed into
vehicles, form ad hoc networks with vehicles in the vicinity, and then communicate with
either road side units or other vehicle clouds. The sensors process and exchange infor-
mation about the environment, and alert the driver about any unexpected changes. This
could be a traffic jam, an accident behind a curve or a dangerously overtaking vehicle.
VANets are different from most wireless sensor networks in that their connectivity is
sporadic and the contact time between vehicles is relatively short [96]. Energy in this
case is not a resource that is likely to be constrained, rather the volume of shared data
and its correctness.
Virtual organisations Virtual organisations (VO) allow companies to decentralise the
management of projects and companies and to pursue “problem solving based on col-
laboration in computation- and data-rich environments” [46]. Multiple disciplines can
collaborate and share their knowledge and facilities, such as databases, software and
computing power. VOs can be set up very quickly and tailored to specific tasks. The
decentralisation allows employees to work from any location at any time and across
boundaries of various physical or virtual institutions. As projects involve more and
more people, a decentralised management maintains scalability and mobility. VOs can
be formed to support cloud computing for enterprises where “dynamically scalable and
often virtualized resources are provided as a service over the Internet” [18]. These
resources can be combined with ‘real’ resources such as time (especially for real-time
services), computing power, electricity, and so on.
Demand-side infrastructure management As the world’s population is growing fast
and gravitating towards cities, maintaining the reliability of infrastructure such as trans-
port, water and electricity, is a key concern. In [113], the benefits and challenges of
demand-side management of an electricity system are evaluated in order to balance gen-
eration and need. Suggestions for distributed and reactive mechanisms to protect critical
infrastructure are presented in [56].
Several examples in the literature investigate these types of open systems from a multi-
agent perspective. Vinyals et al. [118] survey multiple contributions and identify several
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challenges that agent technologies bring to the sensor network domain. A framework for
Virtual Organisations that are managed by intelligent agents can be found in [77], an
agents approach to managing building energy systems is described in [126].
2.4. Different types of resource replenishment
In the above examples, the resources are of different nature and their availability is cou-
pled with the type of replenishment. We will firstly discuss resource allocation methods
used for exogenous replenishment, where the resource is provided by the environment
and the agents have no control over this process. Then, we present problems that oc-
cur with endogenous replenishment, where the agents themselves have to provide the
resource by pooling individual contributions. The third part is a hybrid approach where
both exogenous and endogenous replenishments are used. All resources are implied to
be divisible goods.
2.4.1. Exogenous replenishment
An example where a system relies on external events for resource replenishment is an irri-
gation system. Individuals have no control over rainfall or melt water to refill reservoirs,
but have to deal with the state of the environment at hand.
To formulate the resource that an agent can be allocated at any time, we define a resource
allocation system (following our previous work [93]) as
〈A, P,m〉t
where at time t ∈ N (and we regard time as rounds or slices1) At is the set of agents that
would like to appropriate the resource and Pt ∈ R+ is the pooled resource itself, e.g. for
water this would be the reservoir containing a possible refill and any remaining resource
from t− 1. With mt we denote the operation of performing the resource allocation, that
is mt : At → Pt. Each agent a ∈ At is allocated a certain fraction of the resource Pt,
with the constraint that all agents together cannot be allocated more than the pooled
resource itself minus some critical threshold D ∈ R+:∑
a∈At
mt(a) 6 Pt −D
The function mt can be defined in various ways, for example the agents ai (with i ∈
1These might accidentally be called ‘steps’ from time to slice.
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{1, . . . , |At|}) can form a queue a1 − a2 − . . .− a|At| and allocate the resource in a first-
come-first-serve manner. This happens until there is no more resource left and the agents
remaining in the queue get nothing. The utility uai that any one agent gains from its
allocation at time t depends on the actual appropriation rai(t) it makes (in an optimal
situation2 we have mt(ai) = rai(t)):
uai(t) =
{
rai(t), if
∑i
j=1 raj (t) 6 Pt
0, otherwise.
However, if Pt −∑a∈At ra(t) < D, we consider the resource as depleted and no further
appropriations are possible at a later time. This happens for example in water reservoirs
near the coast, where salt water flows in and ruins the fresh water supply, should the
resource level fall below the critical threshold D.
Typically, an agent wants to maximise the sum of individual utilities3 over a specific time
frame [S, T ], i.e. Uai ([S, T ]) = max
∑T
t=S uai (t). Let T = S, then the time frame is one
time slice and the maximum that the first agent in the queue a1 can appropriate is PS .
For T = S + 1, the maximum amounts to Ua1 ([S, S + 1]) = max (PS , PS+1 + PS −D).
Given that at time S the replenishment for S + 1 is unknown as well as what other
agents appropriate further down the queue, a rational agent will choose to appropriate
the full amount PS straight away (unless there are no other agents).
This example is maximising the utility for only one agent and two time slices. Given
that all agents try to do the same and not all agents’ utilities can be maximised simul-
taneously, this is a classic tragedy of the commons as described by Hardin in [52].
We can see, with the time frame [S, T ] becoming longer, the agents’ rational behaviour
inevitably leads to the depletion of the pooled resource, as the constraints on P have to
hold throughout:
Uai ([S, T ]) = max
T∑
t=S
uai (t) ,
where ∀t ∈ [S, T − 1] :
∑
a∈At
ra(t) 6 Pt −D and
∑
a∈AT
ra(T ) 6 PT
For a sustainable resource and enduring system operation, a resource-allocation method
that respects these constraints has to be defined (and enforced) so that allocations and
appropriations coincide, i.e. mt(ai) = rai(t) for all i at any time t. This means that the
2In this situations the agents follow the allocation when appropriating the resource.
3Here, maximising the utility is equal to maximising the appropriated resource, but this only holds as
long as too much resource is not a disadvantage.
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agents gain less utility than possible in each time slice, which “may be suboptimal in
the short run but prove wiser in the long run” [87].
There are various other methods to determine an appropriate allocation mt. The effect
of different allocation methods in divisible-good auctions is examined in [65], and a
cake-cutting algorithm to allocate each agent to equal satisfaction is described in [23].
2.4.2. Endogenous replenishment
Endogenous resource replenishment requires individual agents to contribute their own
resources to the system, as is the case in ad hoc networks, for example. The contributed
resource serves all agents to achieve their goals, for example multi-hop messaging.
Again, we consider the resource allocation system 〈A, P,m〉t.
This time, the allocation function mt has to take into account the individual agent
contributions ca(t) (assuming there is no remaining resource from the last time slice):∑
a∈At
mt(a) 6
∑
a∈At
ca(t)
In this type of scenario, the pooled resource is usually distributed equally amongst the
members and a resource coming from the pool is more valuable than the same amount of
resource held individually. Imagine an ad hoc network where no agent agrees to transmit
any data and keeps all energy to itself, then the whole system collapses.
We set the resource that each agent a is able to contribute to a maximum of 1, i.e. it
will decide to contribute any amount ca(t) ∈ [0, 1]. For agent ai (where i ∈ {1, . . . , |At|})
this results in a utility following the classic linear public good game (further properties
of this game can be found in [16], for example):
uai(t) =
α
|At|
∑
a∈At
ca(t) + β (1− cai (t))
where α > β and α|At| < β
The utility is a fraction of the pooled resource times its value giving variable α, and the
value that is gained from withholding the resource (1− cai (t)) is denoted by β.
Let |At| = 2, then the utility agent a1 can achieve by contributing fully if agent a2 does
so as well is ua1 = α2 · 2, but only ua1 = α2 if agent a2 contributes nothing. Given that
the contribution of agent a2 is unknown to agent a1 at time t, a1 will rationally choose
to not contribute anything, resulting in ua1 = β, which is more than α2 , but less than α.
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This is yet another tragedy caused by rationally behaving agents. The linear public good
game can be summarised in two conflicting strategies:
◦ The strategy according to the Nash equilibrium is for all agents to fully free ride,
i.e. not to provide any resource to the common pool. This leads to the highest
individual utility which is independent of other agents.
◦ The Pareto efficient strategy is for all agents to contribute their entire available
resources to the pool, i.e. not to withhold anything. This leads to a utility that is
higher than for the Nash equilibrium but depends on the cooperation of all other
agents to achieve its maximum.
Though these strategies apply to rational agents, several studies have shown that humans
deviate from that behaviour and tend to contribute some percentage of their resource
instead of either all or nothing. One reason for that are the variables α and β that are
usually not set globally, but are specific to the individual. This effect has been studied
extensively in economic sciences (as presented in [125], for example) and policies for mt
have been designed to enhance contributions (refer to [47] or [114], for example).
2.4.3. Hybrid replenishment
Hybrid replenishment occurs when there exist both exogenous and endogenous replenish-
ment mechanisms. Most demand-side infrastructure management falls into this category
such as smart grids. These are future energy grids where not only power plants provide
energy (externally to the demand-side) but also individuals at the demand-side, such as
households, can feed energy that they produce locally into the grid.
These systems rely on both sources of replenishment to balance the fact that one of the
replenishment methods can be unreliable, such as (endogenously produced) solar power,
and resource has to be taken on from elsewhere. The fact that external resources are
not needed at all times leads to utility fluctuations on both sides that have to be taken
into account.
2.5. Common-pool resource management
The types of open systems considered in this work operate roughly as follows. Firstly,
agents form an opportunistic alliance; secondly, they decide on a policy that defines
how to distribute the resources from the common pool; and thirdly, they execute the
resource allocation for as often as possible or needed. The agents’ focus is to maximise
their individual utility over the entire time frame, which means that a suitable policy
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has to be found that enforces compliance with the rules so that the agents do not deplete
the resource at an early stage.
2.5.1. Top–down (closed)
Traditional approaches to manage a common-pool resource (CPR) in human societies
include privatisation and state control, as they can create incentives for maintaining a
resource which is otherwise used inefficiently [109].
There are arguments to support the choice of state control over commons, such as
Hardin’s rather gloomy paper about the tragedy of the commons. According to him,
“Individuals locked into the logic of the commons are free only to bring on universal
ruin;” and he argues further that “As the human population has increased, the com-
mons has had to be abandoned in one aspect after another.” [52, p. 1248]. Sinn, on
the other hand, argues for privatisation and states that “under well-defined property
rights and correct price expectations, a competitive extraction industry brings about a
Pareto-optimal depletion path, and it has been shown that oligopolistic and monopolistic
market structures may even produce a bias towards conservation.” [109, p. 235].
2.5.2. Bottom–up (open)
Although often claimed, state control and privatisation are not the only way to suc-
cessfully manage a CPR. Weitzman shows that there is a limitation to the mentioned
inefficiency and that “The variable factor will always be better off with (inefficient) free
access rights than under (efficient) private ownership of property.” [119, p. 225]4.
In order to avoid the tragedy of the commons and ensure a sustainable resource, the
agents that appropriate the resource need to get organised, especially when the resource
gets scarce. They need to define policies for drawing resources and enforce compliance
with these regulations. Typically the appropriators will set up an institution that encap-
sulates all these rules and policies, and promotes cooperation. It is then possible that
“the private objective of those with bargaining strength to alter institutions produce in-
stitutional solutions that turn out to be or evolve into socially efficient [institutions]” [83,
p. 16].
There are a number of examples where the self-organisation of managing a common-pool
resource with institutions is very successful as shown by a large variety of examples in
Ostrom [85].
4The variable factor can be, for example, the labour needed for the appropriation, so it directly feeds
into the utility.
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2.5.3. Sustainability issue
One of the main concerns in open systems is that of sustainability. It appears to be very
hard to create enough incentive to sustain a resource over a long period if no entity can
be held accountable for it. This is especially the case if the short-term benefit is nega-
tive, as it is for measures reducing our carbon footprint, for example. Institutions can
create incentives to meet such a sustainability agenda through premiums or sanctioning
mechanisms in the short run, and through the compliance with rules and the evolution
of appropriate norms in the long run.
2.6. Institutions for CPR management
“Wealth that is free for all is valued by none because he who is foolhardy enough to wait
for its proper time of use will only find that it has been taken by another.” [50]
This quote by Gordon summarises the dilemma outlined in Section 2.4.1. It reflects
a short-sighted behaviour which has to be avoided for the benefit of the resource and
future appropriations. As mentioned in the last section, people introduce institutions in
order to regulate appropriation procedures and to reduce the uncertainty within these
interactions [83].
2.6.1. Institutions
Elinor Ostrom conducted a substantial amount of research in self-governance of common
pool resources [85]. She investigated different types of CPR management all over the
world, from communal tenure in Swiss high mountain meadows over irrigation commu-
nities in the Philippines to Turkish inshore fisheries. For each case she analysed the
strengths and weaknesses of the institutions that had evolved and what policies in par-
ticular caused either failure or success in managing the resource. She then published
a catalogue of eight principles that, considered when formulating allocation policies,
ensure the longevity of the common pool.
Due to multiple definitions and meanings of the term ‘institution’, we will follow the
line of Elinor Ostrom who uses the concept of rules as a referent for the term. By rules
she refers to “prescriptions commonly known and used by a set of participants to order
repetitive, interdependent relationships” [84, p. 5]. Prescriptions specify what actions
are required, prohibited or permitted. According to Ostrom, there are four steps to
achieve predictability and order in a defined situation using rules. Firstly, by creating
roles; secondly, by defining how agents take on or step down from these roles; thirdly,
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by defining prescriptions for each particular role; and fourthly, by stating what outcome
an agent is required, permitted or forbidden to affect. Another important aspect of
prescriptions is that all participants are assumed to know the rules and can be held
accountable when violating them.
In general linguistic use, the term institution often also refers to the organisation (e.g.
of academic or social nature) that uses a specific rule set defining interactions within
the organisational context. We will make this distinction apparent when it is important
for the context, i.e. refer to an organisation (or alike) whenever we mean the group of
people, agents, etc., and not the rules.
2.6.2. Rules
Institutions must be designed to allow for adaptation because some current
understanding is likely to be wrong, the required scale of organization can
shift, and biophysical and social systems change. Fixed rules are likely to fail
because they place too much confidence in the current state of knowledge,
while systems that guard against the low probability, high consequence pos-
sibilities and allow for change may be suboptimal in the short run but prove
wiser in the long run.
Ostrom and Hess [87, p. 68]
Rules specify sets of actions an agent can choose from, which means they jointly affect the
structure of a particular situation rather than the behaviour of agents directly [84]. As
the quote implies, there need to be multiple levels to analyse and change how rules affect
different behavioural aspects. In [85], Ostrom suggests three levels of analysis, according
to three levels of rules, that are nested within each other, as shown in Figure 2.1:
◦ The first level concerns the operation. Actions based on operational choice have a
direct impact on the physical world and include actions such as appropriation or
provision of resources that are chosen from the operational rules.
◦ The second level of analysis concerns collective choice. Participants make poli-
cies and management decisions, and they adapt operational rules using collective
choice. Examples for operational rules they change are including/excluding par-
ticipants, strategies for appropriation, monitoring and sanctioning. How the par-
ticipants’ preferences are aggregated, is defined by collective-choice rules, such as
majority or unanimity [86].
◦ The third level concerns the constitution. On this level is decided who is eligible
and what rules are to be used for making collective choices. The constitutional
rules define how and what constitutional choices can be made.
36
2.6. Institutions for CPR management
Ru
le
s
An
al
ys
is
limitlimitlimit defines defines
Collective-Choice
Rules
Constitutional
Rules
Operational
Rules
Constitutional
Choice
Collective
Choice
Operational
Choice
Figure 2.1.: Dependencies of rules and levels of analysis
At any of these three levels of analysis, the rules specified by a higher level are assumed
to be fixed during the time of decision making. Typically, operational choices are made
routinely, whereas choices at higher levels take more effort and can be costly, hence rules
are changed less frequently. The nesting of the rules leads to more stable strategies and
more reliable expectations on the behaviour of participants.
2.6.3. Principles
For the successful management of a common-pool resource, appropriate rules have to
be chosen for each of the three above mentioned levels. Ostrom mentions eight socio-
economic principles that represent design guide lines for setting up an institution for
CPR management [85, p. 90], as summarised in Table 2.1.
Principle P1 defines the boundaries of the CPR, meaning how many households or
individuals are authorised to withdraw from the resource, including closing the resource
from unauthorised access. This solves the issue of ‘overcrowding’, one of the tragedies
that commons involve according to Hardin [52].
Principle P2 defines rules on the appropriation that put restrictions on time, place, tech-
nology and quantity. The rules have to be in line with the prevailing local environment
and include additional aspects on provisions such as labour, material, etc.
Principle P3 concerns the level of collective choice and states that the individuals which
are affected by the operational rules should also have the rights to participate in the
modification of these rules. This is a very important principle, as the local appropriators
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Table 2.1.: Design principles for managing CPR institutions
P1 Clearly defined boundaries
P2 Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions
P3 Collective-choice arrangements
P4 Monitoring
P5 Graduated sanctions
P6 Conflict-resolution mechanisms
P7 Minimal recognition of rights to organise
P8 Nested enterprises
have usually much better knowledge about the condition of the resource and prevailing
environment than external entities.
Principle P4 is about monitoring the conditions of the CPR and appropriator behaviour.
This can be done by the appropriators themselves or by appointed agencies. The costs
for monitoring can be paid by provisions mentioned in P2 and depends on the set of
rules that is adopted in the institution, but is typically low for long-enduring CPRs.
Principle P5 concerns the sanctioning methods of the institution. Upon violation of a
rule, a participant will become subject to graduated sanctions, depending on the severity
and frequency of the violation. The presence of this principle leads to ‘quasi-voluntary
compliance’ for the participants.
Principle P6 states that participants (and appointed agencies) need a facility for fast
conflict resolution at a low cost. A point of contention can be a wrongful sanction
initiated by the monitoring agency, for example.
Principle P7 protects the stability of the institution and stipulates that the rights to
formulate their own rules has to lie within the appropriators and should not be challenged
by external authorities, such as the government.
Principle P8 applies to CPRs that are part of some larger system and states that ap-
propriate rules have to be established that solve potential conflicts between the different
layers of nested CPRs.
In [84, p. 6], Ostrom writes that “Rules are the means by which we intervene to change
the structure of incentives in situations.” That is an important basis for creating high
compliance with the rules, predictability on the appropriable resource and ultimately
satisfaction for all participants.
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Defining what we mean by ‘institutions’ for CPR management and how to design a
good set of rules that enables the appropriators to successful self-governance is a first
step towards answering Q1 (see page 46).
2.7. Related approaches
In this section, we present related approaches for dealing with the problem of resource
allocation. These are computational social choice, including a selection of research work
on voting and fair division, and game-theoretic problems.
2.7.1. Computational social choice
Computational social choice builds upon two disciplines, computer science and social
choice theory. This leads to interesting interdisciplinary work that can solve problems
arising in both separate fields [28]. Firstly, techniques from artificial intelligence can be
used for solving questions that arise in the domain of social choice; secondly, techniques
from social choice theory can be used for solving questions that arise in the domain of
computer science and AI. Examples include the management of autonomous (software)
agents using voting protocols, or fair division for resource allocation [61]. These typically
consider topics from further areas such as welfare economics, game theory, multi-agent
systems, computational logic and operations research.
A typical problem is to define techniques and models with desirable properties, such
as fairness or optimality, according to some specific definition [60]. These definitions
include the optimisation of utilitarian social welfare (a fairness measure that is most
commonly used for multi-agent systems), envy-freeness or Pareto optimality. Topics of
interest to computational social choice include complex aggregation rules, voting rules
that are robust to manipulation, or resource allocation. Much work has been carried out
to analyse the computational complexity of these techniques [27]. When adapting them
for multi-agent systems there are important aspects to consider. For example, many of
the defined techniques assume that all agents are able and willing to follow the rules, an
assumption that cannot be guaranteed in open systems considered in this work.
2.7.2. Voting mechanisms
Voting mechanisms are one way of making social choices. In general, voting does not
involve any payment, and depending on the mechanism, agents not only express their
preference on a single choice but can also rank their choices in order of preference [31].
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Let there be three alternatives X, Y , Z to choose from, then an agent preferring X over
Y and Y to Z, would vote X  Y  Z5. Aggregating the preferences of several agents
to determine a single winner (e.g. a restaurant to go to, or new head of group) depends
on the chosen voting mechanism.
Five examples of voting mechanisms, instances are presented in [20] or [92], are:
◦ Plurality—Each agent votes for one alternative and the alternative with the most
votes wins.
◦ Runoff—Each agent votes for one alternative in the first round, but the two most
voted alternatives enter a second round (unless one of them has the majority of
votes already). Each agent votes for one of the two alternatives, and the alternative
with the most votes wins.
◦ Borda count—This time, each agent has to rank m alternatives in order of pref-
erence. The alternatives are then assigned Borda points as follows: m for the
alternative ranked first, m − 1 points for the alternative ranked second, and so
on. The Borda points are then aggregated over all agents for each alternative, and
that sum is called Borda score of that alternative. The alternative with the highest
Borda score wins.
◦ Instant runoff—Each agent ranks the alternatives in order of preference. The
weakest alternative (that got top-ranked by the least agents) is eliminated from
the set of alternatives. This mechanism is repeated until one alternative has the
majority of votes.
◦ Approval—Each agent selects a subset of alternatives, and the alternative that is
in these subsets most often wins.
Any voting mechanism for three or more alternatives is either manipulatable or dic-
tatorial6 as argued by [49] and [103]. This means that agents might not reveal their
true preferences, but rank alternatives in such a way that it manipulates the outcome.
Consider for example a plurality voting mechanism (as presented in [20, p. 72]) with the
additional condition that in a tie, the alternative with lexicographic lower order wins.
Assume we have four agents. The first two agents vote Y  Z  X, the third agent
votes X  Y  Z, and the fourth agent’s real preference is Z  X  Y , meaning that
it prefers X over Y . That last agent’s top ranked alternative (Z) is not going to be the
winner. In order to manipulate the outcome, the last agent could state X  Z  Y as
its preference and so make X the winner (which is ranked better than Y ) due to the
existing tie rule.
5We assume a transitive and strict ordering in the preference relation.
6A voting mechanism is called ‘dictatorship for agent a’, if the top ranked alternative of a always wins
and other agents preferences are not taken into account [20].
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Voting mechanisms are examples of social choices without payments. If payments are
involved in the decision-making process, auctions can be used. They typically require
an agent in the role of the auctioneer, a central entity that collects the preferences of
agents in form of bids. A number of protocols that can be used are presented in [27].
For auctions and voting mechanisms in multi-agent systems (as in a social context),
it is important to clearly define the rules of the mechanism, what agents are eligible
to vote, what agents are eligible to count the votes, and what agents are eligible to
declare the winner. To this end, Jones and Sergot [59] logically formalised the concept
of institutionalised power, stating what agent is empowered, permitted or obligated to
perform what action in what role within a defined context.
2.7.3. Fair division
Fair division is another example from the field of social choice and has been of great
interest to economists and mathematicians, as presented in [20] or [95], for example. The
typical problem7 is to “endow individual agents with a suitable set of rules determining
their willingness to accept certain deals such that resulting allocations will satisfy our
fairness or efficiency criterion of choice” [39]. There are divisible and indivisible goods,
in this work we only consider the divisible type. The allocation of indivisible goods can
be solved with techniques from combinatorial optimisation, for example. A divisible
good can be homogenous, when each part is valued equally (e.g. money as in [24]),
or heterogeneous, when different parts can be valued differently (e.g. a cake with two
different flavours or a piece of land with varying vegetation as in [23]).
When dividing goods, we can consider various fair or efficient criteria that are quantifi-
able with a utility function. One such example is the collective utility or social welfare.
Let n be the total number of agents, the utility by agent a on its share ra be ua (ra),
and P be the entirety of goods allocated as r = (r1, . . . rn). Then, possible aggregation
functions include (for further functions refer to [27]):
◦ utilitarian social welfare, the sum of individual utilities:
n∑
a=1
ua (ra)
◦ egalitarian social welfare, which is equal to the lowest utility of any one agent:
min {ua (ra) : a = 1, . . . , n}
7Here we will not consider the ordering of goods, i.e. what good is preferred over another.
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◦ elitist social welfare, which is equal to the highest utility of any one agent:
max {ua (ra) : a = 1, . . . , n}
◦ Nash product, which is the product of the individual agent utilities8:
n∏
a=1
ua (ra)
These functions give information on the distribution of goods (or utility rather), but they
do not give information on whether the distribution is accepted as fair by the individuals.
There are further fairness or efficiency criteria that can be considered for division, for
instance as presented in [20, 23, 39]. Let the notation be the same as above and b an
agent different from a. Then a division is
◦ Pareto optimal (or Pareto efficient), if there is no other division r′ possible so
that at least one agent is more satisfied without dissatisfying any other agents (i.e.
decrease their utility):
@a, r′ : ua
(
r′a
)
> ua (ra) ∧ ub(r′b) > ub (rb) for all b
◦ envy free, if no agent feels that it gets less than any other agent:
ua (ra) > ua (rb) for all a, b
◦ equitable, if an agent’s individual utility is the same as for all other agents:
ua (ra) = ub (rb) for all a, b
◦ proportional, if the utility9 an agent receives is at least the utility of the whole
good divided by the number of agents:
ua (ra) >
1
n
· ua (P ) for all a
The above criteria are of special interest in multi-agent systems and can be used to
define goals of an allocation. Which criterion is used depends on the application itself
and additional criteria might be required.
8For a meaningful interpretation the utilities should be positive.
9Here the utility function has to be monotonic, i.e. for ra 6 r′a ⇒ u (ra) 6 u (r′a).
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Much research on fair division uses the example of cake cutting [23], where the cake
represents a divisible, heterogeneous good to be shared between n agents. A procedure
for two agents cutting a cake works as follows. The first agent cuts the cake into (for
this agent) two parts of equal utility and the second agent chooses its preferred piece.
This procedure is called ‘cut-and-choose’ and results in a Pareto-optimal and envy-free
outcome, equitability cannot be ensured.
For more than two agents, several different procedures have been developed to ensure
either envy-freeness or proportionality. There are further properties of such procedures
that are important for deciding which procedure to use in a specific situation. Examples
are the complexity of the procedure, or whether a procedure can be expressed as an
algorithm with discrete steps. Furthermore, the cake can be divided in contiguous or
discontiguous pieces, the number of cuts can be minimal or at least have an upper bound,
and the procedure may require a ‘referee’. For n = 2 the cut-and-choose procedure is
simple and ideal with respect to these properties [39].
We now present a few procedures of fair division for more than two agents (n > 2), see
also [25]. Proportional procedures include:
◦ Banach-Knaster last-diminisher procedure—The first agent a cuts off a piece of
cake (representing 1n · ua (P )), then that piece is offered to each agent in turn. If
the piece is considered too small by an agent b, this agent passes the piece on.
Otherwise b trims the piece down to 1n ·ub (P ). In case the piece gets back to agent
a, this agent has to take the piece. The remaining n − 1 agents then divide the
leftover cake (including trimming) following the same steps.
This procedure guarantees a proportional but not an envy-free outcome. There
is no external referee needed and the number of cuts required for full division is
bounded by 2(n− 1). If the agents merely indicate the cut they are going to take,
contiguous shares are possible.
◦ Dubins-Spanier procedure—This procedure requires a referee that moves a knife
from left to right over the cake. At any time, an agent can indicate that it wants
a cut to be made, and this agent takes the piece of cake to the left of the knife.
The remaining n − 1 agents continue with that procedure until there is only one
agent left which takes the leftovers.
This procedure is also called ‘moving-knife procedure’ and guarantees a propor-
tional but not envy-free outcome, using the minimal number of cuts (n− 1). It is
not possible to construct a realistic algorithm for this procedure, but with a smooth
utility function, good approximations on a discretely moving knife are possible.
Envy-free procedures are more difficult to achieve than the above mentioned proportional
procedures. As agent a cannot influence the share of other agents once a was allocated,
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and agent a is uncertain about other agent’s utility functions, it is possible that a
subsequent agent receives a piece of cake that a would prefer to its own.
Here are two examples of envy-free procedures with n > 2:
◦ Selfridge-Conway procedure—Consider three agents a, b and c. Agent a divides the
cake into three (in a’s measure) equal pieces. Two cases follow from this. Firstly,
if b thinks that two pieces are tied for largest, the agents pick a piece in order c,
b, a, and the procedure finishes. Secondly, if b thinks one piece is larger the two
others, b can trim that piece to obtain two pieces that tie for largest. Again, the
agents pick a piece (not the trimmings) in order c, b, a, where b is required to take
the trimmed piece if c did not take it. Then, the agent that took the untrimmed
piece (b or c) cuts the trimmings into three (in that agent’s measure) equal pieces,
and the agents choose in order non-cutting agent, agent a, cutting agent.
This procedure guarantees an envy-free and also proportional outcome. The num-
ber of cuts needed is at most 5, but the pieces can be discontiguous.
◦ ‘Brams-Taylor procedure’10—Consider four agents a, b, c, d. Agent a cuts the
cake into four pieces, cuts are always assumed to be equal in the cutting agent’s
measure. This agent then distributes the pieces unless an agent objects. Assume
agent b objects, then a and b follow a well-defined process to create six sets of cake
that are used for a 4-person cut-and-choose sequence. This sequence is repeated
until agent b has advantage over agent a, so b does not envy a. This whole procedure
is then repeated at most once for each pair of agents, which can be done in a finite
amount of steps. “The extension to arbitrary n is fairly straightforward and left
to the reader” [25, p. 15].
The above description is merely an outline of the algorithm that is required for
achieving an envy-free division, but we can see that it quickly becomes very com-
plex for higher values of n.
There are several procedures of fair division that can minimise envy, either with respect
to envy between pairs of agents, with respect to the accumulated envy of an agent, and
so on, as argued in [39].
In this work, the allocation procedure of the ‘cake’ is slightly different from the assump-
tions made above, and the ‘game’ is played over multiple rounds. There can be unwanted
resources in a round (therefore no envy), and a fair division in every single round is not
necessary, a fair allocation over a certain period of time will be sufficient. Still, for
the case when the resource is sparse (i.e. not all agents can be allocated the amount
of resource they request), such game-theoretic procedures can be taken into account.
10In their paper, Brams and Taylor call this procedure ‘Envy-Free Protocol for Arbitrary n’.
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However, the computational complexity for a 100 agent11 envy-free division would be
impractical for the amount of intended repeats.
2.7.4. Game-theoretic example
The closest way we found to address the problem of resource allocation in this work
from a game-theoretical perspective is to use a proportional allocation mechanism. This
mechanism assumes complete knowledge and centralised decision making, and can be
formalised as follows (refer to [58] for details):
maximise
∑
a
ua(ra)
subject to
∑
a
ra 6 P
ra > 0, a ∈ S ⊂ A
where ua(ra) is the utility12 of agent a from the subset of agents S that were allocated
an amount ra. The sum of utilities is to be maximised, under the condition that the sum
of allocations has to be below the total resource level P , similarly to the formulation of
utility in Section 2.4.1 for exogenous resource allocation.
Depending on the individual utility, an agent makes a bid for an amount of resource
(resource units are equally priced). We consider the case when an agent anticipates the
influence of their bids and adjusts the bid accordingly. There exists a Nash equilibrium
where the distributer allocates as much resource as possible whilst maximising all agents
utility, more details can be found in [58]. We can then compare the outcome of the
equilibrium to the theoretical optimum and find that the price of anarchy13 is tightly
bound to 3/4. We can interpret this result as investing 1/4 of the optimal utility for
finding an agreement that does not deplete the common pool.
If we do not impose any restrictions on the mechanisms (i.e. there is complete information
and no rule violation), the price of anarchy can take values closer to 1, as stated in [100].
This assumption, however, cannot be made in the scope of this thesis, therefore this
game-theoretic approach cannot be used. Furthermore, in the above game the allocated
resource is considered to be the appropriated resource. Cheating agents are not taken
into account, which further restricts the applicability of the game. The institutional
approach has measures in place that defend the pool against illicit appropriation and we
11That is the amount we use for simulation, see Chapters 4 and 6.
12This function is concave, strictly increasing, continuous and differentiable.
13The price of anarchy here is defined as the worst game-theoretic outcome divided by the optimal
outcome, in some literature the definition is the inverse.
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will see later that we can achieve a lower price of anarchy (i.e. higher efficiency) for the
system operation.
2.8. Summary and Problem Specification
In this chapter, we presented different types of open systems and different types of
resource replenishment. We discussed how the problem of resource allocation is managed
in human societies and presented an approach that we will adapt for use in open systems
considered in this work. This approach is about the evolution of institutions for CPR
management and characterised by a collection of rules, created by the appropriating
parties of a resource, that operate on three different levels and follow eight principles for
the design of those rules.
We then presented approaches from the literature that can be used to manage resource
allocation in open systems. These are computational social choice and game theory. We
argue that, for the type of systems considered in this work, envy-free fair division is
not applicable due to the high complexity of the division procedures, and the presented
game is not applicable due to the requirement of perfect information and fully complying
agents at all times.
The subject matter of this thesis is exogenous resource replenishment where the common
pool is refilled by the environment and not the agents themselves. We consider the case
where no human intervention in the allocation process is required and the system acts
fully autonomously.
This leads us to our first research question:
Q1 Can the problem of resource allocation in open systems be addressedby modelling an institution for self-governance?
We will examine the effect that the use of institutions in an open management approach
has on the sustainability of the resource, and we develop a testbed for this resource
allocation scenario. Agent based modelling is particularly suitable for simulating social
interactions. To implement the testbed, we use Presage214, which is a time driven
simulation platform based on Java that allows for rapid prototyping of agent societies.
We extend Presage2 with Drools15, a business logic integration platform, to be able to
formalise the institution in a rule based environment.
14Available from http://www.presage2.info, accessed on 30 May 2013.
15Available from http://www.jboss.org/drools/drools-expert.html, accessed on 30 May 2013.
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3.1. Introduction
In this chapter, we firstly describe the methodology of sociologically-inspired computing
that allows us to integrate theories from social science into our computer model of open
systems. Then, we introduce a framework for dynamically changing the specification
of an open system at runtime that uses a multi-level protocol stack. This framework
is then compared to Ostrom’s approach of institutional change using multiple levels of
analysis [85]. We can now carry out the first step of the SIC methodology. To that end,
we discuss what roles, rules and methods can be defined for the implementation of the
open system and show how the rules can be nested within each other. Subsequently, we
instantiate the formal model that is used for management of a common-pool resource in
self-organising open systems and present the simulation platform we choose to implement
this model. We then present Drools Expert [94] that uses a production rule system for
expressing and evaluating rules in the computer model. Finally, we give the formal
axiomatisation of the first six design principles for creating institutions for resource
management, which also answers the question whether it is possible to encode Ostrom’s
design principles using norm-governed systems. Up to Section 3.6, we based most of this
chapter on our work described in [93], the formalisation of principles (from Section 3.8)
is presented with regards to the implementation in Drools.
3.2. Sociologically-inspired computing
Social sciences are a great source of inspiration when trying to solve problems that
apply to open systems. Social systems are often concerned with the emergence and
maintenance of roles, power-relations or institutions, which are issues that have been
studied by the social sciences and formalised into concepts [38]. However, in most cases
it is not possible to directly apply the findings of these sciences to artificial systems.
Therefore, researchers developed methodologies that formalise and adapt these findings
and bring them into appropriate shape for experimentation. One of these methodologies
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for sociologically-inspired computing, that we previously presented in [93], follows the
synthetic method of Steels [111] and will be revisited here.
Steels’ methodology is based on the inductive methods used in most scientific research.
It takes as input observed phenomena (not limited to social sciences) and three types of
theories that result from these observations. The first type is observational theory which
analyses the nature of the observed phenomena and is used for classifying and discovering
patterns. The second type is mechanistic theory which defines the techniques, structures
and processes that cause the observed phenomena. The third type is explanatory theory
which is concerned with the underlying reasons of observed phenomena and what made
them occur in the first place. These theories are engineered into a counterpart to the real
world that allows for customised experimentation. The output of these experiments is
compared with the observed phenomena, and either theory or counterpart revised. These
counterparts can be anything from a mathematical predictor, over computer models to
artificial systems. There needs to be a valid link between the counterpart and the
original context, but the counterpart does not need to have the same functionality in
every aspect1.
Advantages of this method include the systematic exploration of variations that would
not be possible in the original context, such as in evacuation scenarios. In some cases,
the described method can be used to substitute functionality from the original context
should that fail, e.g. in the field of prosthetics. Our aim is to apply such a method to
artificial societies such as open systems, rather than modelling human societies using
real-world data.
There are various methodologies in the literature that resemble the idea of Steels, for
example the Prometheus methodology, a step-by-step guide to assist developers of multi-
agent systems in design, documentation and building phase [88], or the CoSMos pro-
cess [4], which also provides a link from theory to computer model. The Prometheus
methodology is specifically designed for BDI-agents. It evolved out of industrial experi-
ence and encapsulates the necessary details for developing intelligent agent systems, so
that it can be used by non-experts. The CoSMos project looks at the use of simulations
for scientific research and for engineering, especially swarm robotics. Their approach
focuses on agent-based simulations where complex behaviour emerges from interactions
within the environment. They describe three phases that are required for engineering
a simulation platform. These are the discovery phase, the development phase and the
exploration phase. Both methodologies, however, are less general in their use cases than
Steels’ methodology.
In Figure 3.1 we define the process from observed phenomena to observed performance
for our computer model. We start with the observed phenomena, such as a (human) or-
1For example, we don’t attempt to model the full spectrum of human capabilities.
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Figure 3.1.: Sociologically-inspired computing
ganisation or legal system, and the (preformal) theory. Social and other sciences provide
the theory construction typically in natural language, such as the theory of governing
the commons by Ostrom [85]. We need to represent this natural language in some form
of calculus, so that we can attach symbolic meaning to the words that our computer
model can understand and manipulate. This process is called formal characterisation.
Depending on the formalism chosen, we can have more expressive capacity or conceptual
granularity with respect to the theory; or more computational tractability or declara-
tive semantics with respect to the implementation. The following step is to embed
the represented theory into a computational environment. This is the principled opera-
tionalisation and can include the implementation of individual agent behaviour and the
environment. The three steps of formal characterisation, principled operationalisation
and controlled experimentation correspond to the three phases of the CoSMoS process
mentioned earlier. The last step is to conduct the controlled experimentation, in order
to observe the performance of the computer model. This can then be evaluated against
the theory, formalism or computer model and either one can be changed if it turns out
to be inappropriate for answering the questions at hand.
3.3. Dynamic specification of open systems
In this section, we introduce the framework of Artikis [8] that we will use for changing
specifications of open systems at runtime. First, we present the type of agents in open
systems, some alternatives for formalising institutions in open systems and the concept
of institutionalised power. Then, we discuss how to perform a rule-based specification
change using a multi-level protocol stack.
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3.3.1. Agents for open systems
Agents are computational entities that represent a physical object or ideological compo-
nent, such as people, organisations or institutions. The agents have the same (or for the
experimentation essential) functionalities and internal structures, and are bound by the
prevailing laws in their environment. To navigate within the environment and to decide
what actions to perform when, agents are equipped with the ability to sense, interact
with their surroundings and pursue some goal, to different degrees of automation.
Autonomous agents are agents that can dynamically adapt to consequences of their own
actions within the environment. This definition stems from Smithers [110] which we
adopt here. The difference to an automatic system is that “it is not clear, not even to
the original designer, how a system will respond because it has precisely been set up so
that responses evolve and change to cope with novel situations” [111, p. 85]. Accordingly,
autonomous systems cannot be controlled in the same way as automatic ones.
Structural reorganisation is crucial for multi-agent systems in an open and dynamic
environment. The agents have to be able to evaluate and decide on an appropriate
organisational and institutional structure depending on that environment (as argued
by [36] or [72]), hence autonomy is a requirement for agents considered in this work.
3.3.2. Institutions for open systems
There are several approaches to leverage the concept of institutions for use in computer
science. In [41], a (human) institution of a fish market is extended to the notion of
electronic institutions, where autonomous agents interact with each other. These in-
teractions are realised by message interchanges and can modify the commitments or
obligations of participating agents, depending on their role in the institution. They
describe a declarative language, ISLANDER [40], for specifying the components of the
institution: the structure, the scenes2, the rules and the roles. The specified electronic
institution can then be executed with the software platform AMELI [5]. Other lan-
guages that can be used to formalise electronic institutions include LAO (Logic of Agent
Organization) [35] or the Event Calculus [64].
The type of electronic institution considered in this work can change its specification
at runtime. We follow the approach of [8] on dynamic specifications for multi-agent
systems, as explained below.
2For each type of activity that happens in the context of an institution, there is a corresponding scene
where the actions take place.
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3.3.3. Institutionalised power
In order to apply and change the rules in an institutional setting, the agents need to
know to what rules they are allowed to use in what context and what role an agent
should occupy to be eligible to make changes to a specific rule. We can use the concepts
of role, role assignment [102] and institutionalised power to meet these requirements.
Institutionalised power refers to agents being empowered to perform specific actions
in an institutional (or norm-governed) setting depending on the role they occupy and
the environment. This concept is usually combined with the concepts of permissions,
obligations and practical possibilities, these ideas have been explored in [59].
It is therefore necessary to define protocols that deal with role assignment, in order to
appoint a specific agent to a role. If the appointed agent leaves the system, performs
incorrectly or is unable to fulfil the obligations connected to that role, it must be possible
to change which agent occupies that role. To achieve such a change in roles (and rules)
during runtime, we need a dynamic specification of norm-governed systems.
Other approaches to role-based collaboration and coordination in multi-agent systems
are reviewed in [26]. [122] presents a methodology to examine the implications on the
society (macro-level) and the agents (micro-level) of systems with multiple interacting
roles, however, their organisational structure is assumed to be static.
3.3.4. Rule-based specification change
Agents in the type of open systems considered here, are modelled according to charac-
teristics and behaviour that are borrowed from theories in social science, meaning that
in “artificial agent societies, the designers can impose these norms on the agents” [104].
This can be achieved by the use of norms. Following [117], their function is to eliminate
selfish or malicious behaviour without dictating the design or restricting the autonomy
of the individual agents.
Typically this is done by using norms that result in a particular agent behaviour, and
the agents furthermore have to be able to develop new norms. Several implications of
norms for compliant behaviour can be found in [12] or [123].
For simulation, legal, social and organisational systems have frequently been formalised
in terms of norm-governed systems. Artikis developed a dynamic executable specification
for those types of systems in open agent societies, which is used to modify protocols at
runtime [8]. His framework has three components: a norm-governed system specification,
a protocol-stack that defines how to change the specification, and a topological space
that expresses the ‘distance’ (e.g. cost to move) between any two specification instances.
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An advantage of this framework is, that the distinction between physical capability,
institutionalised power and permission is maintained and we can express five social con-
straints with a dynamic specification. These constraints are the physical capabilities, the
institutionalised powers, the agents’ obligations, prohibitions and permissions, sanction
and enforcement policies that deal with violations of required, prohibited or permitted
actions, and the designated roles of empowered agents.
The modification of a specification in this framework is facilitated by a communication
language. In order to modify a protocol at some object level, the agents can initiate
the protocol change from some higher level, the meta protocol. To change this meta
protocol, they can go to the meta-meta level, and so on. The hierarchy of up to k levels
is shown in Figure 3.2, and from some level l, any level that lies below can be changed.
transition protocol:
object protocol rule modification
transition protocol:
meta protocol initialisation
level 2 
protocol
meta-level
protocol
object-level
protocol
level k-1 
protocol
Figure 3.2.: K-level protocol stack for dynamic specifications
The specification points of a protocol that can be changed are the degrees of freedom
of the system, and any one set of specification points is a specification instance. The
rules that define under what circumstances the agents are allowed to initiate a change
on these specification points from some higher level are stated in transition protocols.
These transition protocols also define what roles the agents have to occupy to initiate
the change and what points (or degrees of freedom) can be changed with the execution
of the l-level protocol.
This leads us to our second research question:
Q2 Can Ostrom’s design principles be encoded in norm-governed systems?
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3.4. Relating the work of Ostrom and Artikis
In this section, we describe how institutions for enduring CPR management can be
formalised with the help of a dynamic specification. Figure 3.3 illustrates how we can
relate the concepts of institutional change in human societies to dynamic specifications
in open systems.
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transition protocol
Analysis Stack
Meta-Meta-Level 
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Figure 3.3.: Institutional rules versus dynamic specification
As an example, let us consider the issue of winner determination at the middle level
(operational choice or meta level) for both the institution and the dynamic specification.
Assume that there are several degrees of freedom for a winner determination method,
e.g. majority or Borda count, that define how votes are being aggregated.
Firstly, consider the dynamic specification on the right side and an ‘active’ winner de-
termination method. This method indicates how votes have to be counted should the
decision to change a specification point on the object level be made (by another protocol
in the meta level). In order to change the winner determination method used in the
meta level, a protocol on the meta-meta level has to be initiated. This can be done by
following the rules stated in the corresponding transition protocol.
Then, we consider the winner determination method on the middle level of the institu-
tion, the collective choice. The ‘active’ method itself is stated in the rules, modifications
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to rules on the operational level are carried out by choices on the analysis side that are
bounded by the rule side. Modifications to the winner determination method can be
made by the analysis side on the constitutional level, but whether this can be done is
stated in the corresponding rule side (constitutional).
We can detect three categories of protocols: transition protocols, rule protocols and
protocols that lead to actions. For institutions, the ‘action protocols’ lead to effects
on a lower level or the environment, for dynamic specifications effect is initiated by
‘downwards’ transition protocols.
The main difference between both methods is, that in the institutional case, transition
protocols and rule protocols are gathered on the rule side (the higher level for transition
protocols) and the action protocols represent the analysis side. In the dynamic specifi-
cation space, the rule protocols and action protocols are gathered in the level protocols,
leaving the transition protocol as a protocol to act between the levels.
The good news is that, although there is a slight conceptual difference in the two level
structures, the nesting of the levels has as effect that they will produce the exact same
output. Hence this is a good leap forward in answering Question Q2 .
3.5. Formal characterisation
In this section, we discuss the processes we need for the operation of an open system
for common-pool resource management. Table 3.1 shows at what level of the institution
or dynamic specification these processes take place, the rules needed for these processes
are explained after.
The processes on the institutional side (left) are stated as defined by Ostrom [85, p. 53],
examples of processes on the protocol side are stated as defined by Artikis [8]. The
processes (i.e. the sets of rules) for appropriation, monitoring and enforcement in the
institutional context are used for operating on a daily basis and can be found on the
lowest level. The corresponding level on the protocol stack is the objective level, where we
can define processes for resource allocation or exclusion (for rule enforcement), but also
other methods like monitoring or sanctioning are possible. The next institutional level
contains processes for policy making, adjudication and management, which correspond
to the processes of rule configuration, dispute resolution and role assignment on the
meta-level of the protocol stack. From a computational perspective, governance and
formulation of rules represents a very sophisticated form of reasoning and requires some
form of invention. For this reason, we do not formalise a corresponding process on the
protocol stack. Furthermore, the decisions on an initial set of rules are be made by the
system designer.
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Table 3.1.: Example processes at different levels in institution and dynamic specification
Institutional Levels Protocol Stack
Processes Level Level Processes
Governance
Formulation
Constitutional
Choice
⇔ Meta-Meta-Level
Protocol
Policy Making
Adjudication
Management
Collective
Choice
⇔ Meta-Level
Protocol
Rule Configuration
Dispute Resolution
Role Assignment
Appropriation
Monitoring
Enforcement
Operational
Choice
⇔ Object-Level
Protocol
Access Control
Exclusion
Resource Allocation
In the following, we define the sets of institutional rules that are needed to perform the
resource allocation, and the roles that empower appointed agents to perform specific
actions to change facts in the institution or in the environment.
3.5.1. Roles
According to Ostrom, creating roles is the first step one should take in a situation
using rules, as explained in Section 2.6.1. There are four roles that can be assigned,
namely member, head, monitor and gatekeeper. The role member is the standard role
for an agent and to signal membership to an organisation, in order to take part in a
resource-allocation process. The role gatekeeper controls this membership by assigning
the role of member to agents. The monitor performs the monitoring process and reports
conspicuous behaviour. The head is empowered to revoke the role ofmember, for example
in cases of misbehaviour, and to assign the roles of gatekeeper andmonitor. Furthermore,
the head conducts voting procedures and performs the resource allocation according to
the operational rules, for example. It is possible for an agent to hold more than one role
at a time, for example the head, gatekeeper and monitor will always also be a member
of the same organisation. There is one default agent role that is not assigned, which is
the role of non-member, meaning that this agent does not belong to any organisation.
There are no institutional duties attached to this role, but a non-member can still alter
physical facts of the resource.
The roles of head, gatekeeper and monitor are in charge of ‘defending’ the resource
against illicit access. We contend that the creation of these roles does not contradict the
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openness of the system, as the operation of these roles merely ensures that the principles
for self-organising resource allocation can come into effect. They do not discriminate
against agents that want to join the system as long as the system can ‘afford’ more
members (that comply with the rules) and so ensure the longevity of the system.
3.5.2. Rules and methods
In order to structure the rules used in this work, we define five methods that are invoked
by these rules. In other words, each of these methods represents a subset of rules
that serve a specific purpose. The five methods are acMethod, exMethod, raMethod,
adrMethod and wdMethod.
The first one, acMethod, is the method for access control that defines how the process
of granting access to an organisation is executed. Typically, agents apply for access
to the gatekeeper who determines whether to assign them the role of member or not.
There can be several rules present for access control with a further rule that states
which one to use. Examples for acMethod are ‘attribute based’, where the applicant has
to satisfy some qualification criteria and is automatically admitted, or ‘discretionary’,
where the applicant must satisfy the gatekeeper ’s criteria who is acting on behalf of
the organisation3. This method also includes monitoring of agents that are not granted
access to the organisation.
The second method is exMethod, the exclusion method that is used by the head to revoke
an agent’s membership or to (temporarily) exclude a member from appropriating. Both
exclusions are evoked by rules that regulate monitoring and sanctioning procedures.
These rules specify, for example, how and how often a member is monitored or the
dependency between grade of sanctioning and offence.
Thirdly, the raMethod defines rules for the actual resource allocation. These include
rules about how to partition the resource, for example largest or smallest allocation first,
taking equal rations, form a priority queue, etc. This corresponds to the function mt
from Section 2.4.1.
The adrMethod, alternative dispute resolution method, prescribes how to resolve conflicts
in the organisation. Depending on the nature of the conflict or institutional level where
it occurred, there are different methods in place to give the involved parties the chance
to settle their dispute.
Finally, there is wdMethod, the winner determination method that has to be defined. At
the constitutional level, this method is assumed be fixed, but by constitutional choice,
3A well-known example of organisations that choose discretionary access control as their acMethod are
London’s night clubs.
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the agents can decide to change the wdMethod in the collective-choice rules, that are used
to aggregate votes for collective choices. Examples for different winner determination
methods are plurality, runoff, Borda count, approval voting, etc.
3.5.3. Nesting of rules, roles, methods
The first three methods are part of the operational rules, whereas adrMethod and wd-
Method are part of the operational-choice rules, and wdMethod is also part of the consti-
tutional rules. Figure 3.4 and 3.5 show examples for the nesting of the above mentioned
roles, rules and methods.
votes fixed wdMethod
wdMethodvotes
raMethoddemands
constitutional choice
collective choice
operational choice
head declares
head declares
head performs
constitutional rule
collective-choice rule
operational rule
appropriations
operational choice
agent performs 
common
poolallocations
Figure 3.4.: Nesting of rules for resource allocation
The first example (Figure 3.4) shows some of the rules that influence a resource-allocation
process. At the constitutional level, there is a fixed wdMethod and a set of votes (from
a set of designated agents voting on a method for winner determination). The head
aggregates the votes and declares the winner. This process is an instance of constitutional
choice and alters the wdMethod at the collective-choice level.
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At the collective-choice level, there is the (new) wdMethod and another set of votes (from
a set of designated member agents voting on a method for resource allocation). Again,
the head aggregates the votes and declares the winner, and this collective choice alters
the rule denoting the raMethod at the operational level.
To determine the actual resource allocation at the operational level, the head takes a
set of member demands and applies the (new) raMethod which usually depends on the
available resource in the environment. So far, the rules only altered institutional facts,
but the allocation from this last operational choice empowers the agents to perform the
appropriation of the allocated resource, i.e. the alteration of the actually pooled resource.
votes fixed wdMethod
wdMethodvotes
acMethodapplications
member
constitutional choice
collective choice
operational choice
votes fixed wdMethod
wdMethodvotes
constitutional choice
collective choice
gatekeeper
performs
Figure 3.5.: Nesting of rules for role assignment
The example in Figure 3.5 shows the rule nesting for role assignment. At the constitu-
tional level, the same procedures take place as in the first example. This time, designated
agents decide on two wdMethods to be changed at the collective-choice level, again de-
clared by the head. One of these wdMethods is used to determine the winner of a voting
procedure for the (new) gatekeeper and the other wdMethod is used to determine the
winner of a voting procedure for the (new) acMethod. Both processes take place at the
collective-choice level and both winners, role and rule, are updated at the operational
level. The gatekeeper now performs access control according to the acMethod in place,
and determines for each applying agent that is not a member of the organisation whether
to grant access and assign the role of member or not.
We will show later how the methods presented here can be formalised for use in the
computer model. First we choose an appropriate formalism, as mentioned in Section 3.2.
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3.6. Open systems model
In the next step of the formal characterisation, we will instantiate a formal model for
the management of a common-pool resource. The idea is that the agents will form
into clusters (or organisations) and set up an institution. This institution corresponds
to a specification instance of the dynamic specification for norm-governed systems and
will specify how to manage membership, how to allocate resources, how to enforce the
policies, and so on.
The characterisation for the complete multi-agent system S is defined by
St = 〈A,L, d, E〉t
where at time t ∈ N (which is omitted if clear form context):
◦ A is the set of agents,
◦ L is the set of dynamic norm-governed system specifications, representing a spec-
ification space,
◦ d is the distance function on L,
◦ E is the environment of the system.
The distance that d defines between two specification instances can be regarded as infor-
mation about whether a change from one instance to another is feasible or advisable4.
The environment of the system contains facts about the number and state of common-
pool resources accessible to the agents, and facts about what clusters have formed to
manage these resources. The first category of facts is called brute facts and denotes
physical states, whereas the second category describes the institutional facts that are
conceptual, but not physical facts.
Now let C be a cluster of agents that manage a particular resource. The formal model
for each cluster is:
Ct = 〈M, I, 〉t
where at any time t we have:
◦ M, the set of member agents so thatM⊆ A,
◦ I, the institution as a specific instance I ⊆ L, and
4There might be no or no direct path from one instance to another, or following the direct path might
be too costly to change.
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◦ , the local environment as a set of Bf and If .
The institutional facts If of the local environment  describe values that are determined
by the conventional state, including roles assigned or the amount of resource allocated
to a particular cluster member. The brute facts Bf include ‘physical’ facts such as the
resource level of the common pool and the agents’ appropriations, for example.
In order to illustrate the model consider the following example. We have a set of agents
A = {a1, a2, a3, b1, b2} and two common pools in the environment {P1, P2} ∈ E . Let
furthermore {raMethod,wdMethod} ∈ L, with the resource-allocation methods raM-
ethod= {ration, queue} and the winner-determination methods wdMethod= {plurality,
Borda count, instant runoff}. The distance function d can be interpreted as a cost to
switch from one specification instance to another. For example, depending on what wd-
Method is used, it might cost different amounts to perform a voting procedure in order
to get from raMethod=ration to raMethod=queue. Furthermore, L should contain rules
that specify under what conditions a change to those methods can be initiated.
Now assume we have two groups of agents, and each group forms a cluster to perform
a resource allocation using one of the pools. The members of the first cluster Ca are
Ma = {a1, a2, a3} and the other agents,Mb = {b1, b2}, form cluster Cb. The institution
of Ca is Ia = {queue, plurality}, representing one instance of L, for example. The
environment ε of this cluster would contain the pool P1 as a brute fact Bf and the
agents a1, a2 and a3 in the role of member as institutional facts If .
3.7. Simulation Platform
In order to implement the open systems model from the previous section as a computer
model, we can make use of a multi-agent based simulation platform. We expect the
following functionalities from that simulation platform:
◦ Sophisticated functionalities for agent programming—Agents are not only con-
sidered as particles but as heterogeneous entities that have individual goals and
strategies.
◦ Rule-engine integration—Facilitates the implementation of rules as an executable
specification.
◦ Abstraction—Ability to leverage the infrastructure of a platform in order to deal
with high level objects and concepts, rather than low level implementation issues.
◦ Parameterisable specification—For setting up the simulation specification to match
parameters to an initial state.
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◦ Batch execution—Appropriate tools to automatically run repeats or parameter
space sweeps, particularly useful when running experiments on a high performance
computing cluster.
◦ Database connection—Methods for storing structured and unstructured data for
analysis and post processing.
There are various platforms that can be used for agent simulation and most platforms
are tailored to specific needs. The authors of [82] present a survey of a range of different
platforms including their use case. For example, SimAgent is a simulation platform that
specialises in multi-agent systems with complex environments and human-like intelligent
agents. However, it requires the use of Poplog for implementation and there seem to be
no interfaces to other programming languages available, which is why we did not choose
to use this particular platform. Another alternative from that survey is Brahms which
was built for organisational processes, but it is not open source and uses a custom-built
language for implementation which limits functionality.
Popular, more generic platforms are NetLogo or MASON. In NetLogo, agents can act si-
multaneously and independently of each other, however an implementation into different
class files is not supported and the implementation of complex models is problematic,
as discussed in an evaluation of agent-based simulation platforms [67]. MASON has
several advantages, such as the implementation of agents as class files, easier parameter-
isation and performance speed. Presage2 can be applied to a wide range of situations
and complements other agent-based modelling tools by providing support for all the re-
quirements outlined above. We do not have to make sacrifices on the agent architecture
and can easily simulate a large number of repeats. Presage2 is designed to manipulate
policies and has a ready usable database connection supporting several popular database
management systems, we therefore choose this platform over MASON.
3.8. Formalism: Drools
In this section, we will present the formalism we use for expressing rules in the computer
model of the sociologically-inspired computing methodology. There are various alterna-
tives to represent and reason about events and their effects. In previous work [93], we
used the Event Calculus [64] for the logical axomatisation and implemented the axioms
of the specification in C++ as state-transition constraints, similar to [42]. This method
is inelegant and error-prone, however, at the time there was no efficient dialect of the
EC that would scale up for the kind of experiments used here. Recently, such a dialect
has been developed by Artikis et al. [11]5. Here, we will use a different formalism that
5The release of this dialect was too recent to be used in this work.
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can be directly implemented and allows us to process more events over a longer time
frame during experimentation.
3.8.1. Rule-based systems
In this section, we give a Drools oriented overview of the tools we use. To build an
open system based on rules, we use the concept of production systems [22], which are
forward-chaining reasoning engines. They store so called production rules for knowledge
representation in the production memory (PM), and keep facts and inferences they make
about the rules in the working memory (WM) which is constantly changing during system
operation. A typical production system is shown in Figure 3.6.
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Figure 3.6.: Basic operation of a production system
A production rule is usually written in the following form:
if <conditions > then <actions >
On the left-hand side of the rule (LHS) there are conditions which will be tested against
the current state of the working memory, also called pattern matching. If they evaluate
to true, a set of actions, also called consequences, on the right-hand side of the rule
(RHS) will follow that modify the working memory. Subsequent evaluations of rules
follow according to these steps, as illustrated in Figure 3.6:
1. Find matches, i.e. rules in the production memory whose conditions are satisfied
with respect to the current working memory.
2. Resolve conflicts among the rules that are found and decide which rules to execute
(i.e. to fire) in what order.
3. Change the working memory according to the actions of the selected rules.
62
3.8. Formalism: Drools
These three steps are repeated until there are no more rules to fire.
The working memory holds a set of working memory elements (WME) that are tuples
of the form [22, p. 119]:
(type attribute1 : value1 . . . attributen : valuen) .
Each WME is an existential sentence:
∃x : [type (x) ∧ attribute1 (x) = value1 ∧ . . . ∧ attributen (x) = valuen]
The predicates type, attributei and valuei are all atoms, and the order of attributes is
not important. An example of a working memory element is:
(agent id:7 active:true).
Working memory elements are also referred to as facts or objects, and attributes as fields.
In order for a rule to fire, each of condition of the conjunction has to match a WME and
each condition can either be
◦ an atom,
◦ a variable (such as id:i),
◦ an evaluable expression (such as id:(i+ 2) where i is mentioned elsewhere),
◦ a test (such as id:(< 7 ∧ > 3)), or
◦ a conjunction (∧), disjunction (∨) or negation (¬) of a combination of the above
Note that, for a negation to evaluate to true, none of the working memory elements can
match the condition of the negation at the time of assertion.
Once a rule has fired, all consequences have to be executed in order. They can be one
of the following types:
◦ insert pattern,
◦ remove i, or
◦ modify i {attributej = new_value}.
The pattern is written in the form of a WME and is directly added into the working mem-
ory, i is the i-th condition of the rule’s left-hand side and is either removed completely
or modified as specified.
These are just the basic functionalities of a production system, a general computational
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framework. Advantages of this framework are the modularity, meaning that the rules
work independently; control, meaning there are no complex control mechanisms hidden
in the implementation; and transparency, meaning that the rules are easily understand-
able as the rules are described in a terminology close to natural language.
This framework is used to build expert systems which include ontological models for
domain representation and facilities for knowledge acquisition and explanation. Well-
known examples of expert systems include Mycin, developed for assisting medical diag-
noses [108] and Xcon (formerly R1), the first rule-based system that allowed subsets of
rules to work independently from each other, presented in [76].
3.8.2. Drools Expert
The rule-based programming environment we use here is called Drools Expert [94], a
declarative, rule-based, coding environment implemented in Java. Drools uses a produc-
tion rule system based on the Rete algorithm, an efficient method for matching a large
collection of patterns to objects, the details are presented in [44].
In the following we will explain the syntax for creating rules in the Drools Expert system.
Again, each rule consists of a when...then body, labelled with a starting (rule) and an
ending keyword (end), and some optional rule attributes:
rule "rule name"
<rule-attributes >
when
<conditions >
then
<consequences >
end
Rules of this form are stored in the production memory for pattern matching. A pattern
in Drools looks as follows:
Type( field1 == value1 , ... , fieldN == valueN )
An example of a member that had been sanctioned 9 time slices ago and is currently
serving a sentence is:
Member(confined == 9, served == false , isFree == false)
The fact type or attributes (here fields) of a condition can be referred to by the use of
pattern binding variables that are prefixed by $, though this is an optional character.
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These binding variables are then used to reference the matched objects in either another
condition (LHS) or in the consequences on the RHS:
Type1(field1 == value1 , $var1 : field1)
$type : Type2(field1 == $var1)
An example of using binding variables in a rule is:
rule "Sentence served"
when
$m : Member(confined >= 10, served == false)
then
modify($m){
served = true
}
insert( new Task(freeMember = $m) )
end
This rule says that whenever there is a member in the working memory whose status
is ‘sentence not fully served’, then modify that status of the field served to true when
the time it had been confined reaches 10. We also insert a fact into the WM that can
trigger a notification being issued to that member. A rule that is triggered by this fact
could be:
rule "Notify end of sentence"
when
Task($m : freeMember)
then
sendNotification($m);
modify($m){
isFree = true
}
end
This rule contains a function that sends a notification to the member (the binding
variable $m of the sendNotification attribute) and modifies the member’s status of
being free to true. If there is no Task() element in the working memory, this rule will
not fire.
In order to declare a new fact type, we can use the syntax on the left, an example using
the served sentence scenario is given on the right:
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declare FactType
field1 : type
field2 : type
...
end
declare Member
confined : int
served : boolean
isFree : boolean
end
To create a rule, there are several keywords that are recognised within a specific context,
denoting conditional elements, operators, and rule attributes, and can be used in other
places if wanted. A summary of soft keywords that are used in this work is given in
Table 3.2. Drools’ reserved keywords, namely true, false and null, cannot be used as
identifiers when writing rules.
Table 3.2.: Selected keywords of the Drools Expert system (RHS)
conditional element operator rule attribute
and < <= > >= no-loop
or contains ruleflow-group
not not contains salience
exists memberOf
forall not memberOf
from
collect
accumulate
The conditional elements collect and accumulate allow rules to reason over a range of
objects. Typically objects get collected into a list or set, accumulate furthermore allows
for custom actions on the collected objects in order to return a result object, such as the
sum of all sentenced values of accumulated members.
The operator keywords contains and memberOf are used to check whether a field that
is a collection or list contains a specific object. For memberOf the collection must be a
(bound) variable.
The option to have rule attributes provides a declarative way to affect the rule selection
and we will describe all three attributes in turn:
◦ no-loop: When a rule fires, it can modify a fact in the working memory that
causes the rule to fire again. This attribute is used to skip the creation of a second
activation (with the current set of facts), and so avoids infinite loops6.
6Though this does not protect from the fact that two rules can alter the working memory in such
a way that they are called alternately on repeat. To prevent such behaviour, facts such as
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◦ ruleflow-group: This attribute controls the rule flow, which is a feature to regulate
the firing of rules. The rules are labelled by a ruleflow-group identifier and will
only fire when their group is active.
◦ salience: This attribute describes the priority of a rule (within ruleflow groups if
they are used) and can have negative or positive values, the default is 0. When
choosing what rule to execute, the rule with higher salience value is given priority.
The right-hand side of the rule states the consequences or actions that follow in that
order when the rule is fired. Typically, the RHS is a short list of actions.
As mentioned above, the keywords that evoke some action on the RHS are:
◦ insert(new F): This statement inserts a new fact into the working memory, the
attributes have to be provided depending on the fact type.
◦ remove($f): The chosen fact will be deleted from the working memory.
◦ modify($f): This statement modifies the attributes of the fact as stated.
To simulate resource allocation in open systems, Drools Expert is integrated into the
Java simulation platform Presage2 [73]. In every time slice (or round) of operation, the
rules will be matched against the WM and executed according to a set ruleflow, as we
will explain later.
3.9. Formal axiomatisation of six principles
We will now give a candidate axiomatisation of the first six principles for governing
common-pool resources, see Table 2.1 on page 38. This serves as a proof of concept for
answering Q1 and brings together several strands of research in access control, vot-
ing, and alternative dispute resolution. For each method there are various alternative
formalisations in various complexities possible. Choosing the complexity becomes im-
portant when the cost of adaptation, i.e. shifting to another degree of freedom, has to
be considered.
The fact types (classes) of member, non-member and institution are declared here. This
provides an overview over the fields that are used for pattern matching of rules to the
working memory in this section7. The institutional roles member, head, monitor and
gatekeeper all have the same basic constructor, with the name being the unique identifier
of an agent taking on different roles. The discriminating factors of these roles are the
TaskExecuted(x,y,z) can be inserted into the WM and referred to in the rule.
7The declarations are merely indicative and there are more fields defined for each fact type, for example
what set of principles is active in the institution, the number of sanctions of a member, etc.
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actions they are empowered, permitted and obligated to perform, which is here not
part of the role description but typically constrained by the conditions of the rules. A
complete class diagram will be given in the implementation section (Section 4.2.2).
declare Member
name: String
instId: int
pool: int
active: Boolean
end
declare NonMember
name: String
pool: int
active: Boolean
end
declare Institution
id: int
round: int
pool: CommonPool
end
Note that the pool is represented differently in the three declarations. Whereas the
institution’s pool attribute is the actual CommonPool fact, member and non-member are
related to a pool through its unique identifier, the id field of CommonPool, which is of
integer type.
Although open systems operate in a distributed manner, we will account for all the
actions that take place in a centralised manner. It is therefore important to document
what action has been executed by what agent in what time slice.
3.9.1. P1 : Clearly defined boundaries
This principle defines the boundaries of the system, what agents are authorised by
the institution to withdraw resources (member) and closes access to outsiders (non-
member). These three aspects are represented using different rules and methods. Suit-
able acMethods use role-based access control as discussed in [101] and define a role-
assignment protocol, following [13] for example.
rule "Grant access to non-member"
when
Institution($iid:id, $r:round , pr1==true)
$gk: Gatekeeper(instId ==$iid)
$nm: NonMember($n:name)
$a: App(name==$n , instId ==$iid , round < $r , state=="open")
AccCond(checkBy ==$gk , applicant ==$n , evaluateTo=true)
then
retract($nm);
insert( new Member($nm , $iid) );
modify($a){
state="closed"
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}
end
This rule says that, whenever there is an open application for membership (App) to some
institution (instId) in some round earlier than the current one ($r), and furthermore the
gatekeeper evaluates that the access conditions (AccCond) are met, then the non-member
will become a member, i.e. the $nm fact is retracted and a new member fact naming
the institution inserted. Also, the status of the application is set to closed. There are
some additional constraints such as that the gatekeeper has to be a member of the same
institution and P1 is being used.
The access conditions that have to be fulfilled so that a non-member is granted access
depend on acMethod which is stated in further rules. If the access control method is
discretionary, then the gatekeeper can tie the decision to conditions such as the number
of active members in the institution.
Principle P1 also makes sure that no unauthorised members appropriate the resource,
and a non-member ’s status can be set to inactive whenever they were caught unrightfully
appropriating. An example of an exclusion rule is:
rule "Sanction monitored non-members"
when
Institution($iid:id, $p:pool , $r:round , pr1==true)
$hd: Head(instId ==$iid)
$mon: Monitor(instId ==$iid)
$nm: NonMember($n:name , pool==$p.id)
Monitored(agent ==$n, round ==$r, monitor ==$mon)
not Sanctioned(agent ==$n, round ==$r, inst==$iid)
Appropriated(agent==$n , round==$r , pool==$p , quantity > 0)
then
insert( new Sanctioned($name , $round , 1, $iid , $hd) );
modify ($nm){
setActive(false)
}
end
The conditions of this rule say that a non-member has to be monitored by the monitor
performing an appropriation (quantity > 0) from the pooled resource that the institu-
tion is accountable for, but sanctioning has not yet occurred. Only then, a Sanction fact
is inserted by the head into the WM and the activity of the non-member set to false.
Similar role-assignment axioms are needed for the head to reassign roles to agents that
are already members of the institution, or to exclude members from the institution
depending on the sanctioning mechanism.
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3.9.2. P2 : Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local
conditions
This principle is concerned with the appropriation rules themselves. These rules restrict,
for example, time and quantity of access and make sure they are in line with the current
state of the environment. We present an example of an allocation procedure using queue
as raMethod. The first rule below ensures that members of that institution place at
most one demand per round, and only if they are not still in the demand queue (demQ)
of agents that had not been allocated in the previous round8. The issue of ‘valid’ and
‘invalid’ requests (or demands) is discussed in [101].
rule "Member demands"
when
$i: Institution($iid:id , $p:pool , $r:round , pr2==true)
$m: Member($n:name , instId == $iid)
not Demand(agent==$n , round < $r , this memberOf $i.demQ)
then
insert(new Demand($n , $r , $m.demand($i , $p), $p.getId ()));
end
Note that the Demand fact has a function as third attribute, demand($i, $p). This func-
tion is member internal and not directly governed by the rules, though a considerate
agent will take the local environment and rules into account when placing a demand for
resources.
The second rule of raMethod regulates how the resource allocation is to be performed.
rule "Perform resource allocation"
when
$i: Institution($iid:id , $p:pool , $r:round , pr2==true)
$hd: Head(instId ==$iid)
$dL: List() from collect( Demand(pool==$p.id, round ==$r))
then
Set <Allocation > allocations = $hd.allocate($i , $p , $dL);
for(Allocation a : allocations) {
insert(a);
}
end
The core allocation function, allocate($i, $p, $dL), is executed by the head as an
agent-internal function (implemented in Java), using a list of demands placed in the
current round ($dL) and the demand queue (field $i) from the previous round. There
8Here the queue is represented as ordered list of demands.
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are rules about how to place agents into the queue and how to allocate the demands
with respect to the pooled resource $p, which a compliant agent will follow.
There are several rules and methods to regulate the process of allocating resources, in
Algorithm 1 we present raMethod=queue.
Algorithm 1: allocate() for raMethod=queue
level ←− pool resource level;
demQ ←− demand queue from previous round + new demands;
while (demQ is not empty) ∧ (level > demand d from demQ.front) do
allocate d to corresponding agent;
deduct d from level;
delete demQ.front;
The agents’ demands are added to the remaining demand queue from the previous
round, then the demands in the queue are allocated until there is no resource left in
the pool. The allocation does not alter the brute facts of the resource, this is done in
the appropriation phase afterwards.
3.9.3. P3 : Collective-choice arrangements
This principle establishes that individuals that are affected by the operational rules also
have the right to participate in their modification, e.g. through votes. Several factors
have to be taken into account when setting up voting procedures, as discussed in [91].
Firstly, we need to define the rightful agents that are legitimate to vote (empowerment);
secondly, a mechanism to count the votes has to be specified; and thirdly, we need an
agent occupying a designated role that initiates the voting procedure and one that is
obligated to declare the correct outcome of the vote.
Initiation of the voting procedure for new head and/or new raMethod:
rule "Call for votes"
when
$i: Institution($iid:id , pr3==true)
$hd: Head(instId ==$iid)
then
CallForVote cfv = $hd.callForVotes($i);
modify($i) {
setVoteHead( cfv.isHead () ),
setVoteRaMethod( cfv.isRaMethod () )
}
71
3. Self-Organisation
end
A head can initiate two voting procedures (voteHead or voteRaMethod) with this call for
votes. Note that the callForVotes($i) function can only be called by the head.
Here we present a collective choice on an operational rule, i.e. a voting procedure on
raMethod where the members can vote on the new method to be either ration or queue:
rule "Vote for raMethod"
when
$i: Institution($iid:id , $p:pool , voteRaMethod ==true ,
$r:round , pr3==true)
$m: Member($n:name , instId ==$iid , pool==$p.id)
not Vote(voter==$n , round==$r , ballot =="raMethod")
then
Vote v = $m.vote($i , $p , "raMethod");
v.setVoter($m.getName ());
v.setRound($r);
insert(v);
end
For each agent that is a member of the institution, the vote() function returns a vote
which depends on the agent’s (internal) preferences. Subsequently, the votes (pairs of
(ballot, value)) are counted:
rule "Count votes"
when
Institution($iid:id , $r:round , pr3==true)
$hd: Head(instId ==$iid)
Member($ag:name , instId ==$iid)
Vote(voter==$ag , round==$r , $b:ballot)
not VoteCount(institution ==$iid , ballot ==$b, round ==$r)
$vL: List( size > 0 ) from accumulate(
$v: Vote($voter:voter , round==$r , ballot ==$b) and
Member(name==$voter , instId ==$iid), collectList($v) )
then
HashMap <Integer ,Integer > tally = new HashMap <Integer ,
Integer >();
for(Object o : $vL) {
Vote v = (Vote) o;
if(tally.containsKey(v.getValue ())) {
tally.put(v.getValue(), tally.get(v.getValue ()) + 1);
} else {
tally.put(v.getValue(), 1);
}
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}
insert( VoteCount($iid , $b, $r, tally , $hd) );
end
If there is at least one agent that voted in some ballot, then the rule accumulates all
votes of that ballot from the WM onto a list ($vL). Each value that occurs in the votes
becomes a key in the tally map, and the number of occurrences of that value is mapped
to the key. Note the not VoteCount() condition that ensures that the rule is executed
once for the same set of institution, ballot and round. The head then inserts the result
of the voting procedure (tally) into the WM as a field in VoteCount. This fact is used
in the next rule where the same agent declares the winner, i.e. the new raMethod, and
updates the operational rule in the institution:
rule "Declare winner and update raMethod"
when
$i: Institution($iid:id , $r:round , pr3==true , wdM=="plur")
$hd: Head(instId ==$iid)
$vc: VoteCount(ballot =="raMethod", round ==$r, inst==$iid ,
head==$hd)
not Declared(inst==$iid , ballot ==$vc.ballot , round ==$r)
then
Integer forQueue = $vc.result.get(RaMethod.Q.ordinal ());
Integer forRation = $vc.result.get(RaMethod.R.ordinal ());
if(forQueue ==null) forQueue = 0;
if(forRation ==null) forRation = 0;
if(forQueue > forRation) {
modify($i){
setAllocationMethod( RaMethod.Q );
}
} else if(forRation > forQueue) {
modify($i){
setAllocationMethod( RaMethod.R );
}
}
insert( new Declared($iid , $hd , $vc.ballot , $vc.round ,
$i.getAllocationMethod (). ordinal ()) );
end
The winner determination method used here is plurality (wdm=="plur") and in case of
a tie there are no changes to raMethod. There are many alternatives to the wdMethod
used here, and many alternatives to the procedure of voting. In [91], a full formalisation
of a voting protocol based Robert’s Rules of Order [98] is presented, including specific
issues such as enforcing one-member-one-vote or private ballots.
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3.9.4. P4 : Monitoring
This principle is about monitoring the conditions of the resource and appropriator be-
haviour, and the cost involved in that process. Logic-based representations are very
well suited for event recognition and environment monitoring, refer to [9] for a review of
suitable approaches.
Here, an agent in the role of monitor is appointed to report any offences regarding
appropriations exceeding allocations. First, the monitor has to decide what members to
watch during the appropriation action:
rule "Member monitoring list"
when
$i: Institution($iid:id , $p:pool , $r:round , pr4==true)
$mon: Monitor(instId ==$iid)
$mS: Set() from collect( Member(instId ==$iid) )
not TaskExecuted(inst==$i , task=="monitor", round==$r)
then
Set <String > monitored = $mon.monitor($i , $p , $mS);
for( String ag : monitored ) {
insert( new Monitored(ag, $round , $mon) );
}
insert( new TaskExecuted($i , "monitor", $round) );
end
The set monitored is a collection of agents names, specifying what agents are monitored.
The following rule deducts a cost (monitorCost) from the resource that has to be paid
for each monitoring action:
rule "Deduct member monitoring cost"
when
$i: Institution($iid:id , $p:pool , $r:round)
$mon: Monitor(instId ==$iid)
Member($n:name , instId ==$iid , pool==$p.id)
$mo: Monitored(agent==$n , round ==$r, monitor ==$mon)
not Deducted(action=$mo)
then
modify($p){
setResourceLevel(getResourceLevel ()-$i.getMonitorCost ())
}
insert( new Deducted($mo) );
end
As a result of the monitoring process, a member can be sanctioned by the head according
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to the next rule. For this case we assume that there is no graduation in the sanctioning
method, which means that a sanction at level 1 leads to an immediate exclusion (here
merged in one rule).
rule "Sanction members"
when
Institution($iid:id, $p:pool , $r:round , pr5== false)
$hd: Head(instId ==$iid)
$mon: Monitor(instId ==$iid)
$m: Member($n:name , instId ==$iid , pool==$p.id)
Monitored(agent ==$n, round ==$r, monitor ==$mon)
( ( Allocation(agent ==$n, round ==$r, $alloc:quantity ,
pool==$p)
and
Appropriated(agent==$n , round==$r , $approp:quantity ,
pool==$p , $approp > $alloc)
)
or
( not Allocation(agent ==$n, round ==$r, pool==$p)
and
Appropriated(agent==$n , round==$r , $approp:quantity ,
pool==$p , $approp > 0)
) )
then
insert( new Sanctioned($n, $r, 1, $iid , $hd) );
retract($m);
insert( new NonMember($m) );
end
The conditions on the LHS say that there are two cases in which a member can be sanc-
tioned/excluded. Firstly, if the quantity an agent appropriated exceeded its allocation
($approp > $alloc) and secondly, if there is no Allocation() fact for that agent in the
WM but it performed an appropriation ($approp > 0). These two cases could be split
at the conditional argument or and put into two separate rules, with the rest of the
conditions and consequences staying the same.
Note how the last two rules did not state pr4==true, this is implied as no monitoring
action could have occurred without that principle in the first place.
3.9.5. P5 : Graduated sanctions
This principle is concerned with a flexible scale of sanctions, which is applied to agents
that violate a rule of the institution. The following rule shows how agents are sanctioned
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for repeated violations:
rule "Sanction members (repeated offences)"
when
Institution($iid:id, $p:pool , $r:round , pr5==true)
$hd: Head(instId ==$iid)
$mon: Monitor(instId ==$iid)
$m: Member($n:name , instId ==$iid , pool==$p.id)
Monitored(agent ==$n, round ==$r, monitor ==$mon)
( ( Allocation(agent ==$n, round ==$r, $alloc:quantity ,
pool==$p)
and
Appropriated(agent==$n , round==$r , $approp:quantity ,
pool==$p , $approp > $alloc)
)
or
( not Allocation(agent ==$n, round ==$r, pool==$p)
and
Appropriated(agent==$n , round==$r , $approp:quantity ,
pool==$p , $approp > 0)
) )
not Sanctioned(agent ==$n, round ==$r)
Sanctioned(agent ==$n, $level:level)
not Sanctioned(agent ==$n, $l:level , $l > $level)
then
insert( new Sanctioned($n, $r, $level+1, $iid , $hd) );
modify ($m){
setActive(false)
}
end
For this rule, there are the following conditions necessary. Firstly, the monitor has mon-
itored a member and detected an offence (and/or-construct) by this agent. Furthermore,
the agent has not been sanctioned in this round and $level is its number of previous
sanctions9, i.e. there is no sanction fact with a higher level in the WM.
There should also be a rule, similar to “Sanctioning monitored members”, that sanctions
an agent for a first offence, i.e. inserts a Sanction() (at level=1) fact and sets the agent’s
activity to false, rather than excluding the agent from the institution. This rule is
required so that the conditions of the above rule (more precisely Sanctioned(agent==$n,
$level:level), the so far highest level) can be met.
9We assume here that an agent is sanctioned for every offence, but a policy where an agent is only
sanctioned once every three offences, for example, is also possible.
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In the consequences of the rule, the head inserts a sanctioning fact whose level is increased
by 1 to the previous sanction, and modifies the member ’s activity to false.
A member can regain access to the resource10, i.e. its activity state is reset to true,
depending on the terms of the sanction.
rule "Member back after sanction"
when
$i: Institution($iid:id , $r:round , pr5==true)
$gk: Gatekeeper(instId ==$iid)
$m: Member($n:name , instId ==$iid , active == false)
$s: Sanctioned( agent==$n , $sanRd:round , $level:level ,
($sanRd + $level*$i.excludetime < $round),
$level <= $i.maxSanctionLevel )
not Sanctioned(agent == $n, $rd:round , $rd > $sanRd)
then
insert( new Included($n, $r, $iid , $gk) );
modify ($m){
setActive(true)
}
end
Since the time of the most recent sanction ($sanRd), an agent must be inactive for a
number of rounds which is given by the level of sanction times a constant excludetime
(specified by the institution). Furthermore, the level of sanction must not be higher
than the allowed maximum (maxSanctionLevel), then the gatekeeper modifies the agent’s
activity state to true and inserts an Included fact.
This rule is part of acMethod and the readmission of a member can require this agent
to go through an application procedure beforehand. For cases where maxSanctionLevel
is exceeded, another rule describing the exclusion procedure should follow, according to
the rules of exMethod.
3.9.6. P6 : Conflict-resolution mechanisms
This principle states that the institution should include mechanisms to resolve conflicts
between agents rapidly and at a low cost. Different types of conflict can occur when
self-organising a resource-allocation process. One type is concerned with the conflict
between rules, meaning that some action can be permitted and prohibited at the same
time for a particular agent. In [117], mechanisms for the detection and resolution of
10According to the rules of this institution, an agent remains a member during the graduated sanctioning
process (until exclusion), though its status is set to inactive for that time frame.
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such normative conflicts are presented. Another type of conflict occurs when agents do
not act according to the rules, are not aware of some rule or make mistakes applying the
rules, which leads to intentional and unintentional violations.
Alternative dispute-resolution (ADR) mechanisms are well suited for resolving conflicts
in institutions as an alternative to litigation, as they can preserve and even strengthen
the relationship among the involved parties. In contrast to a litigation process, ADR
does not require filing lawsuits and going to trial (even though only a small proportion
arrive at a verdict as often settlements are reached before or cases break down), thus the
resolution of conflict comes at a lower cost, in shorter time and with limited damage.
ADR mechanisms include mediation and arbitration, which allow the disputed parties
to solve their conflict with greater control and in a more creative way than if left to a
judge or jury.
The method presented here is just a simple appeals procedure, though more refined
mechanisms can be defined. The evolution of online dispute resolution and cultural
implications are presented in [62].
In the following rule, a member appeals against a sanction:
rule "Appeal against sanction"
when
$i: Institution($iid:id , $r:round , pr6==true)
$m: Member($n:name , instId ==$iid , active == false)
$san: Sanctioned(agent==$n , round==$r)
not Appealed(agent ==$n, round ==$r)
then
insert( new Appealed($n, $r, $iid) );
end
In this rule, an agent appeals after every sanction, but a discretionary method is also
possible. An appeal can only be made once per time slice and the sanction is upheld by
the head with:
rule "Uphold sanction"
when
$i: Institution($iid:id , $r:round , pr6==true)
$hd: Head(instId ==$iid)
$m: Member($n:name , instiId ==$iid , active == false)
$san: Sanctioned(agent==$n , round==$r)
not (Appealed(agent ==$n, $aRd:round , inst==$iid ,
$r - $aRd <= $i.appealtime) )
not (Included(agent ==$n, $iRd:round , inst==$iid ,
$r - $iRd <= $i.appealtime) )
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then
insert(new Upheld($n , $r , $iid , $hd) );
retract($san);
end
The sanction is upheld by the head if the time of last appeal and last inclusion dates back
long enough. By that we mean that the agent must have been active in the institution
for at least appealtime rounds without being accused of wrongful appropriations.
The Upheld() fact then allows the gatekeeper to grant the member access to the resource
again, i.e. $m.setActive(true), using a rule similar to “Member back after sanction”.
3.10. Summary
In this chapter, we brought together the necessary tools to be able to perform the first
step of the SIC methodology, the formal characterisation. We described a framework that
allows us to address the three levels of analysis and rules using a multi-level protocol
stack, which maintains the functionality of a (human) institution to change rules at
runtime. Using an appropriate formalism, we then gave an axiomatisation of Ostrom’s
first six design principles that make use of the roles, rules and methods defined before.
The rules presented here are only a subset of rules necessary for implementing the re-
quired methods, further rules will be presented when we describe the algorithm of the
testbed. Nevertheless, concluding from Section 3.4 and 3.5, we showed that the pro-
cess of formal characterisation from the SIC methodology allows us to axiomatise the
rules of the institution. This axiomatisation represents a dynamic system specification
L which is used to perform the resource-allocation process according to the Ostrom’s
design principles. Therefore, we can positively answer Q2 , it is indeed possible to use
the dynamic specification for norm-governed systems to model socio-economic principles
for enduring CPR management.
Now the question remains:
Q3
Is it possible to use the formal axiomatisation to specify and implement
a testbed that ascertains the sufficiency of these principles for enduring
open systems?
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4.1. Introduction
The formal characterisation of Ostrom’s first six principles using an appropriate for-
malism was the first step towards simulating an open system. Following further the
methodology for sociologically-inspired computing, see Figure 3.1, the next two steps
are the principled operationalisation and controlled experimentation.
We first show how to embed the formalisation of agents and rules into the Presage2
simulation platform and define the classes and agent states in Java, and the control loop
using the rule-flow group functionality provided by Drools. We then describe the agent
behaviour in detail, the implementation of specific rules and class functions can be found
in the appendix.
The next step is the setup of the testbed for experimentation. We describe the sets
of parameters that are used to initialise the sets of experiments, and what aspect of
self-organisation a specific set of parameters is testing. Possible parameters are the set
of principles in use, specific agent characteristics or environmental factors that influence
the pooled resource. We then evaluate the data obtained from experimentation and
show that a full set of principles is beneficial for the endurance of the system operation.
For the first set of experiments, we used the same parameters as in our publication [93],
but using the new testbed. Three more sets of experiments follow to examine the effect
of different environmental conditions that were previously unexplored.
4.2. Principled operationalisation
In this step, we have to define the implementation of the environment and the individual
agent behaviour. According to [41], the used formalism has to reflect the key components
of a specification for ‘electronic institutions’, i.e. it should be able to express the rules
that constitute the institution, the roles and the environment in which the agents can
communicate with each other, see also [10].
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Figure 4.1.: Creating a simulation with Presage2
4.2.1. Testbed specification in Presage2
To facilitate the integration of the key elements relevant for this simulation, we make use
of Presage2, a multi-agent based animation and simulation platform, that we present in
more detail in [73].
The core of the Presage2 platform controls the interaction of three main parts: the
simulator, the libraries and the experimentation tools. In the simulator, there is the
state engine and the rule engine, wrapped together by the core which also initialises the
simulation loop. The state engine is responsible for storing and updating the simulation
state, and has an interface to the rule engine’s working memory. There are several pack-
ages that can be used to customise a simulation, such as libraries for the environment,
agents or a (communication) network, and experimental tools including databases and
a batch executor.
Figure 4.1 shows the process of creating a simulation with Presage2. In the phase of
principled operationalisation, we embed the rules, the facts and the agents into the
simulation specification.
For the simulation in this work, we set up Drools as our rule engine. We create a
package containing the roles of agents including the ‘internal’ procedures of agents in
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that role (which can be violated), and we further implement a package containing the
facts that are used by the working memory. These facts include brute facts, such as the
replenishment mechanism of the resource; institutional facts, such as the raMethod and
facts about actions that are performed by the agents, such as allocations, demands, etc.
Each round of the simulation is regulated by Drools’ ruleflow groups. There are nine
groups whose rules are fired when the group is activated, independently of the rules in
other groups. The flow of groups is shown in Figure 4.2. Each round of an experimental
INIT CFV VOTE DEMAND ALLOCATE
APPROPR
IATE REPORT APPEAL EXCLUDE
next round
Start
End
Figure 4.2.: Flow of ruleflow groups
run starts with an Init phase where the round is incremented. If the resource has not
been depleted in some previous round (which leads to the abortion of the run), the
resource is refilled and the next ruleflow group activated. The remaining ruleflow groups
will be discussed in detail later.
4.2.2. Classes
An agent is permitted, prohibited or obligated to perform certain actions depending on
the role it occupies in the institution. Figure 4.3 is a class diagram showing the different
roles with respect to the institution, including a selection of class fields and methods.
The full list of class fields can be found in Appendix B. Each class object that is created
in during simulation, is inserted into the working memory, along with the fields as
ClassName( field1 == value1 , ... , fieldN == valueN ).
The roles member and non-member are mutually exclusive, and they get determined at
the start of a simulation run via acMethod. The institution defines that an agent has
to be a member1 in order to take on the role of a head, gatekeeper or monitor, and an
agent can be assigned more than one role.
Each agent can be uniquely identified by its name, further fields that all agents have
in common are activity, stating whether an agent has the capability (or not) to take
1We assume that an agent can be a member of only one institution at a time.
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Figure 4.3.: Class diagram of the testbed
resources2 and its degree of compliancy, a private field stating how prone the agent
is to unrightfully appropriate the resource (compliancy_degree). In addition, a mem-
ber contains fields stating its institution (inst_id) and the associated common-pool
resource (pool_id), and fields keeping track of the offences and level of sanctioning3
(sanction_level).
All agents are able to perform appropriate actions, we recall that that only a mem-
ber is permitted to appropriate the resource, but both active member and non-member
have the capabilities to do so (the non-member stores the information what pool to
appropriate from in pool_id). In addition, all agents are able to revise their behaviour
(rev_behaviour) according to their own judgement and to what they perceive in the
environment, such as sanctioning events.
In the role of member an agent is furthermore empowered to vote, place a request for
resources (demand) and appeal against a sanctioning procedure. The actions that an
agent decides to take depend on its internal state and how it perceives the environment.
2For this implementation, active=false means that it is impossible for an agent to appropriate the
resource, i.e. the brute facts cannot be changed in that state.
3As already said, here, each offence increases the level of sanctioning by 1 straight away.
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The actions that an agent in the role of gatekeeper can perform are the assignment of the
member role (assign) and granting a member access again to the resource after a served
sentence or successful appeals procedure (include). The monitor is empowered to carry
out the monitoring of members (monitoring) and non-members (monitoring_out), and
is obligated to report any offences that then initiate a sanctioning process, performed by
the head (sanction). Additional actions the head is empowered or obliged to perform
are calling for votes (cfv), declaring the outcome of a voting procedure (declare), the
exclusion of an agent (exclude) and uphold sanctions after a member appealed.
The fields of an institution represent a collection of institutional facts (If ), namely the
used resource allocation method (raMethod), the access control method (acMethod), the
winner determination method (wdMethod) and the method for alternative dispute res-
olution (adrMethod). Whether and in what way these methods are represented in the
rules, depends on the set of principles that the agents use to govern their institution4.
Furthermore, there is the frequency with what monitoring is carried out during the ap-
propriation phase (monitoring_freq) and when guarding the boundaries of the institution
(monitoring_freq_out). The penalty that is applied for a sanction uses exclude_time5.
The maximum level of sanctions (max_sanction_level) and the time an agent has to go
unsanctioned so that an appeal is granted (appeal_time) are also part of the institutional
facts. Being a construct of rules, the institution does not have any methods attached.
Finally, there is the common pool. The only method in this class is refill which hap-
pens at the start of every round. The field of the pool are brute facts (Bf ) in the
environment and include the currently available resource (resource_level), the param-
eters for the refill (refill_scheme), the maximum level to which the resource can be
pooled (max_level) and a factor that describes whether unintentional violations happen
during the appropriation process (unintent_violation).
In this testbed, the powers, permissions and obligations of a certain role are not imple-
mented as part of the rule engine, but are expressed through the Java class methods
and checked against the working memory. For example, if an agent wants to perform an
allocation action which is part of the head class, it can only do so if there is a fact in
the WM stating this agent as the head of the corresponding cluster. Typically, the rules
in the production memory include these checks as conditions in the left-hand side of a
single rule.
4The presence of principles is not decided by the agents themselves but is an experimental parameter.
5The penalty applied in Section 3.9, was to sanction a member for sanction_level*excludetime
rounds.
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4.2.3. States
The agents in the simulation are heterogeneous, meaning that they have different char-
acteristics that influence their behaviour when reacting to changes in the environment 
and specification instance I. Depending on the principles that are used in the run and
the agents’ behaviour during resource appropriation, the activity status of an agent can
be changed, see Figure 4.4.
[!report_out ∨ !Pr 1]
appropriate
[report_out ∧ Pr 1]
[Pr 1 ∧ (|sanction_level| > max_sanction_level ∨ !Pr 5) ∧ (!uphold ∨ !Pr 6)]
appropriate
[report ∧ Pr 4]
[!report ∨ !Pr 4]
[(|sanction_level| ≤ max_sanction_level ∧ Pr 5) ∨ (uphold ∧ Pr 6)]
Active 
Member
Inactive 
Member
Inactive 
Non-Member
Active 
Non-Member C
C
Figure 4.4.: Agent activity state chart
There are four possible states that an agent can be in, they are active member, inactive
member, active non-member and inactive non-member. At the start of a run, acMethod
decides what agent is assigned the role member of an institution or non-member, both
in active mode (P1 ).
A member remains active, if it does not appropriate more than its allocation or if the
wrongful behaviour has not been detected by the monitor of the institution, thus not
reported. Any detected noncompliance is reported (P4 ) and the agent’s status is set to
inactive. Only in the following two cases, an agent’s state can be set to active again
(i.e. included again in the allocation process): The level of sanction is below or equal
to the maximum level allowed (P5 ) and the agent served its sentence, or the sanction
has been upheld due to a successful appeals procedure (P6 ). In all other cases, the
agent is excluded from the institution and becomes an active non-member. This agent
is not permitted to become a member again in any subsequent round. Furthermore,
a non-member is not permitted to appropriate the resource, but should it be reported
doing so, the agent’s state is set to inactive which means it becomes impossible for the
agent to appropriate the resource (P1 ).
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4.2.4. Testbed control loop
In this section, we present the control loop used for self-organising a resource-allocation
process in an open system. We first describe what facts are inserted into the working
memory, how the rules are organised inside in the production memory, and then ad-
dress the main methods that define the agents’ internal decision-making process (see
Figure 4.1).
Initialisation and termination criteria
This is the initialisation6 for one cluster C of a multi-agent system S governing one
common-pool resource (for a reminder of variables see Section 3.6).
◦ ∃p ∈  ⊆ E :
insert( new CommonPool(p.id, resourceLevel==maxLevel) );
◦ ∃i ∈ L:
insert( new Institution(i.id, round==0, pool==p, pr1==true) );
◦ ∀m ∈M ⊆ A:
insert( new Member(m.name, instId==i.id, pool==p.id, active==true) );
◦ ∀nm ∈ A \M:
insert( new NonMember(nm.name, pool==p.id, active==true) );
◦ ∃h ∈M (repeat for Gatekeeper and Monitor):
retract( Member(name==h.name) );
insert ( new Head(name==h.name,instId==i.id,pool==p.id,active==true) );
The conditions that terminate an experimental run are the absence of a pool or institu-
tion, or that the time frame set for the run is over:
◦ CommonPool( resourceLevel < 0 ) retracts the CommonPool
◦ not( exists(Member(instId==i.id)) ) retracts the Institution
◦ Institution(round >= finishTime)
Ruleflow and control loop
In this section we present a ruleflow diagram that shows the ruleflow of the implemen-
tation, a control loop in algorithmic form is shown in Appendix A.17.
6Note that the declaration of the facts’ field variables is merely representative.
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Figure 4.5 shows how the rules are arranged within the ruleflow groups, most rules have
been discussed in a basic version in Section 3.9. The dotted lines within a ruleflow group
partition the rules according to their salience, with the rules on the left having priority
over the rules on the right of the line. Furthermore, rules that fire only if a certain
principle is active, are tagged with that principle on the bottom right. Arrows between
rules mean that a rule that is a head can only fire, if a corresponding fact has been
created by the tail rule. The very last rule to fire in each round is "create log files"
which is for data collection purposes.
In Section 4.2.2 we described how the actions an agent can perform are connected to the
role this agent occupies. Now, we illustrate how changes in the environment  (both brute
(Bf ) and institutional (If ) facts) and the use of design principles for CPR government
invoke a sequence of agent actions and rule consequences.
Initially, we set P1 of the institution to active (pr1==true), refill the pool to its maximum
level and assign the roles of member, non-member, head, monitor and gatekeeper. The
algorithm starts in round r = 0 and cycles until one of three termination criteria is true.
The corresponding code can be found in Appendix A.16 to which the following lines
refer. The three criteria are: the predefined finishing time is reached, i.e. r > finishTime
(line 2); the resource is depleted, i.e. resourceLevel < 0 (lines 13, 17–21); or there are no
members left in the cluster, i.e.M = {} (lines 28, 30). This is considering a single pool
and institution per run, otherwise the run continues until all common-pool resources are
depleted or clusters memberless.
In each round, the agents perform the following actions, depending on the selection of
corresponding principles (see page 38) and ruleflow groups (Figure 4.2):
◦ cfv: With P3 in use, the collective-choice arrangements, the head calls for a vote
on the resource-allocation method.
◦ vote: After a successful call for vote, all member agents vote for their preferred
method and the head declares the winner to be the new raMethod. If P3 is not
used, the method for the current cycle is automatically reset at periodic intervals
according .
◦ demand: In order to conduct a resource-allocation process, P2 has to be selected,
so that active members are empowered to place demands.
◦ allocate: The head will then allocate the demands according to raMethod, such
that the sum of allocations does not exceed the current resource level. Furthermore,
the monitor creates lists of agents that it will monitor on appropriation, depending
on the use of P1 and P4 .
◦ appropriate: Subsequently, all agents perform an appropriate action, where even
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89
4. Self-Organising Resource Allocation
the non-members have the power, though not permission, to appropriate from the
common pool.
◦ report: With P4 in use, the monitor monitors the members on its list and
reports the offences to the head. The same happens with the non-members on the
list, if P1 is in use. The head then applies a sanction to the misbehaving agents
and the sanction level increases by 1 with each offence. Sanctioned non-members
get their activity status set to false, which inhibits further appropriations. The
remaining non-members revise their appropriation behaviour (i.e. ask the question
whether it pays off to illicitly appropriate from this particular common pool in
the future) which might change their degree of compliancy. In case P5 is selected,
the sanctioning method within the institution is graduated and an agent’s activity
state is set to false after an offence. This state temporarily inhibits the member
from appropriating resources.
◦ appeal: In case P6 is selected, the sanctioned (inactive) member is empowered
to appeal against the sanction and the head can uphold the sanction or reject the
appeal, resulting in a decrease of sanctioning level, or not.
◦ exclude: The last ruleflow group is concerned with the reported members. If
graduated sanctions are not used (no P5 ), the member ’s sanction after being re-
ported is the exclusion from the institution (remember P1 controls who is and is
not a member of the institution). A member is also excluded if P5 is active and
the member’s level of sanctioning has exceeded the limit.
If P5 is used and the sanctioning level has not reached the limit, a member is
empowered to apply for readmission after it has served its sentence. The duration
of the sentence is determined by the sanctioning level and some fixed constant
(excludetime), during which the agent will revise its attitude towards wrongful
appropriation. After a successful application, the member is included back into
the resource-allocation process, i.e. the gatekeeper sets the agent’s activity state
to true. When a member becomes active again, it will revise its appropriation
behaviour. When an agent successfully passes an appeals procedure (P6 ), its
activity state is changed back to active straight away.
◦ init: After all ruleflow groups have been activated to fire their rules, this process
repeats. In this first ruleflow group, the round is incremented and the state of the
system reviewed. If the resource level is < 0, there are no members left7 or the
round reaches the finishing time, the execution of the run is aborted. Otherwise
any roles of head, monitor or gatekeeper that got excluded from the institution in
the previous round are reassigned, in this case to some member at random. Then
the members are counted (for P1 and P2 ), the common pool is refilled and the
7Remember that a head, monitor or gatekeeper is a member as well.
90
4.2. Principled operationalisation
next ruleflow group (cfv) is activated.
Experimental data is collected with the rule "create log files", which is fired as last
rule (lowest salience) in the last ruleflow group in each cycle (exclude).
Agent behaviour
Every agent’s goal in this testbed is to obtain the resource needed to accomplish their
task8. A second goal is to create a resource allocation process that ensures these needs
can be met over a long time frame. Therefore, the agents try to match the collective need
to the pooled resource. They demand some amount of resource in a time-slice or round r
instead of appropriating it directly and a designated member (the head) will perform the
allocation of resources according to an agreed method. It is also the head that initiates
a vote on the resource-allocation method. Depending on what goal a particular agent
values more, this agent will then only appropriate what the head allocated or exceed that
allowance. In certain circumstances an agent unintentionally appropriates more than its
allocation. In case a sanctioning scheme has been set up and the agents’ compliancy
with the rules is monitored and enforced, the agent can take certain actions to mitigate
the sanctioning effects. The agent can either appeal to the sanction to be reconsidered
in the allocation process, or it can revise its appropriating behaviour and prevent future
sanctions by complying with the rules after being excluded from appropriating for a
certain time frame.
In the following, we describe how the agent behaviour is implemented in the different
agent classes. The methods in a class (see Figure 4.3) describe the actions that an object
of that class is empowered, permitted or obligated to perform. The implementation of
these methods is outlined in the following, the line numbers refer to the corresponding
code that can be found in Appendix A. Not all rules are implemented as stand-alone
class functions, those that are less subjective to the influence of an agent’s characteristics
(e.g. role assignment or resource replenishment) are often included in the rules9.
We start with the methods of the different agent roles, first the member methods (pre-
ceded by a reference to the code):
◦ A.1 demand(): The agents in the open system are assumed to require a stan-
dard amount of resource to maintain their operations, their preferredRequest,
though they will not place a demand in every round. This amount depends
on the compliancy degree (= 1 for compliant, > 1 for noncompliant agents)
and the preferred amount becomes higher for noncompliant agents (by the fac-
8What specific tasks these are is of no concern to this context.
9That is purely for ease of implementation, all functions could have been implemented in the corre-
sponding Java class as well.
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tor compliancy_degree). Depending on raMethod they will adjust their demand.
For raMethod=queue the demand is the preferred amount (line 5), but demand() is
only called if they are not waiting in the queue already. For raMethod=ration the
agent becomes more considerate and takes other agents’ demands into account as
well as some estimation of the monitoring cost. If the current resource level (mi-
nus monitoring cost if pr4=true, line 12) per agent is smaller than their preferred
amount they will demand that (multiplied by their compliancy degree, line 10),
otherwise they stick to the usual demand (line 15).
◦ A.2 vote(): In this case, the vote is cast for raMethod. If the current resource
level is smaller than 75% of the maximum amount possible, then a member votes
for ration (line 5), otherwise for queue (line 7). Noncompliant agents are more
reluctant in voting for ration and divide the threshold by their compliancy degree
(line 4).
◦ A.3 appropriate(): If P2 is not in use, an agent will appropriate the preferred
amount at the same rate it would place a demand (line 16). With P2 , an agent
will appropriate what it has been allocated (line 13) or, if naughty, take what it
demanded (line 10) or top up its allocation if considered too low (line 8). In case
unintentional violation upon appropriation happens (which does not affect each
agent in every round, line 19), an agent’s appropriation is increased or diminished
by a factor depending on the noise_level and average allocation (line 25 or 27
respectively). Note that a member only appropriates from the resource if they are
in active state (lines 2, 35).
◦ A.4 rev_behaviour(): A member is willing to change its behaviour depending
on its current level of sanction and maximum level allowed as per the institution
(line 2). Changes in behaviour will affect the compliancy degree and the amount
of preferred resource (lines 3, 4).
◦ A.5 appeal(): This method is part of the “members appeal against sanction” rule,
which regulates the whole process form appeal to readmission of a member. If P4
is used, a member will appeal as soon as it is being sanctioned (line 6, 10).
◦ A.5 & A.8 apply(): Being part of both “members appeal against sanction” and
“include member after sanction”, the application procedure is implicitly executed
when the conditions for inclusion are met.
These are the non-member methods:
◦ A.6 appropriate(): The frequency of non-member appropriation depends on its
compliancy degree and the perceived safety (of not being caught) with respect to
this common pool and its institution (line 3). An active agent then appropriates
its preferred amount (line 4), inactive non-members appropriate nothing (line 2).
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◦ A.14 rev_behaviour(): The revision of behaviour for non-member takes place as
part of the “sanction monitored non-members” rule. Every time, a non-member is
sanctioned (line 58), appropriating from that pool is perceived to be less safe and
the frequency of further appropriation goes down (line 63).
The methods of the head, monitor and gatekeeper roles are as follows:
◦ A.7 assign(): Agents are assigned membership to a cluster and further roles at
the start of a simulation run. When an agent leaves its roles as head, monitor or
gatekeeper, for example due to exclusion after a sanctioning procedure, this role
to be reassigned to an entitled agent. The rule “assign new head” assigns the role
of head to a member at random (line 8), should there be no agent occupying this
particular role10.
◦ A.5 & A.8 include(): This method is part of two rules, “members appeal against
sanction” and “include member after sanction”. The LHS of the first rule (A.5)
contains conditions about the last times the member got sanctioned and appealed
(lines 7, 8), and if they are within the allowance, the member is automatically
included (line 13). The LHS of the second rule (A.8) contains conditions about
the last times the members got sanctioned and the level of sanction (lines 7,8).
If the conditions for inclusion are met, the agents get the chance to revise their
behaviour (line 11 and A.4) and the member gets included (line 13).
◦ A.9 exclude(): There are two rules for excluding a member from the cluster,
one where only P4 is in use (“member exclusion”) and one where P5 is used in
addition (“member exclusion with graduated sanctions”). The first rule excludes a
member after their first sanction, i.e. retracts the member and inserts a new non-
member (lines 8, 9), the second rule checks whether the level of sanctions reached
the maximum amount and excludes the member if that is the case (lines 19, 20).
Once a member is excluded, its compliancy degree goes back to the value it was
before any revision of behaviour.
◦ A.10 monitor() & monitor_out(): Depending on the principles in use (lines 5,
13), the monitor will create a list with members and non-members that are to
monitor in that round (lines 8, 16). After the execution of this method (line 33),
the Monitored facts are inserted into the working memory (line 35).
◦ A.11 cfv(): If P3 is used (line 2), the head calls for votes in the current round.
Different strategies to decide when to call for a vote can be used, here the head ini-
tiates a voting procedure for raMethod in every round (line 3), which gets inserted
10This rule does not specify that it is the gatekeeper who performs the role assignment. It is possible
to include such a constraint, but then there has to be a rule handling the case when there is no
gatekeeper and what role is empowered to assign a gatekeeper role.
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as a fact into the WM (lines 19, 20).
◦ A.12 declare(): In order to declare the result of a vote, the head has to count
the votes11 for each possible raMethod (lines 11–18, 28–31). The winner is de-
clared according to wdMethod (here plurality, lines 32–36) and updated in the
WM (line 37).
◦ A.13 allocate(): The head allocates the resource (which is viewed as an institu-
tional fact here) to members with pending demands according to raMethod, either
QUEUE or RATION. Before deciding how to split up the resource between the mem-
bers, he deducts any cost for monitoring (line 3). If raMethod is QUEUE, then the
allocation happens as described in Section 3.9.2, making sure only agents that are
not in the queue from a previous round get added to it at random (lines 9–19).
If raMethod is RATION, then the resource is divided equally between all demanding
members (lines 31–46).
◦ A.14 sanction(): The sanctioning procedure is split into three rules. The first
rule concerns members that have not yet been sanctioned and fires when P4 is used,
as a consequence of monitoring actions in that round (line 7). The amount a mon-
itored agent has been appropriating is compared with the amount it was allocated
(lines 10–14) and a sanction follows in case of wrongful behaviour (line 18), which
sets the agent’s activity state to false (line 20). The second rule concerns repeated
offences (P5 ) and evaluates monitored members that have been sanctioned already
(line 39). Again, allocations are compared with appropriations (lines 33–37) and
agents sanctioned at one level higher than the previous time (lines 39, 40, 42). The
last rule concerns monitored non-members. They get sanctioned (line 58) upon
detected misappropriation (line 56) and their activity state set to false (line 60).
As non-members do not have the ability to get into active state again, no rule for
repeated offences is needed.
◦ A.5 uphold(): This method is part of the “members appeal against sanction”
rule. A sanction is upheld (i.e. retracted, line 11), when the supposedly offensive
member successfully passes both tests on time of last sanctioning (line 8) and time
of last appeal (line 7).
The final method described here belongs to the common pool:
◦ A.15 refill() There are four different refill schemes that can be used, HIGH,
MODERATE, LOW or CUSTOM. The first three schemes refill the pool with half the
maximum resource level12 Pmax/2 for the first 50 time slices (line 47), then multiply
11This is a general rule for counting votes and also works for ballot=="head".
12Jumping ahead to the simulation parameters, this would be the amount that all agents can appropriate
using the standard request.
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this amount with a high, moderate or low factor (lines 49, 51 or 53). The CUSTOM
scheme changes the refill rates every 50 time slices and the factor multiplied with
Pmax/2 takes values in three ranges, high, moderate or low (lines 10–29).
4.3. Controlled experimentation
In this section we prepare the testbed for resource allocation in open systems, which we
created in the last section. We present a subset of the parameters that can be manip-
ulated in our testbed and describe how these parameters are used for experimentation
with the testbed. Remember, the open system is S = 〈A,L, d, E〉 at the top level with a
cluster C = 〈M, I, 〉 at the local level that aims to self-organise the resource-allocation
process, see Section 3.6. The full specification of parameter settings can be found in
Appendix B.
4.3.1. Experimentation with brute facts
The parameters of the environment  are chosen such that they avoid both super-
abundance and prolonged insufficiency. In the first case, self-organisation with the aim
to impose restrictions on appropriation would be redundant, the second case means that
the system would be in constant crisis.
The refill scheme as well as the resource level P , size of the pool (maximum resource
level Pmax) and environmental factors that lead to unintentional appropriations, are part
of Bf in , the local environment. The threshold D (see Section 2.4.1) that defines the
critical level of resource to remain in the pool in order to avoid depletion is chosen as 0.
Refill Scheme The default scheme that is used for resource replenishment is CUSTOM with
alternating periods of high (h), moderate (m) and low (l) replenishment. This ensures
that there are sufficient resources in the long term, provided that the appropriators avoid
depleting the common-pool during periods of scarcity. For comparison, we experiment
with three more refill schemes: HIGH, MODERATE and LOW.
The refill rates for the CUSTOM scheme change every 50 time slices and correspond to half
the size of the common pool13 times a factor h, m or l. The sequence of factors is:
h → h → m → l → h → h → l → m → l → h
13maxLevel/2 corresponds to standardRequest*agents, the amount that all member in the institution
can appropriate together (when compliant).
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where the refill factors are within the following ranges (theoretically, the range of l starts
from 0 but the lowest factor actually used is 0.5, see Appendix A.15):
h ∈ (0.9, 1] , m ∈ (0.7, 0.9] , l ∈ [0.0, 0.7]
If the refill scheme is HIGH, MODERATE or LOW, the rate of refill starts with 50 time slices of
refill at factor 1.0, followed by the factors
h = 0.95, m = 0.8, or l = 0.5 .
Unintentional Appropriation Unintentional errors on appropriation have as effect that
in 5% of appropriations, a member will take up to 10% more or less resource than it
intended to. The default for unintentional errors to happen is set to false.
Agent Population We start each simulation run with 100 member and 20 non-member
agents, all of which are fully compliant (compliancyDegree=1.0) by default. The demand
of a member amounts to 50 resource units (when compliant) and is placed in 90% of
rounds (when permitted). The first member is assigned the role of head. As role assign-
ment is not the main focus of this experimentation, we decided to integrate the roles of
monitor and gatekeeper into the head role.
To experiment with noncompliant agents, we can change the compliancy degree14 of
the agents. This results in agents appropriating up to 20% more than their allocation,
or appropriate without prior allocation. There are separate parameters to specify how
many of the members and non-members are noncompliant (numCheat and outNumCheat).
4.3.2. Experimenting with institutional facts
Anything that is a conventional rather than physical state is part of If . That is all the
rules and roles in the institution that govern the resource-allocation process, but none
of the appropriation or refill phase.
Principles 1, 2 and 3 P1 is needed for the institution to exist, if there are no members
that make up rules there is no institution, and is therefore set to true at start. The
changeable parameter of this principle is the non-member monitoring frequency and
takes an either high (default of 10% non-member per round) or low (1%) value at a
relatively low cost (5 resource units per observation).
14The compliancy degree is a measure of the quantity rather than the frequency of appropriating re-
sources. A degree higher than 1 means that more resources than allocated may be appropriated.
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Adding P2 and P3 ensures themanageability of the resource-allocation process. Without
P2 all members appropriate without going through a demand or allocation phase, and
without P3 there will be an automatic assignment of raMethod. This assignment then
happens once every 50 time slices, depending on P at that time, i.e. ‘queue’ for P >
0.75Pmax , and ‘ration’ otherwise.
Principles 4, 5 and 6 P4 , P5 and P6 are used to protect the common-pool resource
from wrongful appropriations through misbehaving members. The changes that can be
made to P4 include the frequency of member monitoring which is set to either high (10%
by default) or low (1%) at a cost of 50 units. Using P5 does not exclude the member from
the cluster for a first offence, but penalises them according to the level of sanction. Up to
(and including) the maximum level of sanctioning (3), the member state is set inactive
for 5*sanctionLevel rounds, for more offences, a member gets excluded. P6 defines the
appeals procedure and a member ’s sanction is upheld if this agent has not been reported
(no sanctions or appeals) within the last 30 rounds (default for appealtime).
4.3.3. Goal
The main goal of the open system in each simulation run is the maximisation of the
institution’s lifespan [0, T ], that is until PT < 0, MT = {} or T = 500. Furthermore,
an appropriate trade-off between resource level and amount of members is important,
as only sufficient membership can protect the resource against non-members and will be
useful in case there is a cost of ownership to cover.
4.4. Results
This section describes the experiments conducted with the testbed and evaluates the
data obtained. We start with a thorough analysis of four experiments using the CUSTOM
refill scheme and present the results of the HIGH, MODERATE and LOW refill schemes after.
Table B.6 in the appendix shows a summary of how the parameters are set up for the
individual experiments conducted in this chapter, Table B.7 shows the corresponding
figures, and all measurements that are taken for experimentation are listed (page 202).
Each of the experimental runs was performed over 100 trials and the following graphs
are shown over time (rounds), and the value of the resource level (left) as well as the
number of active agents (right) were averaged over all existing clusters in that time slice.
A third curve (axis on the far right) shows the number of clusters out of 100 trials that
were still active, i.e. their resource had not yet been depleted and there were members
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remaining in the institution. The ranges for the refill rates used during a certain time
frame are displayed in rectangles as h=high, m=moderate and l=low.
4.4.1. Existence and management principles
Figure 4.6 shows an environment where all members comply with the rules and no
unintentional errors take place, though 50% of non-members appropriate the resource
illicitly. With this almost perfect population profile, we test Principles P1 , P2 and P3 ,
whose main function is to manage the resource allocation. Four runs with the same
environmental settings were tested using a different institutional setup.
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Figure 4.6.: P1, P2 and P3 : Lifespan of a cluster with all members compliant, 50% of
non-members noncompliant, no unintentional violation.
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To ensure the existence of the institution, we use P1 in every trial. It clearly defines the
members of the institutions as well as the boundaries through a monitoring procedure.
Two different settings of monitoring frequency are used, high (h) and low (l), in order
to test the impact of enforcing the boundaries of the common pool. The first run shows
the lifespan of C with only Pr1h, whereas the second has P2 added but the monitoring
frequency is set to low, Pr1l/2. In these two runs, the resources in all 100 trials got
depleted, for the first run this was in round 152, for the second in round 306, both at
times when the refill rate became low. We can see that neither a proper monitoring of
the border nor the use of a resource-allocation method alone is enough for a sustainable
resource and enduring cluster.
The third run has a high monitoring frequency again, Pr1h2. This time, about 4/5
of the trials suffer from resource depletion between round 122 and 150, a few more
later until only 2 of the clusters remain running by the end of round 500. The high
monitoring frequency combined with an automatic resource-allocation policy effects that
the institution now better responds to non-member appropriation.
With P3 added, 99 trials reach the finish time without the resource being depleted.
Enabling the agents to choose raMethod according to their needs has notable advantages
over an automatic assignment. The results from these four runs suggest that all the
principles are needed for an appropriate management of the CPR with respect to the
prevailing agent population.
4.4.2. Protection principles
Again, we are comparing four runs to each other, see Figure 4.7, this time with a
population of 50% noncompliant members and non-members, furthermore unintentional
errors happen during the allocation process. From now on, P1 is used with a high
monitoring frequency.
The run with P1–P3 in use, results in all but 2 trials being depleted of resources over
the course of 500 rounds, due to the (unintentionally) noncompliant behaviour of the
agents. Adding P4 detects the noncompliant member and excludes them from further
allocations. 82 clusters endure until the end, but on average only 21.4 active members
remain per cluster. This low number of members is a consequence of the non-graded
sanctioning policy that also excludes agents that unintentionally appropriated too much
resource. With P5 used, noncompliant members get the chance to revise their behaviour
and as a result 76.4 members are active in round 500 and no depletion of resource occurs.
An additional P6 results in few depletions, 6 in total, all of them before round t = 30.
This time corresponds to appealtime and suggest that at the beginning of the life cycle, it
is not clear whether an agent intentionally or unintentionally appropriates more resource
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Figure 4.7.: P4, P5 and P6 : Lifespan of a cluster with 50% noncompliant members and
non-members, with unintentional violations.
than allocated, but the policy is to let them off. An advantage of P6 is that more active
members remain (86.0) in the institution, as opposed to the runs where a monitoring
procedure is in place (Pr1-4 and Pr1-5).
The resource level Figure 4.7(a) shows that there is a high correlation between P and
|M|. Especially in Pr1-4, there remain too few members to be able to deplete the
resource, yet agents are still excluded. This shows how important P5 is, but also implies
that exMethod is needed that can adjust the monitoring frequency (given that there is a
cost implied) and grades of sanctioning to the amount of resource and number of agents.
100
4.4. Results
4.4.3. Alternatives from the parameter set
With the following experiments we show that it is important to carefully tune the im-
plementation of the principles to the environment . To this end, we conduct two sets
of experiments with different agent populations and test P4 using a high and low mon-
itoring frequency.
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(b) Remaining Agents / Clusters --- Principle 4 high/low (Good)
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Figure 4.8.: P4 ‘good’ population: Lifespan of a cluster with all members compliant and
50% noncompliant non-members, no unintentional violation.
The first set of experiments contains three runs where all members are compliant with
the rules, no unintentional errors happen and 50% of non-members appropriate illicitly
from the resource. These are the same population settings as in Section 4.4.1. Figure 4.8
shows that (as before with P1 , P2 and P3 ) only 1 cluster depletes their resource dur-
ing the life cycle. Adding P4 with a high monitoring frequency (Pr1-4h) considerably
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diminishes the amount of resource left at the end of a round during times of medium
and low replenishment, 3 clusters deplete their resource midway. Setting the monitoring
frequency to low (Pr1-4l) leaves the members with sufficient resources. Given that there
are only compliant members in the institution all of them remain in their cluster in all
trials, member monitoring is theoretically not needed. The experiments confirm that
run Pr1-3 is a best and Pr1-4l a close fit for the environment.
The second set of experiments also contains three runs, but this time there are 50%
noncompliant members in addition to 50% noncompliant non-members. Again, there is
no unintentional appropriation of resources.
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(b) Remaining Agents / Clusters --- Principle 4 high/low (Bad)
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Figure 4.9.: P4 ‘bad’ population: Lifespan of a cluster with 50% noncompliant members
and non-members, no unintentional violation.
Figure 4.9 shows that when no monitoring takes place (Pr1-3) all agents remain in the
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clusters, but during times of low and moderate resource refill they manage to deplete
the resource, so that there are only 9 clusters that endure until the end. This time,
the expense of additional resources for monitoring pays off when adding P4 with a high
monitoring frequency. 88 clusters are able to sustain their resource and they exclude
almost all of their noncompliant members, so that only 56.9 remain on average. When
the monitoring frequency is set to low, the institution is not as successful in catching
the misbehaving members, in total 67 remain on average. The downside of a higher
noncompliant membership is that they manage to deplete the resource in 65 trials.
4.4.4. Comparing the refill schemes
After running experiments with the CUSTOM refill scheme, the scheme that we used for
experimentation in [93], we repeated each run with the same environmental and institu-
tional profile but different refill schemes for this work. The refill rate for the HIGH scheme
is h = 0.95Pmax/2, for MODERATE it is m = 0.8Pmax/2 and for LOW l = 0.5Pmax/2, after an
initial 50 rounds of refill rate Pmax/215.
We have three measurements per run. Firstly (a), the agents that remained active at
the end of a trial given as average per remaining cluster (including standard deviation
as error bars). Secondly (b), the number of trials where the cluster endured throughout
500 rounds. Where no cluster endured, the round when the last cluster got bankrupt
is mentioned instead. And thirdly (c), the appropriated resource per cluster over the
course of the whole life cycle (as average including the standard deviation as error bars),
which includes member and non-member appropriations. A grey bar at the right of
each group is the theoretical maximum of resource that all members can appropriate
in any one trial given the current refill scheme and when appropriating the standard of
50 resource units in 90% of rounds. This last measure can be regarded as the efficiency
of the resource allocation and uses the concept of utilitarian social welfare according
to [28]. The efficiency is an objective measure for conducting a quantitative evaluation
of the system.
Existence and management principles
In Figure 4.10, we can see these three measurements for four different refill schemes,
using the same population profile as in Section 4.4.1.
The principles that are used for the experiments do not include a monitoring or sanc-
tioning procedure, therefore all members remain in the clusters and only the runs where
15This initial refill period is set to match the theoretic demand, based on the fact that with P1 the
initial number of members should have been chosen smaller otherwise.
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Figure 4.10.: P1, P2 and P3 : Comparison of refill schemes in an environment with all
members compliant, 50% of non-members noncompliant, no unintentional
violation.
the pool of all trials was depleted has no members left, compare Subfigure (a) and (b).
For the case with high refill rate, all combinations of principles are successful and the
efficiency, see Subfigure (c), reaches the theoretical maximum16. For a moderate or low
refill rate P1 and P2 only are not enough to sustain the resource, furthermore, the
efficiency is relatively low with values of 14% (m) and 18% (l) of the respective maxima.
The addition of P3 in these cases results in only few trials being depleted and the
efficiency increases to 98% or 93% for a moderate or low rate respectively. For the three
runs with a constant refill rate, the difference between a low and high monitoring level
16In all these cases the standard deviation is typically higher for runs with more depletions, especially
if the times of depletion are spread out so that the agents get a longer or shorter time frame to
appropriate, see Figure 4.6, C.1, C.5 and C.9.
104
4.4. Results
does not become apparent within a group as the times of resource depletion are relatively
early. When the rates are mixed as in the custom scheme, we can see that although high
monitoring comes at a higher cost, the amount of resource that the agents are able to
appropriate over 500 rounds increases by 7%.
Protection principles
The next set of experiments, see Figure 4.11, has 50% noncompliant members and non-
members as population profile, and on top of that, unintentional errors occur upon
resource appropriation.
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Figure 4.11.: P4, P5 and P6 : Comparison of schemes in an environment with 50% non-
compliant members and non-members, with unintentional violations.
The lack of an exMethod (Pr1-3) shows that, apart from a high refill rate, the members
are not excluded from the institution but deplete the resource in nearly all trials. As
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a result, the efficiency lies by only 40%, 26% or 24% for custom, moderate or low rates
respectively. If the refill rate is high, then Pr1-3 proves to be most efficient and even
surpasses the theoretical maximum by 3% due to successful (but not depleting) illicit
resource allocation. With a standard deviation17 of 10%, we can see that the agents are
able to achieve a considerable increase on appropriation.
Adding P4 , member monitoring and exclusion at a first offence, brings the membership
down below 29 remaining agents per remaining cluster (which are 48 for a low refill rate,
but above 82 clusters for all other schemes). Both decreased membership and remaining
clusters have an effect on efficiency which is 56% (m) at its best. The fact that there
are less members excluded for a high than for a moderate or low refill rate is due to
the fact that noncompliant members only cheat on appropriation if they did not get an
allocation close to the amount they asked for (see A.3, lines 6–8).
With P5 in use, all clusters manage their resources in a sustainable way so that no
depletion occurs in none of the refill schemes. Furthermore, membership increases by a
factor between 3.3 and 4 in comparison to Pr1-4. This is due to the fact that with the
graduated sanctioning mechanism, noncompliant members now get the chance to revise
their attitude towards resource allocation after each offence. The efficiency for these
experiments increases by a factor between 1.5 and 2.1.
When we add P6 to the institutional rules there are two effects: on the one hand, the
membership further increases to up to 99 for a high refill rate, and on the other hand,
the number of remaining cluster decreases and is 90 at its lowest point (l). This is again
caused by the fact that during an initial period of appealtime, the members are let off
for intentional misappropriation, resulting in resources being depleted during that time.
Afterwards however, the adrMethod manages to keep the membership higher than is for
the case without P6 . In terms of efficiency, this has on average benefits for a high and
medium refill rate, though the standard deviation is relatively high due to early dropouts
(compare Figures C.1, C.5 and C.9 in the appendix). For a low refill rate the number
of early resource depletions is too high, so that the agents in the remaining clusters are
not able to achieve a higher efficiency than in the previous run (Pr1-5).
Depending on the nature of the open system, the outcome of either Pr1-5 or Pr1-6 might
be preferable in order to achieve higher membership or higher sustainability. And there
is always the option of combining the two approaches and take the appeals procedure in
effect after the initial period of appealtime only.
17This time, the variation in the standard resource is further influenced by the fluctuation of active
member agents, see Figures 4.7, C.2, C.6 and C.10.
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Figure 4.12.: P4 ‘good’ population: Comparison of refill schemes in an environment with
all members compliant and 50% noncompliant non-members, no uninten-
tional violation.
Alternatives from the parameter set
Now we examine the effect of changing an institutional field variable, the member mon-
itoring frequency, on two different population profiles, the ‘good’ one with no noncom-
pliant members (50% noncompliant non-members), and the ‘bad’ one with 50% noncom-
pliant members (and non-members). In both cases no unintentional violation of appro-
priation rules occurs. The monitoring frequency can take two values, high (Pr1-4h) and
low (Pr1-4l), and is compared to the case where no monitoring takes place (Pr1-3).
The first set of experiments using a ‘good’ population is shown in Figure 4.12. As
expected, no members are excluded from the cluster (a) and only when the refill rate
is low, the non-members manage to deplete the resource completely (see (b) custom
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Figure 4.13.: P4 ‘bad’ population: Comparison of refill schemes in an environment with
50% noncompliant members and non-members, no unintentional violation.
and low). As a result, the efficiency in the all refill schemes apart from low reaches the
theoretical limit (or by 99%). With a high monitoring rate, there are more resources
depleted than without monitoring at all, but with a low monitoring, the amount of
remaining institutions is as high or even higher18. This also increases the efficiency of
the runs to a value the same as or slightly higher than without monitoring.
The second set of experiments is with a ‘bad’ agent population, see Figure 4.13. For
Pr1-3, all members remain active in their institution as long as the resource is not
18An explanation for more remaining clusters is that the agents are likely to overestimate the monitoring
cost and lower their demands (raMethod is ration with this refill rate). This means they do not
appropriate all possible resource and illicit appropriations from non-members do not deplete the
resource as easily. Underestimation of monitoring costs results in an allocation 6 demand, thus has
no effect for a ‘good’ population.
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depleted, which is the major problem for this population profile. Only with a high refill
rate 97 clusters endure, in the other cases this amount decreases to 9 (custom) or 1
(m), with a low rate the resource in all trials is depleted by round 350. The efficiency
is accordingly low, between 23% and 47%, apart from the high refill scheme where the
theoretical maximum is exceeded by as much as 4%.
Introducing monitoring with a high frequency (Pr1-4h) brings the membership down to
57 for custom and low refill schemes, but the number of remaining clusters increase sub-
stantially for custom, moderate and low schemes. For high and moderate there remain
99 clusters and for custom and low remain 88 and 37 respectively. The efficiency increases
by a factor between 1.5 and 3.6 in all cases apart from the high scheme where it decreases
by 12% due to fewer members in only two remaining clusters more and high monitoring
costs. Changing the monitoring frequency to low results in more members staying active,
but decreasing cluster numbers (apart from high refill which is now 100). This affects
the efficiency which is decreased in comparison to the high monitoring frequency, but
still higher than with no monitoring taking place, in cases for custom, moderate of low
refill. For a high refill rate, the efficiency surpasses the theoretic maximum by 3%.
4.5. Evaluation
The data obtained from the testbed simulation and presented in Figures 4.6–4.9 (CUSTOM
refill scheme) demonstrates well that it depends on the specific agent population and
environment how the principles will perform. When the agents conform to the rules,
Principles P1–P3 are enough to manage the resource-allocation process. As the as-
sumption on the compliancy of the agents is relaxed, these principles are no longer
enough to ensure the sustainability of the resource and Principles P4–P6 become neces-
sary. The findings from these experiments coincide with the findings we obtained from
experimentation with our previous testbed [93], which adds credibility to our results.
In order to test and compare the robustness of principles with respect to prolonged
periods of scarce resources, we have simulated three more replenishment schemes, HIGH,
MODERATE and LOW. The results obtained from these simulations reinforce the findings
from the first set of experiments. Principles P1 , P4 , P5 and P6 are used to respond to
unintentional and intentional violation of If , the institutional facts, and to change the
agents’ activity state according to Figure 4.4 (page 86). Moreover, Principles P2 and
P3 allow the agents to adapt to changes of Bf , the brute facts in the environment, such
as a high or low resource level.
As we include more and more principles for creating rules in the institution, we can
greatly increase efficiency (i.e. utilitarian social welfare) in these systems. The only ex-
ceptions to this are cases with abundance on resources where all cost spent on managing
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and monitoring is wasted (HIGH refill scheme). For all other refill schemes we observe the
following pattern:
◦ P1 , P2 , P3 (‘good’ population, no unintentional violation, Figure 4.10(c)): The
efficiency increases with the rate of refill and increased number of used principles,
which is the much stronger effect.
◦ P4 , P5 , P6 (‘bad’ population, unintentional violation, Figure 4.11(c)): The effi-
ciency increases with the rate of refill and increased number of used principles in
the case of custom and moderate refill. For a low refill rate, the leniency of the
adrMethod results in a slight decrease of efficiency when P6 is used.
◦ P4 , high/low monitoring frequency (‘good’ population, no unintentional violation,
Figure 4.12(c)): The efficiency increases with the refill rate, but becomes lower for
high expenses on monitoring.
◦ P4 , high/low monitoring frequency (‘bad’ population, no unintentional violation,
Figure 4.13(c)): The efficiency increases with the refill rate and becomes consider-
ably higher for high expenses on monitoring.
The contrast of efficiency in the last two sets of experiments is compared in Figure 4.14.
The plain bars denote the ‘good’ population and the striped bars the ‘bad’ one. Through-
out, the ‘good’ agents are more efficient than the ‘bad’ agents apart from when there is
resource in abundance. If we compare the outcome of a ‘good’ population to the price
of anarchy in the proportional allocation mechanism in Section 2.7.4 (where compliant
members and non-members are a precondition), we can see that in all cases but one
(that is 0.73 for Pr1-4h at a low refill rate), the price of anarchy is close to 1. This is a
much improved result to the game-theoretic approach where the price of anarchy is 0.75
and can only become 1 if we assume perfect information (i.e. the appropriation sequence
of the agents is publicly known at all times).
Comparing these two sets of experiments makes it even more apparent that the selection
of principles according to the environment is crucial. In cases where monitoring is not
strictly needed, that is for compliant agents or lots of resource, the clusters are better
off with a low monitoring frequency (see also Figures 4.12(c) and 4.13(c–high)). But
in cases where the resource becomes sparse (due to agent behaviour or refill rates), a
high monitoring frequency leads to a more sustainable resource and enduring clusters
(compare Figures 4.13(b) and (c)).
The broad range of experiments that we conducted allows us to answer Q3 . We suc-
cessfully implemented a testbed using the formal axiomatisation given in Section 3.9
and showed that the design principles for CPR institutions (page 38) are sufficient con-
ditions for creating enduring open multi-agent systems that can manage a common-pool
resource in a sustainable manner.
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Figure 4.14.: Comparing the efficiency of Pr4 on a ‘good’ and ‘bad’ population without
unintentional violation.
There are a few limitations in this testbed. They become apparent especially where
the success of the chosen principle (or rather the chosen field value) is related to the
agent behaviour, such as the high or low monitoring frequency in the last two sets of
experiments; or to the environment, such as the use of P6 combined with a low refill
rate in the second set of experiments.
This shows that all principles have to be carefully implemented with respect to the local
environment  and that a trade-off for a single parameter that suits all possibilities cannot
be made. Consequently, we need additional mechanisms for the agents to firstly learn
about the environmental states (including the behaviour of other agents) and secondly
respond to them in an appropriate manner. There is a wide range of independent and
interdependent variables that all have to be analysed and the following question arises:
Q4 Can we equip the agents with mechanisms to evaluate the self-organisation?
One of the challenges is to estimate the overall utility one can obtain by making changes
to the institution I ∈ L. This utility depends on the cost such a change involves,
according to the distance function d (see Section 3.6), to make the change in the first
place, the new running cost of the altered I, and time frame that such a change is going
to be suitable for . According to [83], understanding the cost of a system is key to
understanding the benefits of the institution.
To meet this challenge, we need appropriate mechanisms for runtime self-analysis. Such
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mechanisms include perceiving agents that reflect on events and deduct consequences
from prospective actions, i.e. agents that are self-aware and choose their policies in
line with the environment and so favourably influence the behaviour of noncompliant
agents. In the following we will explore the possibilities of responding to particular agent
behaviour within the institutional context.
4.6. Summary
In this chapter, we showed that it is possible to use the formal axiomatisation of Os-
trom’s design principles to implement a testbed for managing resource allocation in open
systems. We furthermore showed that this is not just possible, but also that these princi-
ples are sufficient conditions for creating enduring open systems for sustainable resource
management. We therefore conducted a range of experiments, using different sets of
parameters to test the influence of P1–P6 on the variation of resource replenishment
and agent behaviour. We found that when the agent population predominantly complies
with the rules, P1–P3 are sufficient to manage the system. When we relax the assump-
tion of compliance, P4–P6 are needed to make the system robust to rule violations, but
it can manage a remarkable 50% noncompliant agents.
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5.1. Introduction
To answer Q4 , we go back to the methodology of sociologically-inspired computing
(Section 3.2) and evaluate the theory, formalism and computer model. The preformal
theory of Elinor Ostrom expresses explicit requirements on the self-governance of a
common-pool resource, but the assumption of human actors that reason about their
individual, sociological and organisational context is merely implicit.
In open systems however, the assumption on the behaviour of agents has to be made ex-
plicit. To this end we complement the preformal theory with the theory of self-awareness,
which gives agents the capability of reasoning about themselves and consequences of their
actions with respect to the institution and environment. This enables them to not only
decide on rules that are suitable for sustaining the resource, but also on rules they are
satisfied with and perceive as fair.
In the context of an organisation (or agent cluster), the fairness of concern is typically
from the area of organisational fairness. Here, we let the agents evaluate the fairness
of procedures within their cluster, which has an impact on their satisfaction. Several
options will be made available to the agents for reacting to perceived unfairness and
reduced satisfaction.
We start with an analysis of awareness and self-awareness in the field of psychology
and neuroscience that we also presented in [105], and then define with what level of
self-awareness to endow the agents in open systems solving the resource-allocation prob-
lem. Afterwards, we illustrate the concept of organisational justice from a psychology
and behavioural economics point of view. In order to explicitly express the reasoning
process leading to fair and satisfying procedures and outcome, we utilise the agents’
self-awareness in combination with a theory of fairness perception with respect to pro-
cedural justice. We include the formalisation of P7 and P8 into the computer model,
which serve as a tool for the agents to self-organise the procedures in the open system.
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5.2. Self-awareness for self-organisation
Autonomic systems have the capability to perceive the environment in which they are em-
bedded and leverage this information for self-organisation, self-adaptation, self-healing,
etc. In order to do this successfully, the components can benefit from some notion of
awareness or self-awareness.
5.2.1. Self-awareness in computer science
Computer science has a well established idea of awareness. Due to the lack of a univer-
sally agreed definition—also in neuroscience and psychology there are many crossovers
to what it means to be aware or self-aware—computer scientists rely mostly on an intu-
itive definition of awareness. Only few attempts to categorise (self-)awareness have been
made in surveys and reviews on this matter, as in for instance [3] or [71].
In artificial intelligence, the idea of (self-)awareness is related to artificial conscious-
ness, introspection and meaning. [75] discuss self-awareness in humans and machines,
focussing on the usefulness of self-awareness for machines, whereas [107] focuses on how
the knowledge derived from self-awareness can be represented. In networks, the idea of
(self-)awareness involves performance measuring against established metrics, for example
Quality of Service, and changing the structure or behaviour of the network accordingly.
Examples include proactive node, link and path discovery as discussed in [48], and the
ability to self-configure, self-provision and self-monitor a network to guarantee quality
of service [66]. Autonomous systems are systems that can manage, organise and repair
themselves even under the assumption of conflicting goals1. However, according to [97],
to initiate self-repair, the system needs to be aware itself that there is something wrong
with it. To achieve this, the system has to learn about its performance over time and
infer from the system’s parameters and performance what actions to choose and what
outcomes to predict with respect to the environment. Self-awareness can furthermore be
interpreted as a form of introspection on beliefs, desires and intentions, as used by [89]
to develop an architecture for emotional agents. In a sociologically-inspired system, self-
aware agents reason about their role or position within that system and in relation to
other agents for social or organisational purposes [72].
1For a CPR that would be the maximisation of individual appropriations vs. the sustainability of the
resource.
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5.2.2. Levels of awareness in social science
Our aim here is not to attempt a definition for self-awareness, but to present a scheme
for different levels of awareness, following some of our earlier work [105]. These are
inspired by Morin’s levels of consciousness and self-awareness [79] and complemented by
models about the self from psychology presents or neuroscience. In [99], for example,
five levels of awareness are presented as they develop in children, and [29] discusses to
what degree self-awareness can emerge from actions. Figure 5.1 gives an overview over
how we define these levels of awareness which we explain in detail after.
Levels of 
Awareness
Meta Self-Awareness
Self-Awareness
Consciousness
Unconsciousness
iterative self-awareness
self-concept
predictive self-awareness
persistent self-awareness
private self-awareness
public self-awareness
self-consciousness
recursive consciousness
spatial consciousness
minimal consciousness
light unconsciousness
deep unconsciousness
Figure 5.1.: From unconsciousness to meta self-awareness: Different levels of awareness
Unconsciousness At the lowest level is unconsciousness which can be further divided
into deep and light unconsciousness. Deep unconsciousness refers to a person deeply
asleep or in a coma, and light unconsciousness to a person that is dreaming or mentally
active, but not processing any internal or external information.
Consciousness The next level, consciousness, is split up into minimal, spatial and re-
cursive consciousness. A minimally conscious person is awake, registers stimuli, and
processes automated cognitive or sensorimotor programmes. A spatially conscious per-
son is aware of their position and (voluntary) movement relative to the environment. A
recursively conscious person is able to relate past and future events to the present state,
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to perceive their phenomenological content, and to respond to actions with a delay [37].
So far these instances of awareness do not include a notion of the ‘self’.
Self-awareness The next level is self-awareness which is sometimes also referred to as
meta consciousness, though the term self-awareness covers a wider spectrum [106]. This
level is concerned with the construction of a coherent mental model of the self, and can
be divided into five more specific levels, namely self-consciousness, and public, private,
persistent and predictive self-awareness.
Self-consciousness extends the level of recursive consciousness and includes an analysis
of the self over time and differentiates the self from others. With public self-awareness we
mean perceptual information that relates to behaviour and physical appearance, meaning
a person is aware of their own representation and the effects of their actions [2]. Private
self-awareness is the conceptual information about the self, which is gained through
reflecting on internal aspects like emotions, goals and physiological sensations. With
persistent self-awareness, the reflection on the self is extended over time, from the past
to some anticipated future. Predictive self-awareness goes one step further and not only
mentally models the self, but also the inner states of others. That includes the reflection
on future environmental states, and consequences of, or reactions on actions.
Meta self-awareness At the top level of the scheme is meta self-awareness, the aware-
ness of being self-aware or self-observing, split up into self-concept and iterative self-
awareness. Self-concept is the ability to analyse own thought processes in order to
abstract from the self, leading to a classification according to roles, value, identity and
character [80]. Finally, iterative self-awareness is an extension from predictive self-
awareness where a person constructs “mental models of other people’s mental models of
someone’s mind” [81].
The above levels are not strictly dependent on each other. Empathy, a sign of predic-
tive self-awareness, for example, does not necessarily presume public self-awareness. We
tried to produce a coherent scheme that includes the various levels and notions of aware-
ness, aiming for a clear distinction between each one of them, despite the ambiguity of
terminology and level transition in the literature.
5.2.3. Awareness in open systems
For creating and revising rules of an institution, awareness naturally influences human
decision making. The level of awareness used depends on individual capabilities and the
task they want to achieve. Typically, most levels of (self-)awareness are used, even if
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the individual is unaware of that. In artificial systems however, only a subset of the
presented levels of awareness can be reasonably applied to a certain process2 and we will
identify how open systems for resource allocation considered in this work can benefit
from using some notion of awareness.
As mentioned in Section 4.5, we need to ensure that the rules (and their parameters)
are chosen such that the resulting norms for appropriation are robust to varying envi-
ronmental conditions. The problem is that even though norms define how an agent is
expected (by other agents) to behave in the cluster or system, autonomous agents can
still deviate from this behaviour. We already looked at possible sanctions when an agent
does not follow the rules. Now we want to look at sanctioning methods if an agent does
not follow the norm3, and possible reactions are to stop interacting with the agent that
violated the norm [104] or with the cluster as a whole, or to change the rules to match
the norm.
To this end, the agents will be endowed with the capability of exhibiting predictive
self-awareness. They will simulate internally how they expect an agent occupying a
particular role to perform, according to their individual perception of norms. As an
example take the head performing a resource allocation. The state of the environment
and institutional facts are evaluated by the individual members (here these are the
allocations with respect to the resource level) and if the changes they observe do not
coincide with their expectations, they can decide to collectively reassign the role of head
to a different member.
Self-awareness can also be helpful in judging the rules in place and setting their param-
eters accordingly. In order to adjust the monitoring frequency used in P4 , for example,
the members have to evaluate the consequences of agent behaviour given the state of
the environment. Then they can decide whether it is sensible or necessary to increase
(e.g. for noncompliant agents appropriating from a scarce resource) or decrease (e.g.
‘good’ agents or plenty of resource) the monitoring frequency. Judging these conditions
requires recursive consciousness and public self-awareness as the basic functionalities.
More sophisticated reasoning is possible using higher levels of awareness. Other exam-
ples that we mentioned before and where awareness can be a beneficial concept include
the revision of an agent’s behaviour (by the agent itself) or the definition of a refined
appeals procedure.
Regarding the answer to Q4 : Endowing the agents with self-awareness constitutes one
such mechanism that can be used for evaluating the self-organisation of open systems
from an internal perspective. As opposed to the quantitative evaluation we conducted
2For example, some applications benefit from modelling spatial consciousness, for others this is not
even an option.
3In this context, to follow a norm means to perform as ‘expected’, i.e. there are no explicit rules
prescribing certain behaviour.
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in Chapter 4, this represents a qualitative measure of self-organisation. This leads us to
the next question:
Q5 Does a qualitative evaluation of processes enable the agents to makemore informed choices with respect to self-organisation?
5.3. Organisational justice in open systems
Two of the major reasons for groups developing rules are to maximise the satisfaction
of the involved parties [14] and to change the structure of incentives in particular situa-
tions [84]. One aspect that influences satisfaction in an institutional setting is how the
individual actors perceive fairness within the organisation. This section introduces the
field of organisational justice [51], elaborating on the area of procedural justice for re-
source allocation. We explain how procedural justice is evaluated and formed by human
actors and how we can apply this theory to agents of an open system using the concept
of (self-)awareness.
5.3.1. Organisational justice
Typically, the term fairness or justice is used in situations where conflicts arise, such as
the distribution of a common-pool resource, payments of premiums or cuts [74], or in
arbitration. Organisational justice comes in three main forms and is concerned with the
perception of fairness in organisations [30]. For each of the three forms we give a typical
statement from a member of an organisation experiencing this type of justice [63].
◦ distributive justice: “I receive fair rewards in this organization.”
◦ procedural justice: “This organization makes decisions in fair ways.”
◦ interactional justice: “In interpersonal encounters, my supervisor gives me a fair
treatment.”
Distributive justice is concerned with the fairness of distributing resources such as pay,
rewards, promotions or the outcome of dispute resolutions. That is, how the prevailing
rules are being applied. In the context of open systems, one example of unfair distribu-
tion is the effect of noncompliant behaviour, meaning the end distribution of resources
(individual appropriation) is not performed according to the rules previously specified.
Procedural justice is concerned with the decision-making processes that lead to a partic-
ular outcome and the amount of control that the procedures allow individuals over the
outcome [19], e.g. the combination of allocation and sanctioning procedures. As direct
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control over the outcome is often not possible, people try to control it indirectly. In the
open systems scenario, that includes the agents’ right to vote on a specific issue for it to
be changed.
Interactional justice is concerned with fairness related to the nature of interpersonal
treatment by colleagues and authorities. To realise interactional injustice in an arti-
ficial environment one would need to implement the equivalent to rude behaviour or
propagation of misleading information.
In [116], several studies are performed to test the effects of distributive and procedural
justice and the results suggest that a variation on fairness of the procedure has much
stronger influence on satisfaction than a variation on the outcome. Reviews of further
studies confirm that procedural justice is much better suited to predict organisational
commitment and trust towards supervisors than distributive justice, which is typically
related to specific outcome only, such as payments for example [78]. Interactional justice
leads to a further increase (or decrease if absent) on job performance and motivation for
compliance [32].
5.3.2. Procedural justice perceptions
The concept of procedural justice relates to the perception that an individual has on
the procedures regulating the distribution of resources. This means that the satisfaction
is not only influenced by the final distribution, but also by the sequence of events that
take place prior to the actual distribution, such as the selection of a distributor and the
process of decision making.
In [70], Leventhal defines seven procedural components that are typically evaluated by
individuals to establish a fairness judgement for an allocation process. For a fairness
judgement, an actor does not have to perform a ‘full’ evaluation, but evaluates any of
the seven components and aggregates the partial results to a final judgement.
Considering the institutional approach for managing resource allocation in open systems,
the procedural components to be evaluated are (fully or partially) integrated in the
principles for designing institutions for long-enduring CPR management.
◦ Selection of agents—Appropriate agents who serve as decision makers or informa-
tion collectors have to be chosen. This element is related to P3 and P4 , meaning
that decisions and monitoring are made by the agents themselves (or appointed
roles).
◦ Setting ground rules—Potential receivers of rewards are informed about perfor-
mance goals and evaluation criteria that must be met to obtain the reward. This
is similar to P2 and P5 which regulates the process of demand and allocation, and
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possible sanctions (negative reward) if the ‘compliancy criteria’ is not met.
◦ Gathering information—Reliable information has to be collected to be able to
evaluate potential receivers, also the type of information that can be used should
be declared. P1 and P4 are in charge of monitoring agents and the environment,
thus cover this element.
◦ Decision structure—A variety of processes are possible that define the structure of
how the final allocation takes place and who is eligible to perform it, see P2 .
◦ Appeals—Dissatisfied agents should be given the possibility to appeal to a distri-
bution or to actions that lead to a particular outcome. Like in P6 , the appeals
procedure can be informal or more structured.
◦ Safeguards—There have to be procedures that serve as ‘safeguards’, meaning they
ensure that the allocation process is performed according to the rules specified
and that nobody illicitly takes more reward than allocated. This element reads
just like P4 and P5 and states that there have to be monitoring and sanctioning
procedures in place.
◦ Change mechanisms—This final set of procedural elements includes methods that
regulate how the allocation procedures can be changed in order to correct unfair
situations, and is related to P3 and P7 .
P8 affects nearly all of the above components, as the fairness judgements can be repeated
on every level of a nested enterprise.
Given the overlap of procedural components and design principles, no additional elements
need to be integrated into the preformal theory, and the agents can directly evaluate the
specification of principles to arrive at their fairness judgements.
5.3.3. Three norms of justice
Many different factors are used to assess fairness within a particular context and relate
to job satisfaction, compliance with organisational rules, or the intention to leave the or-
ganisation or company. According to [32, p. 309], “work attitudes and intent to turnover
are sensitive both to rewards and the fairness or the organizational system” and [63]
examines how different types of justice affect job satisfaction and the intention to leave
the organisation.
In the field of Fairness Theory, the fairness of an event is evaluated by going through
three counterfactuals and individuals determine whether the outcome could, would or
should have been different given a specific situation, as explained in [43].
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The three most frequently used distribution norms in the literature of psychology and
behavioural economics are equity, equality and need4, as for example presented in [70]
and [74].
◦ Equity is the allocation of resources that reflects past contributions or achievements
of individuals;
◦ Equality means that every individual receives an equal allocation of rewards or
resources, regardless of performance or potential; and
◦ Need is the norm for distributing resources according to the relative need of an
individual.
Norms evolve differently according to the sociological context, and what distribution
norm is used by a certain organisation depends on the organisational culture. Equity is
typically used in organisations that want to increase their productivity, equality is used
in a context based on teamwork or when future interactions with the individuals are an-
ticipated, and the need norm is often found in settings with close personal relationships.
The organisational culture, in turn, is usually biased by the culture of the society an
organisation is rooted in. Many studies have been conducted to investigate the cultural
differences in fairness perceptions.
In [63], the authors examine how distributive, procedural and interactional justice (as
defined in Section 5.3.1) are related to overall fairness and how it affects job satisfaction
and the intention to leave in the US, China, Japan and Korea. The findings include
that distributive justice had a much lower influence on overall justice perception for
Americans and Japanese than it had for Koreans and Chinese. For interactional justice
(interpersonal treatment) the proportion of influence was reversed. As a response to
perceived fairness, Americans are much more likely to leave a company than Chinese or
Koreans, and also the job satisfaction was much more influenced by fairness for Ameri-
cans than employees of the other countries. Another important factor when evaluating
fairness is the ‘power distance’, the unequal distribution of power within an organisation.
In countries with a flat hierarchy, employees are much less tolerant to unfair behaviour.
In [69], cultural effects are assessed with respect to (current) situational events and it
is argued that socio-economic conditions can override cultural influences when choosing
a distribution rule. Resource-scarce countries prefer need as a distribution norm more
often than culturally similarly countries that are better off. The same override of cultural
influences was observed in different socio-political conditions (compared were former
East- and West-Germany) and, as mentioned before, for different situational goals such
as solidarity or productivity.
4Note that these definitions might not be equal to those found in the computer science literature.
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Another study of cross-cultural similarities and differences, as presented in [14], came
to similar conclusions, that when the basic requirements on food, clothing and shelter
are in doubt, need is the preferred distribution norm, and that this preference changes
when the minimum requirements are met for the majority of the population5.
The figures in Table 5.1 are derived from experimental data in [14, p. 62]. We have two
different agent populations, a capitalist one and a socialist one. In each population there
are different proportions of agents that act according to one of the three distribution
norms equity, equality and need.
Table 5.1.: Agent preferences for distribution norms
distribution norm
population equity equality need ℘
capitalist 1/2 1/3 1/6 3/4
socialist 1/6 1/3 1/2 1/2
Displayed are the proportion of agents that choose that norm under ‘normal’ or ‘regular’
environment conditions, and ℘ is the probability with which an agent is likely to change
to a different norm under ‘crisis’ environment conditions. Possible changes are6
equity ℘→ equality and equality ℘→ need.
The next section shows examples for the formal characterisation of rules that promote
fair procedures, techniques that can be used for judging fairness will be integrated in
the subsequent chapter.
5.4. Fairness in open systems
So far we used one type of fairness measurement in this work. This type evaluates
the resource distribution (efficiency) from an external perspective, using the concept of
utilitarian social welfare, see Section 4.5. This measurement was taken in retrospect
to inform us about the adequacy of parameter choice. Various alternatives for taking
measurements from an external viewpoint are defined in [68], using five axioms that
categorise a measure as fair. Examples of such fair measures are the Gini coefficient,
α-fair utility or Jain’s index.
5In the next chapter, we will use their results to set up the agent population for the simulation testbed.
6The original work did not specify whether changes from equity to need directly were made and how
high this percentage would be, so we chose to allow on ‘single hops’ only.
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In open systems however, an evaluation from an external perspective cannot be used
for runtime decision making. Therefore, we use a type of fairness measurement that
evaluates the procedure of distribution from an internal perspective, as is the case in the
field of organisational justice. This constitutes a subjective evaluation method.
Neither of those two measurements answers the question whether the open system is fair.
To answer this question, one has to define first what they understand by ‘fair’. In [120],
internal agent fairness is not defined using social concepts, but based on a clear mathe-
matical formulation, which also means that all agents to have the same understanding
of (formula for) fair behaviour. Computational social choice [28] is however a concern
in [61], where multi-agent systems are used to model fairness factors that make humans
deviate from purely rational behaviour.
We will extend the preformal theory with a fairness evaluation method (feMethod), the
functionality of judging procedural justice, using two of Leventhal’s procedural compo-
nents, see Section 5.3.2. Therefore we assume a cluster where the agents have different
cultural, political or economic backgrounds, they have to compare the head’s perfor-
mance to their internal fairness perception and take action for change. The procedural
component we address here are ‘selection of agents’ and ‘change mechanisms’, meaning
the agents evaluate the decision maker (head) and can make changes to that role or the
context they are situated in. For experimenting with these changes, we now axiomatise
the remaining two design principles of Elinor Ostrom (page 38), P7 and P8 .
The feMethod complements the agent model as follows. The agent in the head role
allocates resources to agents according to raMethod=queue. This time, the formation
of the demand queue does not happen at random, but according to the head’s internal
norm of distribution, either equity, equality or need. This norm does not have to be
static but can change according to the environmental circumstances (here the pooled
resource). The members then judge individually whether the head uses a (to them) fair
procedure. Depending on the outcome, their satisfaction will increase or decrease, and
they can subsequently vote for the head to be replaced by another member or leave the
cluster at their own discretion.
In this setting, we evaluate the fairness of the distributing agent (head) by using the
self-aware capabilities; P7 represents the possibility of choosing an alternative distrib-
utor, and P8 is a means to modify the procedural context by migrating to a different
‘department’ of the nested enterprise.
5.4.1. P7 : Minimal recognition of rights to organise
This principle says that the right of the appropriators to design the institution according
to their own preferences should not be challenged by external governmental authorities.
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Without this principle, all efforts of the appropriators to self-organise the resource allo-
cation process can easily be disrupted. Someone that does not agree how the rules of
the institution are set up can attain the authorities to override those local rules. As a
consequence, the appropriators will not have the power to enforce their own rules. Such
interventions from outside can make it very hard to achieve a sustainable organisation
of the common-pool resource.
To test P7 , we introduce a scheme where this principle is or is not respected and the
decision of the agents might be overruled by a third party. The application we choose
concerns the voting procedure.
Firstly the rule that stipulates that the head can be changed according to the vote by
the member agents:
rule "Recognise winner head"
when
$i: Institution($iid:id , $r:round , pr7==true)
Declared(inst==$iid , ballot =="head", round ==$r, $w:winner)
$h: Head(instId ==$iid , this!=$w)
then
retract ($h);
insert (new Member($h));
retract ($w);
insert (new Head($w));
end
The rule means that when P7 is active and $w has been declared to be the winner
according to the ballot in some round $r, this winner becomes the new head—unless the
winner is already the current head.
When P7 is not active, the members’ right to change the role of head is not recognised.
The members’ vote for a new head becomes invalid and the role is appointed by an
external agency. Therefore we have a separate rule that overrides7 the agents’ decision:
rule "External appointment of head"
ruleflow-group "vote"
when
$i: Institution($iid:id , round%rate==0, pr7== false)
$h: Head(instId ==$iid)
$mL: List(size >0) from collect(Member(instId == iid))
then
retract($h);
insert(new Member($h));
7Note that in this scenario, the agents do not even attempt to declare the winner if P7 is not active.
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Member m = (Member) $mL.get(random($mL.size ()));
retract(m);
insert(new Head(m));
end
In this rule, the appointment of a new head takes place at predefined intervals, every
rate time slices. An external agency collets all member agents onto a list ($mL) and
chooses a random member m to be the new head. The old head is retracted from the
working memory. This method to appoint a head externally is used here, alternatives
include a rotation system or appointment by discretion.
5.4.2. P8 : Nested enterprises
This principle is about nested enterprises. More complex CPRs that have to deal with
different local environments and jurisdictions are organised on the basis of two or more
nested layers and rule changes on the bottom layer are made in accordance with the
rules on a higher level [85, p. 102]. Without this principle, it can be impossible to meet
certain other principles. For example, P2 is concerned with the appropriation according
to local conditions. As CPRs grow larger, different conditions can emerge at separate
areas of the CPR, therefore separate appropriation methods are needed. To this end, we
divide the cluster in three subclusters (Ci with i = 1, 2, 3) and two layers. The top rule
layer defines how the resource P is divided into the three subclusters P = P 1+P 2+P 3,
and in the bottom layer, local rules define how to distribute their resource P i.
rule "Split resources for subclusters"
when
$p: CommonPool($l:resourceLevel)
$i: Institution($iid:id , pool==$p , $r:round , pr8==true)
$sL: List() from collect( SubInst(instId ==$iid) )
then
for(Object s : $sL){
modify(s){
setSubResourceLevel( $l*s.getSubMemberCount ()/
$i.getMemberCount () )
}
}
end
In this rule, all subclusters of an institution $i that have members appropriating from
a common pool $p are collected into a list $sL. The consequence of the rule invokes a
method that defines the amount of resource that is distributed to each of the subclusters,
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setSubResourceLevel(), which is the number of members in that subcluster divided by
the number of members in the whole cluster. Based on [74] where it says that equality
“does not differentiate among recipients”, we chose the distribution norm for this top
layer to be ‘equality according to member size’ as there is no possibility to further
distinguish among the receiving cluster members.
The distribution norm on the bottom layer is chosen according to P i, the resource
available to the subcluster Ci, and again (as before for the whole cluster) the head
decides on an allocation but can be ruled out if the members of Ci evaluate their head
to be unfair.
The method the head uses to distribute the resource is influenced by that agent’s internal
distribution norm, either equity, equality or need. For equality the members are put into
a random queue and allocated what they demanded in that round one after another
until there is no resource left. For equity or need the members are put into a queue with
all meritorious or needy members at the front of the queue, respectively. Again, the
members are allocated what they demanded until there is no resource left.
5.5. Summary
After one round of experimentation, we looked back at Figure 3.1 (on page 49) to re-
evaluate the preformal theory, formalism and computer model. The preformal theory
used in the first iteration of the methodology (Chapter 3) made implicit assumptions on
the behaviour of human actors that we have to make explicit for agents in open systems.
These assumptions include the expectation of self-aware actors and a self-organisation
that satisfies the actors according to what is perceived fair. The formalism is still fit for
purpose, so we did not further elaborate on this aspect.
We introduced the concepts of self-awareness and fairness in social sciences and leveraged
them for implementation, which will improve the computer model. To that end, we
performed the first step of the second iteration of the SIC methodology, the formal
characterisation of P7 and P8 . These two principles serve as example rules that are
applied by using self-awareness for judging procedural fairness of the allocation process.
Furthermore we answered Q4 , in that we can indeed equip the agents a mechanism
that enables them to evaluate the self-organisation.
126
6. Fair Self-Organising Resource Allocation
6.1. Introduction
In this chapter, we proceed with the second iteration of the SIC methodology and perform
the steps of principled operationalisation and controlled experimentation in line with
Chapter 4.
First, we describe how the agents perform their internal fairness judgement and what
actions can follow from that. Then, we extend the testbed with that functionality and
describe the phases that changed from the previous ruleflow and the functions that
extend the agent behaviour according to role. For the controlled experimentation, we
introduce a few new parameters and justify their initialisation. We describe the brute
facts and the institutional facts that we will use in the experiments and introduce the
measurements for data evaluation. Again, all experiments on fairness evaluation that
are performed with the CUSTOM refill scheme are analysed in detail and then compared
to the HIGH, MODERATE and LOW replenishment schemes. Finally, we evaluate the results
obtained from both iterations of the methodology.
6.2. Fairness judgement
To provide the agents with the capability to judge the fairness of the head, we use the
idea of predictive self-awareness. Before the appropriation phase, an agent retrieves in-
formation about the current resource level and gets a sample of allocations and demands
of other member agents. Furthermore, the judging agent has to know the individual
profiles of the agents to be allocated, meaning whether these agents have particular
achievements or are in a state of need. This profile information could be gained from
previous experience of social interactions, here it will be predefined. A publicly self-
aware (and noncompliant) agent could choose to influence how its profile is perceived by
others and so achieve a higher allocation than it would theoretically be entitled to, but
we did not consider this type of intentional misbehaviour here.
The judging agent then uses the retrieved information on the agent allocations to sim-
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ulate internally1, how it would have allocated the resources according to its internal
distribution norm and the sample demands. The outcome represents how the head
should have performed in that agents’ view, and relates to the intrinsic motivation of
that agent, that is the satisfaction or propensity to change the head or leave the cluster
it is member of.
According to [70] and [124], procedural justice is fostered when consistent over time.
Therefore an agent’s satisfaction will increase for fair head behaviour and decrease oth-
erwise. In case the head judgement repeatedly yields a bad outcome, the judging agent
has different options when the satisfaction falls below a certain threshold. These op-
tions are ‘no response’ (agents are self-aware but cannot respond), ‘vote for a new head’
(change the agent that exhibited unfair behaviour), ‘leave the cluster’ (leave the organ-
isation), and ‘create nested subclusters for local reorganisation’ (leave the department
but stay in organisation). If the agents experience a positive effect when changing proce-
dures (either procedural components or the whole context, i.e. they are able to respond),
their satisfaction will increase.
6.3. Principled operationalisation
To extend the testbed with the aforementioned functionality, we have to integrate the
fairness judgement procedure into the ruleflow and the self-awareness component into the
agent behaviour. This provides functionality to the agents for a qualitative evaluation
of the system.
6.3.1. Ruleflow
The new ruleflow for the testbed is shown in Figure 6.1, the syntax of the diagram is the
same as before, all added rules are in displayed in red. This control loop is also given in
algorithmic form, in Appendix D.13.
The changes only affect five of the nine ruleflow groups, which we will describe in turn.
◦ init: If P8 is used, three subclusters Ci are created in round 0 and initialised with
C1 = {member ∈ C}, C2 = {} and C3 = {}. In every round, the monitor splits
the resource into three parts P i after the pool has been refilled, one part for each
subcluster according to its member size
∣∣Mi∣∣, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
◦ cfv: In this ruleflow group, no vote is called for a new raMethod (which is auto-
1With ‘internal simulation’, we do not mean that the agent recursively calls the simulator, Presage2,
but that the agent simulates the allocation according to its internal norm (for itself).
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Figure 6.1.: Rule flow in the resource allocation process with fairness judgement
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matically set to queue at the start and samplingrate=500, see Table B.3). Instead
the head will initiate a voting procedure to reassign the role of head.
◦ vote: With P7 in use, the members vote for a new head, the votes are counted
and the winner is declared and updated. If P7 is not active, the winner update
is overruled and a head appointed by an external authority at predefined intervals
(according to samplingrateHead). The fact whether a new head is appointed or
not, has an effect on the member satisfaction.
◦ appropriate: The feMethod requires that members collect demand and allocation
information on a specified amount of member agents (judgeSize). The members
then judge the fairness of the head on the basis of this sample. If the head allocation
deviates by more than judgeTolerance from the allocation that member simulates
internally, the head is considered unfair and the member’s satisfaction is decreased.
◦ exclude: In this ruleflow group, the members decide, depending on their current
satisfaction, whether they would like to leave the cluster (satisfaction<leaveSat)
and become a non-member or not. If P8 is in use, the members have the possibility
to join one of two other subclusters instead of the possibility of leaving.
6.3.2. Agent behaviour
In the extended testbed, an agent is furthermore interested in a fair allocation of re-
sources, where ‘fair’ means ‘according to an agents internal distribution norm’. An
agent will therefore evaluate the head’s performance by sampling relevant information
from the agent population. Judging from these samples, the agent decides whether its
norm coincides with the head’s. The agent will express the perceived fairness through a
satisfaction value which increases for a positive and decreases for a negative judgement.
This judgement will also influence the vote that agent casts when the vote for a head
is called. If an agent is constantly dissatisfied with the fairness in the cluster it has
the option to leave the cluster completely, switch to a different subcluster or must stay,
depending on the testbed setup.
With the extension of the testbed, the different agent roles can utilise additional meth-
ods and rules. These are explained here, the implementation details can be found in
Appendix D.
We start with the additional member methods (again prefixed by a reference to the
code):
◦ D.1 vote(): To cast a head vote, a member checks whether it has judged the cur-
rent head as unfair in some previous round. If that is not the case, the head is voted
for again (line 6). Otherwise, the member makes a list of all candidates, which
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Algorithm 2: vote() by member m
h←− current head;
∃ call for vote on head;
L←− m’s list of heads considered unfair; // list of dropped heads, see judge()
if h /∈ L then
m votes for h;
else if len(L) 6= |M| then
m votes for random member a /∈ L;
else
m votes null;
are the members of the same (sub)institution minus all members that are kept on
the list of heads that previously dissatisfied the agent (droppedHeads, lines 8–13).
The agent then votes for a random member from this list (line 17), unless the list
is empty, in which case the returned vote is null (line 15). This procedure is also
outlined in Algorithm 2.
◦ D.2 satevaluation(): The satisfaction evaluation is split into two parts. The
first part concerns the change of satisfaction after a new head is appointed or
elected (initiated by HeadChange fact), and the second part concerns the change of
satisfaction for unfair head behaviour (see judge() or Appendix D.13). When a
head is appointed externally, a member will give this new head some credit and
set its satisfaction to initialSat, the value of initial satisfaction (line 10). When
a head is elected by the cluster, the satisfaction can be set to two values. Either
to initialSat (line 24) or to 1.0 if the new head coincides with the cast vote of
the member (lines 25–27).
◦ D.3 sample(): Creating a selection of member agents defines the first step in
performing a fairness judgement on the head. Therefore, the agents collect a list of
members (line 7) and select a certain number at random, according to judgeSize
(lines 18–20).
◦ D.4 judge(): To judge the current head, information about the demands and allo-
cations from the sampled members is retrieved from the working memory (lines 8,
9) and serves as input for judgeHead(), executed by the judging member agent
(line 13). There are two parts to the method judgeHead() which is the main com-
ponent of self-awareness. The first part is the agent’s internal allocation simulation
using the sample member demands. The agent calculates how many members can
obtain an allocation, given judgeSize and the current resource level (lines 26–
30). Subsequently, the allocation is simulated according to the agent’s distribution
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Algorithm 3: judge() by member m with distribution norm equity
Sample ←− set of sampled member demands;
m counts meritorious and needy members ∈ Sample: mS and nS ;
m counts meritorious and needy members ∈ Sample that got allocated: mA and nA;
possAll ←−
⌊
resource level
standard request · |Sample||M|
⌋
; // possible allocations, proportional to sample
// Simulated allocations:
if possAll > mS then // more allocations possible than meritorious demanded
m allocates all mS meritorious members;
m allocates rest of possAll to needy members;
else
m allocates possAll meritorious members;
m allocates nothing to needy members;
// Fairness evaluation:
if |m’s allocations to meritorious−mA| >judgeTolerance then
satisfaction(m) ←− satisfaction(m) - decreaseFactor · satisfaction(m);
else if |m’s allocations to needy− nA| >judgeTolerance then
satisfaction(m) ←− satisfaction(m) - decreaseFactor · satisfaction(m);
else // head considered fair
satisfaction(m) ←− satisfaction(m) + increaseFactor · (1− satisfaction(m));
norm, either regularNorm or crisisNorm (lines 20–24). If this norm is equity, then
the agent computes how many meritorious members can be allocated their de-
mand, any remainder goes to the needy members (lines 54–62). For need this is
the reverse (lines 71–79), and for equality the two profiles are allocated to equal
parts (lines 64–69). The second part of judgeHead() evaluates the deviation of
actual allocations by the head to the simulated allocations by the agent. If the re-
sult deviates by more than judgeTolerance (lines 82–93), the head is judged unfair
and added to the droppedHeads list if not there yet. Simultaneously, the member
satisfaction decreases by the decreaseFactor (lines 83, 89). Given a positive judge-
ment on the head’s fairness, the satisfaction of the judging member is increased
by (1-satisfaction)*increaseFactor. An example of judge() by a member using
equity as distribution norm is given in Algorithm 3.
◦ D.5 leave(): A member can leave the cluster if it is dissatisfied due to multiple
unfair allocations by the head. When its satisfaction is lower than leaveSat (line 7),
the member fact is retracted and a non-member fact inserted into the working
memory with a satisfaction of 0 (line 10). The head will not leave the cluster.
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◦ D.6 change(): If P8 is in use, three subclusters are created2, so that instead of
leaving the cluster, the member agents can choose a different subcluster if dissat-
isfied (line 10). Given that there is a different head in the new subcluster, the
satisfaction gets set to initialSat (line 14) upon migration.
The field methods of head and gatekeeper are extended as follows:
◦ D.7 declare(): After the votes are counted (line 6), the head has to declare the
outcome according to the following wdMethod. Firstly, the head checks whether
more than half the members voted for null (no head), in which case the institution
is retracted from the WM (lines 10, 11) which is the end for this (sub)cluster. If
this is not the case and more than half the members vote for the current head, this
agent is declared the winner (line 14, 15, 31). If this does not hold either, the agent
with the highest vote (even if below 50%) is declared the winner (lines 20–26, 31),
in case of a tie one agent is selected at random (line 29).
◦ D.8 update(): If P7 is used and a winner different from the current head has been
declared in the same round (lines 5–7), then the current head resigns (lines 10, 11)
and the agent occupying the head role is updated to the winner (lines 12, 13). A
HeadChange fact is inserted into the WM which triggers the member satisfaction
evaluation.
◦ D.9 allocate(): The allocation method is now executed according to three distri-
bution norms. Which one is used depends on the head’s internal judgment and the
pooled resource (minus any monitoring cost, lines 3, 9–12). If the norm is equity,
the member demands are shuﬄed and one after another added to an empty queue,
a meritorious member at the front, a needy member at the back (lines 15–23). For
need being the norm, adding the member to the queue takes place the opposite
way, a needy member is added to the front and a meritorious one to the back
(lines 31–39). For equality, the demands are shuﬄed and added to the queue
in the new order (lines 25–29). Subsequently, the members are allocated their
demands in order of the queue until there is no more resource left (lines 44–52).
◦ D.10 split(): For implementation purposes we slightly deviate from the order
of pool refill (depending on the refill scheme and maxLevel) and then splitting the
resource over the subclusters according to membership. Instead, the gatekeeper of
C first lowers the maximum resource level of the three subclusters Ci and then the
refill rule fires for each of them (lines 5, 12). In round 0, maxLevel is initialised in
terms of the membership (2*standardrequest*agents), so both methods yield the
same result.
2For implementation purposes, instead of 1 cluster having 3 subclusters, we created 3 clusters C i at
start with the same rules in the institution, i.e. I1 = I2 = I3 which state that there will be 3 separate
heads, unless a subcluster is empty, but only one gatekeeper for the whole cluster.
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There is one method which is not executed by a member or the environment  of the
cluster, but an external agency not in C. This method is:
◦ D.11 appoint(): Without P7 , an external agency appoints a new head for a
cluster or subcluster at fixed intervals (samplingrateHead, line 4). Therefore, a list
of agents is created with members other than the head (line 6) and one of them
chosen at random (line 11), unless empty. This chosen agent is appointed the role
of head, and the current head becomes a member.
6.4. Controlled experimentation
We now prepare the extended testbed for experimentation. Again, there is a subset
of parameters that we manipulate for the individual experimental runs, which we will
explain in the following. The complete list of additional field values and existing field
values that have changed from their previous default is given in Appendix D.12.
6.4.1. Parameters
A few of the new parameters we introduced for the extended version of testbed are
explained here.
◦ judgeSize=10, judgeTolerance=2—We cannot rely on the fact that every sample
drawn from the agent population represents 1-noRequestPercentage demanding
and profilePerc meritorious members, and allocated members depending on the
refill rate r, demand, profile and sample size. Depending on the distribution norm
used, these allocations occur with a certain probability (the member ’s profile is
referred to in brackets), see Table 6.1. Recall that r = 1 is enough resource to
allocate all 100 agents. For judging a head’s allocation procedure, we introduce a
tolerance of 2, so that the fluctuation in sampling (size 10) has less impact. The
probability of getting the sample ‘right’ with respect to sample size and tolerance
are 91% for meritorious/needy3, 99% for demand/no demand, and at least 91% for
allocation/no allocation, depending on the refill rate (worst for r = 0.5, up to 100%
for r > demand). Rawls calls this an instance of imperfect procedural justice [95,
p. 86], even though an evaluation has been carried out carefully and according to
the rules it may still yield the wrong result.
◦ inititalSat=0.8, leaveSat=0.4, increaseFactor=0.1, decreasefactor=0.25—The
initial satisfaction of 0.8 gives the members the possibility to increase their sat-
3Hypergeometric distribution: P (3 6 X 6 7)
((50
5
)2 + 2 · (504 )(506 )+ 2 · (507 )(503 )) /(10010 ) = 0.9084
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Table 6.1.: Probability of allocation by distribution norm with P (agent demanded) = d,
P (agent is meritorious) = m, refill rate = r
norm restrictions probability of allocation
equity
r > d 1.0
dm 6 r < d (merit.) 1.0
dm 6 r < d (needy) (r − dm) / (d− dm)
r < dm (merit.) r/dm
r < dm (needy) 0.0
equality
r > d 1.0
r < d (merit.) dmr
r < d (needy) d (1−m) r
need
r > d 1.0
d(1−m) 6 r < d, (merit.) (r − d (1−m)) / (d− d (1−m))
d(1−m) 6 r < d, (needy) 1.0
r < d(1−m) (merit.) 0.0
r < d(1−m) (needy) r/d (1−m)
isfaction if they encounter fair head behaviour (satnew = sat + 0.1 (1− sat)) or
a winner they voted for (satnew = 1). The chosen threshold for leaving means
that an agent leaves the (sub)cluster after being dissatisfied due to unfair head
behaviour (satnew = sat − 0.25sat) three times in a row (starting at sat = 0.8), or
four times with two fair judgements after each dissatisfaction, etc.
◦ samplingrateHead=r—The sampling rates chosen match different possible events.
The high rate of r = 12 represents the upper bound of heads that are voted for when
P7 (but not P8 ) is used (resulting in 42 appointments, max (voted) = 41.9) and
r = 15 represents the lower bound (resulting in 34 appointments, min (voted) =
33). The choice of r = 50 matches the change of refill rate every 50 time slices.
Some test runs were performed with all agents having equality as preferred distri-
bution norm, which led to 7 head changes when voting. The rate r = 75 results
in the same amount of appointments, r = 25 is in the sampling rate sequence for
good measure.
◦ institutions=3—We initialise P8 with three subclusters (for implementation pur-
poses they are three institutions with the same rules), one for each distribution
norm equity, equality and need, and no separate subcluster for ‘indecisive’ agents.
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6.4.2. Experimentation with brute facts
Again, we are using different schemes for the resource replenishment, these are CUSTOM,
HIGH, MODERATE and LOW. The schemes are the same as described in Section 4.3.1 with the
only difference that for HIGH, MODERATE and LOW the initial period of refill at factor 1.0 is
omitted. The total amount of refill does not change for the case with three subclusters.
Also, this time no unintentional violations will occur.
Furthermore, we only have two types of agent population, one is capitalist and the other
socialist. To make the influence of fair or unfair behaviour apparent, both populations
consist of fully compliant members, no non-members are present. The agents’ profiles
in both cases are 50% meritorious and 50% needy4.
In the capitalist population (as illustrated in Table 5.1), for 50% of the agents equity is
their distribution norm of choice and 75% of those will choose equality in times of scarce
resource (these agents are called ‘equityChange’) and the remaining ones will not change
their norm (‘equityStay’). 33% of agents in the capitalist population choose equality as
their regular norm, again 75% will change when the resource gets scarce, this time to
need (‘equityChange’), the others stay with equity (‘equityChange’). The remaining 17%
of the capitalist agents have need as their distribution norm (‘need’) from which they
will not deviate.
For the socialist population, the emphasis is on need which accounts for 50% of the
population. The equity norm is only chosen by 17% of agents whereof 50% change to
equality in times of scarce resource. 33% of socialist agents choose equality as distribution
norm and again, 50% will deviate to need when the resource gets scarce.
6.4.3. Experimentation with institutional facts
As the population in our experiments consists of compliant members, we use P1 , P2
and P3 in all runs, and P4 , P5 and P6 in none of them5. P7 and P8 will be used on
and off for experimentation. As the assignment of the gatekeeper and monitor is not
the focus here, their tasks (such as the splitting or resource over three subclusters, for
example) will be performed by a random member agent.
P7 ensures that the cluster’s right to organise is recognised by the authorities. This
principle is challenged by external authorities prescribing the head of an institution
every r time slices, where rater ∈ {12, 15, 25, 50, 75}. If P7 is used, the agents are
allowed to vote for the head themselves.
4These profiles are needed for both allocation and fairness judgement according to an agent’s distribu-
tion norm.
5This results in a collection of rules that are not fired anymore, which are displayed in grey in Figure 6.1.
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P8 concerns the nesting of clusters. With P8 used, the members choose a different
subcluster when their satisfaction falls below the threshold of 0.4. Two cases are tested
with P8 not used. One where the agents do not leave the cluster at all (leaveSat=0.0) and
one where the agents leave the cluster and become non-members when their satisfaction
falls below 0.4.
The aim of these sets of experiments, with brute and institutional facts, is to find out
whether the use of P7 and P8 result in a higher member satisfaction and lower leaving
rate, the main benefits of procedural justice.
6.5. Results
We now describe the experiments we conducted with the extended testbed and evaluate
the obtained data. The experimentation was split into four parts according to the refill
schemes. Each of the experimental runs was performed over 100 trials and the results
averaged. Several measurements (per remaining cluster unless otherwise stated) provide
information about the performance of the ‘self-aware open system’:
◦ Satisfaction—This is the measure for the satisfaction per member and time slice in
a cluster (or subclusters), i.e. 1/500∑t (∑a∈Mt sat (a) / |Mt|). For the case when
agents can leave the cluster, a measure per agent and time slice that includes non-
members is provided as well, i.e. 1/500∑t (∑a∈At sat (a) / |At|). The satisfaction
is averaged over all agents, including the ones from clusters that did not endure
until t = 500.
◦ Head Changes—With this measure, we collect all head changes that occurred by
the end of a run in a cluster or in all subclusters together, i.e. $l.size(), where
$l: List() from collect( HeadChange() ).
◦ Remaining Agents—This measure counts the agents that have not yet left the
cluster, i.e. |M500|.
◦ End Distribution—This is the distribution of remaining agents according to pre-
ferred distribution norm, i.e. |{a ∈Mt : norm(a) = x}| / |Mt| at t = 500 for the
group of agents with norm x ∈ {equityStay, equityChange, equalityStay, equality-
Change, need}.
◦ Purity—This measure has two components. Firstly, it retrieves the subcluster
that has the highest share of agents with some norm x in comparison to the
other subclusters, i.e. c = argmaxi∈{1,2,3}
∣∣{a ∈Mit : norm(a) = x}∣∣, where Mit
denotes the members of subcluster Ci at time t, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Secondly, the ‘dis-
tribution’ of this share of agents within the subcluster Cc is calculated, which is
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|{a ∈Mct : norm(a) = x}| / |Mct |. This value is then multiplied by the ‘concentra-
tion’ of members with norm x in Cc, meaning how big the share of agents with
norm x in this subcluster is in comparison to all agents with norm x in the whole
cluster, i.e. |{a ∈Mct : norm(a) = x}| / |{a ∈Mt : norm(a) = x}|.
The purpose of the first three measurements is obvious. The fourth, end distribution,
is used when agents can leave the cluster and allows us to judge whether a group of
agent that prefers a certain norm performs better or worse in comparison to the start
distribution of agents at t = 1. The last measurement, purity, is only used when members
can change into a different subcluster. It states how well agents of a certain norm group
do within a single subcluster and how many other agents are in that subcluster. For
example, purity= 1 means that all agents of norm x are in the same subcluster and they
are the only members in that subcluster. Compared to the initial purity value (t = 1),
we can judge whether the agents spread out evenly over the subclusters or whether they
prefer to gather with agents having the same norm.
We now present the results of the first refill scheme.
6.5.1. Fairness evaluation for the CUSTOM refill scheme
Figure 6.2 shows the satisfaction measure (a), how many heads changed (b) and how
many agents remained in the institution (for the leave case) (c). For (a) and (b) the
variations on P7 are presented along the x-axis and the variations on P8 are expressed
with several graphs. All runs are performed under the CUSTOM refill scheme.
The runs where only Principles P1 , P2 and P3 were chosen are shown in red triangles
(minus the value on the very left) as no leave with rate r ∈ {12, 15, 25, 50, 75}. In
these runs P7 and P8 are not used, i.e. the agents can express their satisfaction, but
they cannot do anything about their situation (which is either leave, go to a different
subcluster or vote for a new head).
We can see in Figure 6.2(a) that adding P7 (vote, leftmost column) leads to an increase
in satisfaction between 5% and 11%. The addition of P8 (change, green) leads to a
satisfaction increase by at least 5% for r = 12 up to at most 10% for r = 75. The
satisfaction rises with r, as the agents have more time to search for an appropriate
cluster before a new head is appointed.
The case where P8 is not used but the agents can leave gives them a limited possibility
to express their satisfaction. For the members in this category (leave (rem), blue), the
satisfaction is highest compared to other cases (without P7 ), but when we take into
account that between 70 and 80 agents leave the cluster over the 500 rounds, see (c), the
satisfaction averaged over all agents (leave (all), purple) decreases considerably to values
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Figure 6.2.: Satisfaction, head change and remaining agents for custom refill scheme
near the leaveSat threshold (grey line). A higher satisfaction for higher r is caused by
the low number of members. As all members are fully allocated, no unfair behaviour is
detected and the member satisfaction increases.
The difference between the satisfaction of members and all agents is not as big when P7
is used, as around 60 members stay in the cluster. The highest satisfaction value of all
runs, 0.95, is reached when both principles are used (vote, change).
Figure 6.2(b) shows the changes of head, averaged over 100 trials. Without P7 the
changes are predefined by the rate and are considerably higher for P8 due to multiple
clusters that are being populated after some time. For the case with P7 however, the
possibility to change cluster leads to a lower head change than for the two other cases.
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Figure 6.3.: Remaining agents by distribution norm for custom refill scheme
This is particularly important if the procedure of changing the head comes at a certain
a cost (which we did not implement here), like the monitoring procedure in the first
version of the testbed.
The socialist and capitalist runs notably differ for leave only. The satisfaction for all
agents is between 8% and 13% higher for capitalists than for socialists, note that with
P7 this is reversed and the difference is smaller (+5%). The absolute values of remaining
agents per distribution norm in these runs are shown in Figure 6.3.
The voting case has more agents remaining than when a head is appointed externally.
Moreover, the socialist population structure is better preserved in that case. This is due
to the fact that 50% (or 67% when resources are low, which is also the time when most
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Figure 6.4.: Distribution of remaining agents by norm for custom refill scheme
conflicts arise) of agents with ‘need’ as distribution norm are enough mass to successfully
call for a new vote as soon as a head’s norm differs, whereas when the head is appointed
by an external agency, they just have to stick with it for r time slices or leave. The
same holds for the capitalist population, although the effect is not as strong, as for a
low resource, merely 13% of the initial population have ‘equity’ as preferred distribution
norm and ‘equality’ has a share of 46%.
The percentage distribution of remaining agents can be recognised better using the end
distribution measure, see Figure 6.4. It shows well that agents do not leave uniformly
in which case all the lines would be flat. Again, for the socialist case, the distribution
for vote follows the opposite trend than for rate (apart from equalityStay) but for the
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Figure 6.5.: Purity by distribution norm for custom refill scheme
capitalist case the numbers merely differ in magnitude. The groups that profit6 in the
socialist case (a) are need and equalityChange, whereas in the capitalist case (b) they
are equalityStay and equityChange.
The last measure we discuss is purity (change). Figure 6.5 shows that the agents do not
just spread out equally over the subclusters (this theoretical case is represented at the
far left), but organise group wise. As they are more likely to migrate when the resource
is low, they tend to group ‘need & equalityChange’, ‘equalityStay & equityChange’ and
‘equityStay’. When the head is appointed externally, the grouping works better for
higher rates as there is more time for exploration.
6We say a group profits wherever the graph goes up from the perspective of ‘initially’.
142
6.5. Results
0 100 200 300 400 500
time
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
a
g
e
n
ts h h m l h h l m l h
(a) Vote For Head --- Socialist
Subcluster 1:
equityStay1
equityChange1
equalityStay1
equalityChange1
need1
Subcluster 2:
equityStay2
equityChange2
equalityStay2
equalityChange2
need2
Subcluster 3:
equityStay3
equityChange3
equalityStay3
equalityChange3
need3
400 420 440 460 480 500
time
5
10
15
20
25
30
a
g
e
n
ts
l h
(b) Zoom
Figure 6.6.: Subcluster change of socialist population (Pr7 and Pr8, 20 head changes)
Table 6.2.: End distribution of socialist population (Pr7 and Pr8 )
equityStay equityChange equalityStay equalityChange need
subcluster 1 · · · 14 50
subcluster 2 9 · · · 1
subcluster 3 · 8 18 · ·
total 9 8 18 14 51
We now show the subcluster migration for two singular trials. Both have a socialist
population structure and for the first trial, P7 was used, see Figure 6.6. The refill
rates during certain time frames are shown in the rectangles, above those are strokes of
different length indicating how many head changes occurred at what time. All 20 changes
occur during periods of low resource refill. This is mainly due to the fact that at times of
high refill all members that demand resources (90%) can be fully allocated. Furthermore,
for times of medium refill rates only 22% of agents that demanded resource cannot be
allocated, which, if a representative sample of 10 members is drawn (see Section 6.4.1),
might be seen as fluctuation and is to 97% covered by the tolerance of 2.
How the agents are distributed over the three subclusters by the end of this trial can be
seen in Table 6.2. These figures indicate that the predominant distribution norm for the
first subcluster is ‘need’, for the second it is ‘equity’, and ‘equality’ for the third. From
that, we conclude that the self-organisation into different subclusters according to the
agents’ individual fairness perception is working well.
The second trial we present, see Figure 6.7, uses again a socialist population structure
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Figure 6.7.: Subcluster change of socialist population (rate = 15 and Pr8, 82 head
changes)
Table 6.3.: End distribution of socialist population (rate = 15 and Pr8 )
equityStay equityChange equalityStay equalityChange need
subcluster 1 · · · 19 33
subcluster 2 · · 1 3 21
subcluster 3 8 5 10 · ·
total 8 5 11 22 54
and P8 , but the head is appointed at rate r = 15, i.e. P7 is not used. Other than in
the first trial, we observe a high number of subcluster changes for agents preferring the
need norm. This is due to the fact that in this trial the agents cannot express their
dissatisfaction other than through leaving the subcluster, whereas in the previous case
voting for a new head is the first resolution method.
Also the other groups of agents change subclusters more often than in the previous trial,
and their distribution at t = 500 within the subclusters is shown in Table 6.3. This time,
both subclusters 1 and 2 have ‘need’ as their predominant distribution norm, and the
third subcluster is shared by ‘equity’ and ‘equality’.
Two more trials similar to the above can be found in Appendix E, this time the pop-
ulation structure is capitalist but the use of principles is the same. Again, we can see
(Figure E.1 and Table E.1) that P7 enables the agents to organise themselves into sub-
clusters according to preference. Without this principle (Figure E.2 and Table E.2) the
agents migrate much more frequently. Furthermore, the groups of agents with the same
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distribution norm are even more defragmented than in the corresponding socialist trial
with no P7 , and no clear classification into predominant norms is possible.
We briefly summarise the outcomes of these first sets of experiments:
◦ The satisfaction is best when Principles P7 and P8 are in use. When P7 is not
used, the satisfaction rises with r. When P8 is not in use the satisfaction is lowest
on average for agents that have the possibility to leave, but highest for the few
agents that remain in the cluster, see Figure 6.2.
◦ The head changes we observe when P7 is in use are about the same as the changes
that occur for external appointments with r = 12 or r = 15. When P8 is added,
the external appointments increase significantly, whereas there are even less heads
changed by vote for than without P8 .
◦ The numbers of remaining agents are considerably higher with P7 than when a
new head is appointed externally. Without P7 , the small membership results in
all members being allocated resources in every round, therefore the satisfaction
only decreases shortly when a head change occurs. This effect becomes apparent
for high r when the accumulated satisfaction increases.
◦ The end distribution of remaining agents shows that agents do not leave the cluster
uniformly. When P7 is used, the agents that remain in the cluster more likely are
the agents in line with the current population structure (socialist or capitalist).
When P7 is not used, this trend is stronger for the capitalist, but reversed for the
socialist population, see Figure 6.4.
◦ When P8 is used, the agents can migrate from one subclusters to another. The
purity measure shows that they are indeed able to form subclusters of like-minded
members, which works best when the head changes are low and the rate of migra-
tion decreases (Figures 6.6 and 6.7).
6.5.2. Fairness evaluation for HIGH, MODERATE and LOW refill schemes
This section evaluates the experimental runs with the refill schemes HIGH, MODERATE
and LOW, where the refill rate is constant over the whole 500 rounds. Again, there are
two population structures (socialist and capitalist), all agents comply with the rules of
appropriation, and Principles P7 and P8 have been tested with different parameters.
Figures 6.8 and 6.9 show the satisfaction, head changes and remaining members of the
sets of experiments with a high and moderate rate of replenishment respectively. For
the high case, there are no differences due to the variations on P8 . When there are
enough resources so that every agent gets allocated in every round, no unfair behaviour is
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Figure 6.8.: Satisfaction, head change and remaining agents for high refill scheme
detected and all members stay in the cluster. As none of the agents becomes dissatisfied,
no head changes occur for the case when P7 is used and the satisfaction is nearly 1.0.
When the head is appointed by an external agency, the agents satisfaction decreases
at each time of appointment and re-increases in subsequent time slices. This has as
effect that for frequent head changes the satisfaction is lower on average than for less
frequent ones. When the refill rate is moderate, the satisfaction differs a little according
to the chosen instance of P8 , is slightly higher for the capitalist than for the socialist
population, and the satisfaction is higher when P7 is used as when it is not. This time,
between 7.2 and 12.1 new heads are voted for, including the case when P8 is active
and three subclusters can vote for their separate heads. When P7 is not used, the head
changes with P8 increase by at least 61% in comparison to the cases where members
146
6.5. Results
vote rate=12 rate=15 rate=25 rate=50 rate=75
head appointment
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
a
v
g
. 
sa
ti
sf
a
ct
io
n
 p
e
r 
a
g
e
n
t/
ti
m
e
st
e
p
(a) Satisfaction (MODERATE)
socialist:
no leave
leave (rem)
leave (all)
change
 
capitalist:
no leave
leave (rem)
leave (all)
change
vote r=12 r=15 r=25 r=50 r=75
head appointment
0
20
40
60
80
100
h
e
a
d
 c
h
a
n
g
e
s 
p
e
r 
a
ct
iv
e
 c
lu
st
e
r
(b) Head changes (MODERATE)
socialist:
no leave
leave
change
 
capitalist:
no leave
leave
change
vote r=12 r=15 r=25 r=50 r=75
head appointment
0
20
40
60
80
100
re
m
. 
a
g
e
n
ts
 o
r 
re
m
. 
cl
u
st
e
rs
(c) Remaining agents and clusters --- leave case (MODERATE)
ag. socialist
cl. socialist
ag. capitalist
cl. capitalist
Figure 6.9.: Satisfaction, head change and remaining agents for moderate refill scheme
cannot change to a different subcluster. Furthermore, only up to 2.3% of agents leave
the cluster when it is possible.
The experimental runs with a low replenishment rate have a very different outcome in
satisfaction, head changes and remaining agents, see Figure 6.10. For the first time, not
all the clusters endure until the end. When P7 is used and agents can migrate, the
number of head changes amounts to a value between the numbers for appointment with
rate 12 and 15. This means for the satisfaction, that it is only up to 5% higher for the
vote case than in comparison to r ∈ {12, 15} and the satisfactions at r = 50 and r = 75
surpass the satisfaction from the vote case.
When P8 is not used, the difference in head changes between voting and appointment is
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(c) Remaining agents and clusters --- leave case (LOW)
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Figure 6.10.: Satisfaction, head change and remaining agents for low refill scheme
substantial. The highest value, 425, is from the case where leaving is allowed, P7 is used
and the population profile is socialist. In only 13 of the 100 trials, the cluster endures
until t = 500 with an average of 64 remaining agents. In all other cases, more than
half the members vote null at some t < 500 which leads the end of the institution and
subsequent abortion of the trial. This is also reflected in the satisfaction value which is
the average per agent and time slice, including the runs that ended prematurely. The
satisfaction for all agents in this case is 0.39, which is lower than leaveSat.
For a capitalist population, 56 trials endure until the end with on average 352 head
changes, which results in more remaining agents (57.4) and a 7% higher overall sat-
isfaction. When P7 is not used, a predefined number of head changes occur, which
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lead to a greater overall dissatisfaction (as low as 0.2) and even fewer remaining agents
(19.2). However, this time, and in all other remaining trials with the low refill scheme,
all clusters endure until the end as there are no voting conflicts.
The end distribution of the two population structures can be seen in Figure 6.11. In
comparison to the initial distribution, more agents that prefer the need norm (for a low
refill these are equalityChange and need) are present in the socialist population when P7
is used. For the capitalist population, the profiting agents have equality as their preferred
norm (equityChange and equalityStay). When the head is appointed externally, these
distribution differences increase for the capitalist population, but for the socialist one,
‘need’ looses out and ‘equity’ profits this time. As no agents or almost none leave when
the replenishment rate is high or medium, the end distribution in these cases is (quasi)
the same as the initial one, see Figures E.3 and E.4 in the appendix.
When the agents are not able to leave the cluster, the capitalist population votes for
245 new heads if P8 is used, the socialist population vote for 197, see Figure 6.10(b).
In both cases, the satisfaction reaches 0.74. Without P8 and a fixed amount of head
changes, the satisfaction drops down by 13% to 25%, as the agents have no means to
express their preferences. Contrary to the other refill schemes, the satisfaction now de-
creases with decreasing head changes (r increasing), as there are fewer resources resulting
in a higher probability of perceived unfairness (average satisfaction below initialSat).
The next measure we discuss is the purity for runs when P8 is used. For the case with
high refill rates, no member changed subcluster and the purity does not deviate from
the initial value. When the refill rate is moderate, only very few agents migrate and the
purity remains nearly the same. These two cases are shown in Figure E.5 and Figure E.6
in the appendix.
A low replenishment rate, causes the agents to change subcluster frequently until they
find themselves with likeminded agents in the cluster. Figure 6.12 shows that the purity
increases substantially for all groups of agents that prefer the same distribution norm.
The purity in these three figures is also reflected in the figures and tables hereafter that
show the migration and end distribution of members in four individual trials.
The first two trials in Figure 6.13 use P7 and P8 with a socialist population and a
high (a) or moderate (b) refill scheme. As mentioned before, no subcluster changes
happen when the replenishment rate is high and only a few when the rate is moderate,
mainly by agents preferring equity as sole distribution norm (equityStay). The appendix
contains Table E.3 with the final distribution of agents over the subclusters in both trials.
The third trial, again with P7 , P8 and a socialist population, is shown in Figure 6.14.
This time, many more agents change subcluster in the first half of the trial. In the second
half, they manage to organise themselves into sufficiently similar clusters and vote for
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Figure 6.11.: Distribution of remaining agents by norm for low refill scheme
appropriate heads (370 head changes in total) so that only a few more changes follow
towards the end of the trial. So overall, the rate of subcluster change and head change
seem to be inversely proportional for this trial.
In the end, the agents reach the following distribution over the three subclusters, see
Table 6.4. The prevailing norm in the first subcluster is ‘need’ and in the third ‘equity’.
The agents in the second one come from various groups, but all of equityStay and the
remaining agents of ‘equality’ are included.
In order to compare the case when the agents are able to vote for their head to the
case when the head is appointed externally, we include Figure 6.15. Again the refill rate
is low and the end distribution is in the appendix, Table E.4. In this trial, the head
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Figure 6.12.: Purity by distribution norm for low refill scheme
changes ‘only’ 102 times, but all of them are critical to the cluster as the appointment
is made at random. This has as effect that even the majority group in a subcluster has
to migrate (see for example need1 → need2 in (a)). Still, the agents manage to organise
into subclusters intermittently. When a new head is appointed the agents can be forced
to change again and the stability of the subclusters does not endure.
6.5.3. Evaluation
The data obtained from the four refill schemes allows us to draw several conclusions on
the benefits of Principles P7 and P8 .
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Figure 6.13.: Subcluster change of socialist population (Pr7 and Pr8 with 0 and 17 head
changes respectively), high and moderate refill schemes
Table 6.4.: End distribution of socialist population (Pr7 and Pr8 ), low refill scheme
low equityStay equityChange equalityStay equalityChange need
subcluster 1 · · · 13 44
subcluster 2 9 3 6 3 5
subcluster 3 · 7 10 · ·
total 9 10 16 16 49
There are two variations that do not use any of these two principles, one is ‘no leave’, the
other ‘leave’ with different rates of head appointment. In all experiments, the satisfaction
of the ‘no leave’ case is higher than for the ‘leave’ case, that is because all agents remain
in the cluster until the end, adding to the total satisfaction. In the other case, however,
agents leave the cluster as soon as they are dissatisfied and do not contribute to the
satisfaction any longer. Which agents they are, depends on the population structure
and the agents’ individual preference of distribution norm. On the one hand, this leads
to a much increased satisfaction for the remaining members, but on the other hand,
the overall satisfaction becomes very low as the resource replenishment is low. If we
merely care about the members that remain in the cluster, however small that number
might be, then this should be the preferred strategy. If membership is important, more
functionality (here principles) is needed to avoid the relatively low satisfaction of the ‘no
leave’ case.
Adding P7 , i.e. enabling the agents to choose their own head, surpasses the satisfaction
of all other agents but in a few cases. For the custom refill, the satisfaction for remaining
members is higher by at most 2.7% for the rates 50, and 75, and when the refill scheme
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Figure 6.14.: Subcluster change of socialist population (Pr7 and Pr8, 370 head changes),
low refill scheme
is moderate and the appointment rate is 75, they are about the same for remaining
and all members. For the low refill scheme, the satisfaction increases between 15% and
31% for all appointment rates when we consider the remaining agents only. Although
more agents remain in clusters where agents can vote for their head as opposed to
have it appointed, in many cases the members of these clusters cannot find a head that
suits them, so when they run out of possibilities, the clusters have to be terminated
prematurely. According to the rules, the agents move a head onto their droppedHeads
lists as soon as they are dissatisfied with its performance once, and there is no possibility
for a head to get off these individual lists. We contend that a more graduated scheme
where, if a head performs well for several time slices after it misbehaved (even if the
behaviour is misjudged), the head can be taken off the list again, can solve this issue.
However, taking into account that not all clusters (and corresponding members) make
it until round 500, the satisfaction still reaches a very high value compared to when a
head is appointed and all clusters endure.
P8 allows the agents to create subclusters within their cluster, each with their own head.
They will move to a different subcluster after several instances of dissatisfaction in the
current subcluster7. With this principle, the agents can organise themselves into more
homogenous groups (see purity measurement) and within that group an appointed head
is more likely to satisfy the members, and it is easier for minority groups to have their
preferred head elected, who would otherwise be out ruled. The satisfaction with P8 is
highest in comparison to all other runs of the ‘no leave’ or ‘leave’ cases.
7Effectively, this is a graduated scheme.
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Figure 6.15.: Subcluster change of socialist population (rate = 15 and Pr8, 102 head
changes), low refill scheme
When we compare the CUSTOM scheme with the other refill schemes, we can see that the
agents organise during low refill periods and the agent distribution (either end distribu-
tion or purity) are similar to the runs where the LOW scheme was used.
The satisfaction of the socialist and capitalist population structures are different by less
than 1% and the head changes by at most 2.4 changes, although the structure within
the subclusters is very different for both cases. This suggests that both structures are
able to self-organise according to their needs and that they perform equally well.
We did not yet answer Question Q5 , whether the qualitative evaluation enables the
agents to make more informed choices with respect to self-organisation. Consider the
case of fairness evaluation in combination with P7 , for example. Here, self-awareness
allows the agents to make informed choices as opposed to the random choice an external
agency makes when appointing a different agent to the role of head. The results suggest
that the informed choices are also the better choices, at least when it comes to the
individual agent satisfaction. That is at least in all cases but one, when the agents
fail to agree on a head (see Figure 6.10). The extended version of the testbed does
not exploit the full spectrum of awareness. We believe that enabling the agents with
a level of recursive consciousness and persistent self-awareness, i.e. the reflection over
time with respect to the environment and the self, can resolve the issue of repeatedly
voting for new heads although the environmental circumstances did not yet change.
Appropriate functionalities can include a forgiving droppedHeads list on the agents’ side
and exculpation procedures (adrMethod) for the head. It depends to what extent the
agents can utilise the knowledge that they gained from evaluation (principles in use)
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and to what extent such an evaluation is possible (level of awareness), but as we can
see from the results presented here, adding a mechanism for evaluation from a system’s
perspective enhances the success of self-organisation due to more informed agent choices.
6.6. Summary
In this chapter, we presented the principled operationalisation and controlled experimen-
tation of the second iteration of the SIC methodology, in order to integrate a subjective
evaluation mechanism. We showed that if the agents fail to introspect on fairness (on
the example of the present allocation process), they run the risk of being exploited by
the head agent without knowing about it. That is, the head might implement a fairness
norm they do not approve of and therefore some individuals might get less resource
allocated than they would otherwise. We tested this effect by endowing the agent with
self-awareness but not giving them the capabilities to react on their justice perceptions.
We saw that the satisfaction was significantly lower for these cases. In a second set of
experiments, we gave the agent the capability to leave the cluster completely, which re-
sulted in a higher satisfaction for the remaining members, but the total average outcome
became worse as there was no alternative provided for the leaving agents.
The agents could take two sets of actions to counteract unfairness, depending on the
principles used. P7 enables them to vote for an alternative head when the present head
is perceived unfair, and P8 enabled them to create subclusters within the main cluster
where each subcluster had their own head performing the resource-allocation process.
Upon introspection, the agents chose whether to vote for an alternative head with a
more suitable norm, or to migrate subclusters where there might be more agents sharing
the same norm. Both methods lead to a significant increase in satisfaction and show
that agents that subjectively evaluate the system performance make better choices for a
successful self-organisation.
Deciding on how to instantiate the principles depends mainly on the environment and
objectives of the open system, and the potential behaviour of the agents. The absence of
P7 can hinder the self-organised execution of all other principles and impede sufficient
membership. If maximising the total number of members is one of the goals then P8
can provide a valuable addition to prevent alienating members.
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7. Summary, Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, we summarise the main findings of the testbed for self-organised resource
allocation in open systems and the testbed extension, and we summarise the results of
the five research questions that have been answered throughout this work. We then
illustrate the limitations to this work and present future research directions.
7.1. Final summary
We considered the problem of self-organising resource allocation in open systems with
the aim to develop a simulation testbed to test an institutional approach of the alloca-
tion process. We then used objective and subjective evaluation methods for judging the
longevity, occupancy and fairness of the system. For the development we mainly consid-
ered two theories, one from political economy to address the issue of resource allocation,
and one from computer science to address the issue of integrating the first theory into
the open systems testbed. The obtained results show from an objective perspective (the
designer’s view) that combining both theories leads to a sustainable (self-)management
of the resource and has particular advantage when the endurance of the system is more
important than short-term optimality.
In order to evaluate the system from a subjective perspective (the agent’s view), we took
two more theories into consideration: One from the field of psychology and neuroscience
on awareness and self-awareness, and one from psychology and organisational economics
on organisational justice. We then extended the testbed functionalities and endowed the
agents with the capability of exhibiting self-awareness. That allowed them to evaluate
the fairness of the resource-allocation process and to take appropriate action to influence
the processes or their position within the system.
We make three main contributions in this work: The first formal characterisation of
Ostrom’s design principles for creating institutions for resource management in a rule
management system; the design and implementation of a large-scale, reusable exper-
imental testbed embedded in a multi-agent systems simulator, which transforms the
design principles into policies and procedures that can be directly executed; and the two
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sets of experiments conducted with this testbed showing that the Ostrom’s design prin-
ciples are sufficient conditions for electronic institutions for enduring self-organisation of
the system, and that the individual and collective performance can be further improved
by mechanisms for subjective system evaluation. This provides a basis for evaluating
procedural fairness and for cost-effective prevention of noncompliance. We equipped the
open systems considered in this work, i.e. systems of rules and organisational structure,
with the means to ensure a system’s operation in the best interests of its components,
given only the sum of the components’ subjective opinions and their interactions with
which to work.
7.1.1. Conclusions from the testbed and its extension
We modelled the open system using a formal characterisation of Ostrom’s eight design
principles for managing common-pool resource institutions [85]. In Table 7.1 we show
the benefits of each principle (see page 38) individually.
Table 7.1.: Benefits of Ostrom’s principles for resource allocation in open systems
Principle Benefit
P1 robustness to intentional violation by outsiders/overpopulation
P2 robustness to environmental variation
P3 robustness to environmental variationrobustness to ‘unfair’ behaviour
P4 robustness to noncompliant behaviour
P5 mitigation of intentional violationtolerance to unintentional violation
P6 repair of unintentional violation
P7 robustness to arbitrariness/despotism
P8 robustness to underpopulation
Principles P1 , P2 and P3 are used to respond to variations of brute facts Bf in the
environment , such as the resource level or agents appropriating from the resource1. In
the extended version of the testbed, P3 is furthermore used to respond to variations of
1Responding to the number of agents comes in two parts. Firstly, it defines a subset of agents that can
appropriate, and secondly, prevents the remaining agents from appropriating.
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institutional facts If , i.e. to provoke role changes.
Principles P4 , P5 and P6 are used to respond to violation of institutional facts If , such
as appropriating more resource than what was factually allocated as per the rules of
the institution. Depending on the type of violation, intentional or unintentional, the
principles ensure adequate methods to avoid such violations in future rounds2.
Principles P7 and P8 provide an alternative to leaving the cluster based on how the
agents perceive the institution, i.e. the implementation of rules and roles.
According to [14], how norms evolve depends on the nature of the population. Given an
agent population where agents have roughly the same ideals and comply with the rules,
P1–P3 are sufficient to manage the allocation process and to create an enduring CPR
institution. If these assumptions are relaxed, we need P4–P6 to sanction misbehaviour
and P7 and P8 to mitigate the conflicts that arise with heterogeneous norm perceptions
and not make agents leave. These last two principles were furthermore used a subjective
evaluation method to decide what actions to take for improving the system operation.
Accordingly, depending on the prevailing environment and agent population, a subset
of principles is enough for a successful deployment of an open system. Deciding which
principles should be used in a given environment becomes important when there is a
cost of operation to cover, for example of monitoring, see Section 4.4.4. There are other
operations that could entail a cost factor, such as the voting procedures, migrating
subclusters, appealing to sanctions or if there is a cost of ownership to cover.
For every open system the decisions on how to instantiate the principles have to be
carefully tailored to the agent population and (local) environment. Although the system
is considered to be open, P1 can manufacture boundaries that ensure that the system
does not get overcrowded. Otherwise, this can result in a harshly competitive environ-
ment due to the size of the system and variations on the availability of resources. It can
even be to the extent that more resource has to be spent on P4–P6 for monitoring and
sanctioning than what is used by the individual agents for achieving their personal goal,
thus making the system operation highly inefficient. Enforcing boundaries becomes less
crucial in systems where the operation improves with increasing numbers of members.
However, monitoring can become even more important in order to keep ‘good’ members
in the system that are resource deprived because of over-appropriating ‘bad’ agents and
might leave due to dissatisfaction.
In the first set of experiments, we took P7 for granted, i.e. there was no possibility for
principles to be challenged by external authorities. In the second set of experiments,
2For intentional violations, the agents are given the possibility to revise their behaviour, resulting
in fewer violations of this type; unintentional violations cannot be prevented and should not be
sanctioned, hence P6 .
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only P3 became ineffective in the absence of P7 . However, P7 is effectively intertwined
with all other principles and needs to be present: Spending resources on monitoring
agents without the possibility to prosecute them (within legal boundaries) or allocating
resources without effect on appropriation volumes questions the benefit of self-organising
the resource-allocation process.
Whether or not to instantiate P8 depends on the specific properties and goals of an
open system. For some large systems, a hierarchical structure might be needed with
different parts of the system being responsible for either constitutional, collective-choice
or operational rules and their analysis. For other types of large systems, it might be
enough to set up a flat hierarchy when most of the allocation process can be organised
in a distributed fashion.
All eight principles have to be interpreted on a case by case basis, so that they can be
implemented in different strengths accordingly. A great advantage of the principles is
that they describe a basis for creating flexible rules that can be adapted to the system’s
needs at runtime.
So far, we as designers made the decision on what principles to include in the testbed,
but for a fully autonomous open system, this functionality has to be made available to
the agents themselves as we cannot predict how the system will respond to particular
situations, see also [111]. To this end, the agents have to be able to make decisions on a
higher level of analysis, e.g. as part of the constitutional choices. The agents can make
use of meta self-awareness (see Section 5.2.2), in order to judge the benefits of a new
role or principle with respect to the prevailing environment and agent population.
As Ostrom wrote [84], rule changes are the means to change incentives, and in the best
case that leads to a compliant population. The cost of adaptation is an important factor
to consider, and can be expressed through a distance function between the specification
instances of the open system, see Section 3.6. In [57], it is studied whether participants
in a common-pool resource game invest enough (of their own) resource to achieve in-
stitutional change, and the question is positively answered. As long as the agents can
expect benefits from changing a rule, role or principle, such as a higher satisfaction at
no higher costs, these changes will be made, as presented in [17], for example.
Although the agents might not be able to take the optimal decisions (as could be pos-
sible in a closed system with complete information), giving the open system the possi-
bility of self-analysis greatly improves the decision taking processes. This can be seen
from the examples where the agents had to deal with incomplete information, such as
monitoring intentional and unintentional violations (recursive consciousness to judge dis-
tributive fairness3), or voting to appoint a new agent to a role (predictive self-awareness
for judging procedural fairness). Fair procedures have a beneficial effect on intrinsic
3That is the appropriation as actual outcome of the distribution process.
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motivation4 [124] that, if lacking, not only makes agents leave, but also enhances non-
compliance [32], a route that we did not explore in this testbed.
7.1.2. Answering the five questions
Throughout this work, we asked five questions that relate to the process of resource allo-
cation in open systems. The answers to these questions represent the main achievements
of the thesis.
Q1 Can the problem of resource allocation in open systems be addressedby modelling an institution for self-governance?
Using the methodology of sociologically-inspired computing, as presented in Section 3.2,
we can model open systems as common-pool resources. In Section 3.9, we gave an
indicative axiomatisation of the first six principles for governing common-pool resources,
followed by the remaining two principles in Section 5.4. The axiomatisation provides
a proof of concept for answering the first part of this question and brings together
several strands of research in access control, voting and alternative dispute resolution.
Concluding from the data evaluation in Section 4.4, institutions can be used to manage
open systems, and there are multiple alternative formalisations of these mechanisms in
various complexities to choose from.
Q2 Can Ostrom’s design principles be encoded in norm-governed systems?
In Section 3.4 we bring together the work of Ostrom on socio-economic principles and the
work of Artikis on dynamic specifications for norm-governed systems. The main aspect
considered here is that the nesting of rules has to be maintained, and the correspondence
in structure, i.e. the levels of analysis and levels from the protocol stack, allows for exactly
that. Further important aspects when formalising an institution are the roles that the
agents play in this institution and the rules defining what actions they are empowered,
permitted or obligated to perform. Section 3.5 elaborates on this and gives detailed
examples for the nesting of rules and relevance of roles on different levels.
Q3
Is it possible to use the formal axiomatisation to specify and implement
a testbed that ascertains the sufficiency of these principles for enduring
open systems?
We implemented a testbed using all eight principles and tested their intended purposes.
Principles P1–P3 are for managing the resource allocation considering the environment,
such as the resource available. With all three principles in use and under the assumption
4Here we can compare it to individual satisfaction.
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of compliant agent behaviour5, the resource is sustainable and the open system endures.
Principles P4–P6 are used for responding to intentional and unintentional violation of
allocation rules, e.g. appropriating more than the allocated resource. Their purpose is
to ‘convince’ (through the use of sanctioning mechanisms) the agents to behave when
appropriating or make them leave the cluster. Again, the more principles the better,
but from several experiments (see Section 4.4.4) we conclude that the parameters and
methods that are used have to be carefully adjusted to the local environment and pre-
vailing agent behaviour. Principles P7 and P8 are used to keep the membership high in
cases that could otherwise lead to unsatisfied agents leaving the cluster governed by the
institution. In summary, as discussed in Section 7.1.1, the implementation of principles
to govern the resource-allocation process (and accompanying issues) is indeed sufficient
to create enduring open systems.
Q4 Can we equip the agents with mechanisms to evaluate the self-organisation?
In order to evaluate this question, we endowed the agents with mechanisms that made
them aware of their surroundings and themselves. The agents can use this mechanism of
self-awareness to evaluate the institutional processes from an internal perspective and so
evaluate the failure or success of the self-organisation, see Section 5.2.3. In this work, the
agents exhibit predictive self-awareness for judging procedural fairness from a subjective
perspective, a qualitative measure of self-organisation.
Q5 Does a qualitative evaluation of processes enable the agents to makemore informed choices with respect to self-organisation?
Self-awareness enables an agent to make informed choices, considering the environment,
consequences of own actions, and other agents’ behaviour. In Section 6.5.3, the agents’
individual choices influence the system operation in such a way that it leads to greater
(overall) satisfaction as opposed to choices taken by an external decision maker. There
are many decision-making processes in the open systems testbed that can benefit from
additional knowledge through self-awareness, but already at this stage we conclude that
a qualitative evaluation by self-aware agents leads to better choices and a more successful
self-organisation.
7.2. Limitations
There are several limitations to this work. These are connected to the parameters and
principles, information, institutionalised power, scalability, autonomy, synchrony, self-
5At least by those agents that actively participate in the allocation procedure.
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awareness and cost. Ultimately, all of these limiting factors in combination (and quite
possibly some more) will decide on the success or failure of an open system.
Parameters How we choose the parameters has a strong influence on the outcome of
the simulation, two examples are presented here. The sequence of events for the CUSTOM
replenishment scheme, for example, was chosen so that there are times of abundant and
times of scarce resources available to the agents. Alterations on this sequence lead to
different outcomes, however the ‘pure’ refill schemes (HIGH, MODERATE and LOW) show how
the system performs for a steady rate of replenishment.
Further influence on the performance has the choice of numCheat, the number of noncom-
pliant agents. The system supports 50% of agents that intentionally violate the rules,
but from past experimentation we know numbers much higher than that cannot be sup-
ported and lead to a guaranteed depletion of the resource at an early stage. If nearly
no agent has the sustainability of the resource as its goal, there remain little choices
(compare P3 ) that this minority has impact on. If there are less than 50% noncompliant
agents, we do not know how the system will behave. It could be the case that, depending
on the environment, a low number of intentional violations leads to a higher efficiency
not only for a high, but also a medium replenishment rate, compare Figure 4.14.
Principles The system’s operation is clearly influenced by the choice of principles we
make and how we implement those, and we mentioned a few alternatives to P1–P6
throughout this work. We used P7 ‘for free’ in the first round of experimentation
as we did not implement the system to be challenged by an external authority, but
we did not exploit the full capacity of P8 (in the second round). Here, the agents
evaluate the fairness of the allocation procedure on a subcluster level, the procedure
on the cluster level that defines how to distribute the resource to the subclusters is not
challenged. We defined equality as the distribution norm to be used, on the grounds that
the distributor on the cluster level does not differentiate between the subclusters other
than by member count. A choice that could be challenged by the subclusters, given they
can derive additional information about the profile of other subclusters for evaluation.
This represents a nested fairness judgement on two nested levels of system operation.
Information Throughout the system operation, agents have to deal with incomplete
information. The first example is the sanctioning procedure, where accurate information
on rule violations is dependent on the level of monitoring. The second example is the
evaluation of the head’s fairness. The accuracy depends on the size of sampled agents.
Both variables are set externally and for the first case, the effect of alternative levels has
been shown, for the second case, we can merely compute a lower bound to estimate the
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accuracy of fairness estimation. Although for some cases a more accurate information
enhances the performance, for other cases it imposes a too high cost that cannot be
borne by the system. There is no mechanism available to the agents of the testbed to
decide what accuracy of information they require for a successful operation.
Institutionalised power The rules implemented in this testbed make only implicit use
of the powers, permissions and obligations that are expressed through the Java classes.
A role is only empowered to perform certain actions if this functionality is supported
by the corresponding class and permitted to perform an action if the conditions for that
function are met. Obligation to perform some action arises when a corresponding rule
is fired. The implicit use of institutionalised power however, precludes a query that lists
the specific powers, permissions and obligations for any single role.
In order to explicitly express these we could insert the corresponding facts into the
working memory and conditions into the production memory of Drools. It would then
be possible to query the state of the system and retrieve information about what agents
occupy what roles at a certain point in time and what are the powers, permissions and
obligations associated with that role.
Scalability In the scope of the simulation testbed, we believe scalability is not a prob-
lem. The complexity of raMethod is linear with |A|, the most expensive method is
feMethod whose complexity is at most squared (|A|2). This is due to the relatively sim-
ple (in comparison with alternatives) implementation of methods. Moreover, increasing
the population by a large factor does typically not yield much more information on the
system performance in simulation.
For real world applications however, scalability is of greater concern. Depending on the
type of open system (e.g. wireless sensor network, vehicular ad hoc network or virtual
organisation), the complexity of certain tasks can be an inhibiting factor for a successful
system operation. The space complexity (e.g. memory requirements for a queue or
sanctioning facts) grows linearly with the amount of agents, as does the computational
complexity per agent (even for feMethod). Significant factors are the time constraint
and network load. The frequency with which the rounds have to occur for a meaningful
operation could cause high bandwidth requirements and be unfeasible for certain type of
networks (e.g. WSN). These factors also depend on the specific method implementations,
meaning when the lightweight methods in this work are substituted by computationally
more intensive approaches.
Autonomy The autonomy of agents is limited by several factors. In the step of prin-
cipled operationalisation, we make several assumptions on the behaviour of agents and
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the environment that are reflected in the computer model and affect the observed per-
formance. Moreover, we predefine how the agents solve a certain issue. Some of them
are solved using self-aware techniques, whereas others are decided at random. Ideally,
the agents decide for themselves to what detail they need to analyse a certain situation,
depending on how much utility they can gain in contrast to random decisions.
Synchrony The simulation operates in time slices (rounds), and every issue (voting,
appeals, etc.) is resolved in the same round. In reality however, the issues that occur on
different levels of analysis do not have to be solved simultaneously and within one round,
thus can be implemented asynchronously in so called ‘action situations’. These action
situations then occur on different levels of the protocol stack and can take varying times
to be resolved. For example, whilst two parties are engaged in dispute resolution on the
collective-choice level, they can still perform actions at the operational choice level, such
as monitoring or appropriating.
The simultaneous turn taking has additional effects on the agent strategies. If some agent
does or does not know another agent’s move before the next ruleflow group becomes
active, the games that can be played differ from one another. For example, in the first
case an auction turns into an open price auction, whereas in the second case it is a sealed
bid auction [31].
Self-awareness As mentioned before, the principles have to be implemented carefully
according to the prevailing environment. There is no one-size-fits-all strategy so that
a trade-off between parameters will not optimise the results. Adding self-awareness as
a mechanism for the agents to learn the environmental and agent states and how to
respond to them, proved to improve the outcome but so far self-awareness has only been
used for a limited amount of decisions. There remains a wide range of variables to be
analysed for the system to autonomously choose the parameters of the principles and
ideally create further rules themselves.
Cost One of the factors that are influenced by choices is the cost factor. We did not
make extensive use of costs in this implementation, but in addition to monitoring costs,
further costs for dispute resolution, applying for membership, voting for a new raMethod
or head, for example, can be introduced. Some of them are one-off transaction costs
(new head) and some are recurring costs (monitoring procedure). When deciding on a
different specification instance l ∈ L (i.e. a different set of parameters), these costs, that
are reflected by the distance d, have to be taken into account.
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7.3. Future Work
There are several lines of research we consider for future work. These include enhancing
the testbed with alternative and additional institutional and brute facts, or improving
the agents’ fairness perception with an evaluation of applicable fairness components
using six rules. Further ideas concern the judgement of agent profiles that has so far
been predefined, but could be obtained by social networking techniques. The last line
is to instantiate the abstract model presented in this work for developing and deploying
an autonomic power system for the management of energy distribution.
7.3.1. Principles and methods: Institutional facts
Ostrom’s eight principles have proved to be sufficient for enduring CPR management, but
there has been work done to extend these with over 30 factors that influence endurance [1]
or subdivide some principles into further cases [34]. One point of critique is that the
principles do not address the social mechanisms (such as trust or transparency) as an
important factor for failure or success. So far, the testbed includes fairness as a social
mechanism that influences action selection, but this represents only one cause that affects
human behaviour [70]. Possible extensions to the testbed can include mechanisms for
trust, following up on our previous publication on trusted communities [15].
We only chose a relatively simple implementation of the different methods, whereas
there are more complicated methods available from the literature to be integrated into
the computer model. There are role-based access control methods [101] for distributed
environments or floor-control protocols for open systems [8] that can be used as alter-
native acMethods. On the issue of winner determination (wdMethod), there are various
alternative protocols that can be used, as presented in [91] or [115], for example, bearing
in mind that each wdMethod has a different level of robustness to strategic manipula-
tion. Depending on the nature of dispute, different adrMethods can be used, compare
for example [62] and [117].
In future work, we could extend the preformal theory with further principles, social
mechanisms and alternative implementations of methods. The additional principles will
cover a broader range of reactions to a changing environment and agent behaviour, and
the different methods can be used to tailor the testbed to the capabilities of specific
types of open systems. The use of alternative methods is likely to come at varying
costs and complexities that can also depend on the choice of other degrees of freedom.
Our ultimate goal is for the agents to choose which specification instance is the most
appropriate, considering the cost involved and prospects of the system to endure.
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7.3.2. Environment: Brute facts
The prevailing environment in this work included exogenous replenishment of a divisible
resource. We can modify the testbed to include different replenishment types, such
as endogenous replenishment or a combination of both, and different resource types,
such indivisible or reusable resources. One possibility for a endogenously provided and
reusable resource is a knowledge commons, with a popular example being Wikipedia [45].
This type of CPR has been analysed from the perspective of institutions [54] and presents
the benefits and drawbacks of digital knowledge and its impact on intellectual property,
overpricing and preservation.
An interesting line of research is to model policies at the design stage before they are put
into effect by the legislation, and analyse their impact the evolution of norms and the be-
haviour of the society. [21] presents an approach for modelling environmental policies to
understand the interaction of agents, actions and norms in socially and environmentally
coupled systems. We can utilise their findings to optimise the policy-making process for
knowledge commons.
7.3.3. Fairness perception of procedures
In the scope of this work, we judged fairness using counterfactual thinking6 applied to
a subset of seven procedural components. An alternative to this approach are the six
justice rules as formulated by Leventhal [70]. They describe factors that, when found
present or absent upon evaluation, increase or decrease the perceived procedural justice
by the evaluating agent.
◦ Consistency rule—The allocation procedure should be consistent over time and
across actors.
◦ Bias-suppression rule—The procedure should not be dictated by self-interest or
preconceptions, and preferably, judicial and adversary roles are separated.
◦ Accuracy rule—Record keeping and accountability are important factors to ensure
the integrity of the allocation process. It should be based on reliable information
and informed opinions.
◦ Correctability rule—The possibility to modify and reverse decisions during the
allocation procedure has to be offered.
◦ Representativeness rule—The values, concerns and outlooks of important sub-
groups of individuals affected by the allocation process must be considered. This
6Counterfactual thinking concerns the questions of what would/could/should have happened.
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rule is relevant for participatory decision making.
◦ Ethicality rule—This rules states that the procedures have to be compatible with
the moral and ethical values by the evaluating individual.
For a fairness judgement, an agent does not have to perform a ‘full’ evaluation, but
can evaluate any of the seven procedural components using any subset of the six justice
rules, and then aggregate these partial results to a final judgement.
In future work, we could redesign the fairness evaluation applying the concept just
described. In total there are 42 evaluations that can be made when judging procedural
justice, though not each of them might be applicable to open systems. Applicable
judgements can be aggregated according to an agent’s individual preference, for example
with a weighted sum.
Human actors apply such rules selectively and follow different rules at different times or
attach different importance to them7. Several factors are responsible for determining to
what extent an actor is concerned about fair procedures. The actor can occupy a certain
role that requires maintaining fairness, or can be occupied with goals of greater concern
than fairness. Typically, an actor is more likely to evaluate the fairness of a situation
when the suspicion arises that fair procedures have been violated or there are sudden
changes of operation.
This last set of criteria can be leveraged for judging fairness in a security context with
constrained resources. A possible attack will only be investigated in detail, if there
is reason to suspect unfair behaviour (such as a battery exhaustion or other denial of
service attacks [121], for example). Furthermore, it is important to distinguish between
‘true fair’ behaviour from ‘quasi-fair’ behaviour [70]. This latter type resembles the
former type of behaviour and arises when agents set up a strategy to manipulate other
agents or exploit the system. Quasi-fair behaviour will be abandoned as soon as it has
served its purpose or proves ineffective in achieving the final goal (e.g. a security breach).
However, it might be much harder to game a system where the agents evaluate fairness
(even without the distinction of quasi-fairness), so that this mechanism can serve as an
primary disincentive for potential attackers.
7.3.4. Social networking
When a head performed an allocation according to its internal distribution norm, the
resource was allocated according to information on the agent profile (meritorious or
needy). This information was predefined for each agent at start and did not change
7This was realised in the testbed with agents having different norm preferences at different times, i.e.
the groups ‘equityChange’ and ‘equalityChange’.
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throughout the course of a single simulation.
In future work, this information does not have to be predefined but can be gained from
(social) interactions between agents. We can interleave a cycle of opinion formation
and belief revision within each agent that allows them to form internal profiles of other
agents, which can be updated in each time slice, as presented in [92]. The process of
opinion formation does not have to lead to the same opinion on an issue within every
agent, it is more likely that for diverse initial opinions, clusters of similar opinions will
evolve, as presented in [53], for example.
The same mechanism can be used to form an opinion about the prevailing norm that is
used by other agents when it is their turn to perform a resource allocation. From this, an
agent can revise its own interpretation of norms. The consequences are twofold. Firstly,
an agent can adjust its behaviour to match the perceived norm when allocating resources.
Secondly, an agent can adjust its behaviour when resource is allocated according to a
norm different from his. If that different norm is perceived to be unfair8, an agent is less
motivated to comply with the rules of the institution (e.g. on appropriation), as stated
in [32] or [69].
It would be interesting to investigate the effect of fairness perceptions on agent com-
pliancy (instead of ‘automatic’ behaviour revision, see A.4) and how this affects the
sustainability of the resource and endurance of the open system.
7.3.5. Assisted resource allocation
We presented three types of organisational justice: distributive justice which is related
to fair allocations, procedural justice which is related to fair procedures, and interac-
tional justice which is related to fair interpersonal treatment. The first two types can
be analysed through simulations of open systems, such as in Chapter 4 and 6, where
we considered automated resource allocation. For the third type, simulations are not
suitable. The idea of assisted resource allocation involves an open system where the
agents contain an interface to human actors that influence the agents’ behaviour. An
example where such an artificial system (a big step up from simulation [112]) can be
used is demand-side management of infrastructure, such as energy, water or transport.
Take a local neighbourhood in a smart grid, for example. There are human actors that
both provide (with the use of solar panels, for example) and consume energy. The
challenge for the electricity grid is to balance out the need and generation of energy.
This means that the agents cannot supply and appropriate resources to their liking but
have to make arrangements with each other. The decision making takes place in an
8That is most likely the case, otherwise they would be in the same ‘norm-cluster’.
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automated fashion, but reflects the preferences of the individual user.
We would like to use electronic institutions to manage electricity as a common-pool re-
source. For first experimentation, the behaviour of the agents can be simulated following
the (noncooperative) generalised Nash equilibrium problem9 [6] which has applications
to electricity markets, or by using divisible good auctions [65]. Interesting aspects in-
clude a system of local neighbourhoods, where entire neighbourhoods are competing with
each other (viewed as a single entity) when offering flat-rate, on-demand, or spot-market
resource access.
Simulating smart grids as CPRs furthermore presents unique challenges and opportuni-
ties for policy-makers. They can test the effect of policies that are meant to incentivise
micro-level behaviour, aiming for macro-level improvement with respect to minimising
energy consumption, reducing carbon emissions and encouraging sustainable living. This
requires understanding how old and new policies interact with each other, how new poli-
cies impact on the user behaviour and perception, and how this behaviour affects the
selection of new policies. (Self-)awareness is an important component when trying to
understand the interconnectedness of policies and human behaviour when it comes to
instantiating the real-world application. When humans are taking part in the design of
the institution, self-awareness is used to judge interactive justice during conflicts which
in turn can help to promote trust [30] in the interaction of humans and technology (here
the smart meter, for example).
9Also known as ‘social equilibrium problem’ or ‘abstract economy’, the GNEP represents the problem
of finding a Nash equilibrium in a game where a player’s action has impact on the payoff and possible
actions by other players, as presented in [7].
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A. Class methods and rules
A.1. Member :: demand
1 public double demand(Institution i, CommonPool pool) {
2 | if (active && i.isPrinciple2 () && Random.randomDouble () > ←↩
noRequestPercentage) {
3 | | switch (i.getAllocationMethod ()) {
4 | | case QUEUE:
5 | | | demand = preferredRequest;
6 | | | break;
7 | | case RATION:
8 | | | if(pool.getResourceLevel () * compliancyDegree / ←↩
i.getActiveMemberCount () < preferredRequest){
9 | | | | if(!i.isPrinciple4 ()){//no monitoring
10 | | | | | demand = ←↩
pool.getResourceLevel ()*compliancyDegree/ ←↩
i.getActiveMemberCount ();
11 | | | | } else {//with monitoring
12 | | | | | demand = (pool.getResourceLevel () - ←↩
i.getActiveMemberCount () * i.getMonitoringCost () * ←↩
i.getMonitoringLevel ()) * compliancyDegree / ←↩
i.getActiveMemberCount ();
13 | | | | }
14 | | | } else {
15 | | | | demand = preferredRequest;
16 | | | }
17 | | | break;
18 | | }//end switch
19 | }
20 | else demand = 0;
21 | if(demand < 0){
22 | | demand = 0;
23 | }
24 | return demand;
25 }
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A.2. Member :: vote
1 public Vote vote(Institution i, CommonPool pool , String ←↩
ballot) {
2 | if (ballot.equals("raMethod") && i.isVoteRaMethod ()) {
3 | | RaMethod vote;
4 | | if (pool.getResourceLevel () < 0.75 * i.getMaxLevel () / ←↩
compliancyDegree) {
5 | | | vote = RaMethod.RATION;
6 | | } else {
7 | | | vote = RaMethod.QUEUE;
8 | | }
9 | | return Vote.voteRaMethod(vote);
10 | }
11 | return null;
12 }
A.3. Member :: appropriate
1 public double appropriate(Institution i, CommonPool pool , ←↩
Allocation all) {
2 | if (active) {
3 | | double appropriateAmount = 0;
4 | | if (i.isPrinciple2 ()) {
5 | | | double amount = (all == null ? 0 : all.getQuantity ());
6 | | | if (compliancyDegree > 1) { // wrongful appropriation
7 | | | | if(amount + (preferredRequest-standardRequest) < ←↩
demand){
8 | | | | | appropriateAmount = amount + (preferredRequest - ←↩
standardRequest);
9 | | | | } else {
10 | | | | | appropriateAmount = demand;
11 | | | | }
12 | | | } else{ // appropriate allocation
13 | | | | appropriateAmount = amount;
14 | | | }
15 | | } else if (Random.randomDouble () > noRequestPercentage) ←↩
{ // Principle 2 disabled
16 | | | appropriateAmount = preferredRequest;
17 | | }
18 | | //not every agent subject to noise
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19 | | if(pool.isUnintentionalError () && Random.randomDouble () ←↩
< i.getNoisePercentage ()){
20 | | | double share = standardRequest;
21 | | | if( i.isPrinciple2 () && i.getAllocationMethod () == ←↩
RaMethod.RATION ){
22 | | | | share = i.getFairshare ();
23 | | | }
24 | | | if(Random.randomDouble () < 0.5){
25 | | | | appropriateAmount += ←↩
share*i.getNoiseLevel ()*Random.randomDouble ();
26 | | | } else {
27 | | | | appropriateAmount -= ←↩
share*i.getNoiseLevel ()*Random.randomDouble ();
28 | | | }
29 | | }
30 | | if (appropriateAmount < 0){
31 | | | appropriateAmount = 0;
32 | | }
33 | | return appropriateAmount;
34 | } else { // inactive agents
35 | | return 0;
36 | }
37 }
A.4. Member :: revise behaviour
1 public void changeBehaviour(int maxSanctionLevel , int ←↩
sanctionLevel){
2 | if(Random.randomDouble () < changeBehaviourPercentage + ←↩
sanctionLevel / (2* maxSanctionLevel)){
3 | | compliancyDegree -= compliancyDegree * (1 - ←↩
improveBehaviour*Random.randomDouble ());
4 | | preferredRequest = standardRequest * compliancyDegree * ←↩
(0.9 + 0.2* Random.randomDouble ());
5 | }
6 | //else no revision
7 }
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A.5. Member :: appeal / Head :: uphold / Member :: apply /
Gatekeeper :: include
1 rule "Members appeal against sanction"
2 ruleflow-group "appeal"
3 when
4 | $i: Institution($iid:id , $r: round , pr6==true)
5 | $m: Member($n:name , instId ==$iid , active == false)
6 | $san : Sanctioned(agent==$n , round==$r , inst==$iid)
7 | not (Appealed(agent ==$n, $aRd:round , inst==$iid , $r-$aRd ←↩
<= $i.appealtime))
8 | not (Sanctioned(agent ==$n, $sRd:round , $l: level , ←↩
$sRd <$r , $r - ($sRd + $l*$i.excludetime) <= ←↩
$i.appealtime , inst==$iid))
9 then
10 | insert(new Appealed($name , $round , $iid));
11 | retract($san);
12 | modify ($m){
13 | | setActive(true)
14 | }
15 end
A.6. NonMember :: appropriate
1 public double appropriate(CommonPool pool) {
2 | double appropriateAmount = 0;
3 | if (initialCompliancyDegree > 1 && active && ←↩
Random.randomDouble () < ←↩
pool.getOutAppropriationFrequency ()) {
4 | | appropriateAmount = standardRequest * ←↩
initialCompliancyDegree;
5 | }
6 | return appropriateAmount;
7 }
A.7. Gatekeeper :: assign
1 rule "Assign new head"
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2 | ruleflow-group "exclude"
3 | when
4 | | Institution($iid:id, $r:round)
5 | | not( exists(Head(instId == $iid)) )
6 | | $mL: List( size > 0 ) from collect(Member(instId ==$iid))
7 | then
8 | | Member m = (Member) ←↩
$mL.get(Random.randomInt($mL.size()));
9 | | retract(m);
10 | | insert(new Head(m));
11 end
A.8. Gatekeeper :: include()
1 rule "Include member after sanction"
2 | ruleflow-group "exclude"
3 | no-loop
4 | when
5 | | $i: Institution($iid:id , $r:round , pr5==true)
6 | | $m: Member($n:name , institutionId ==$iid , active == false)
7 | | $s : Sanctioned(agent==$n , $sanRd:round , $level:level , ←↩
($sanRd + $level*$i.excludetime < $r), $level <= ←↩
$i.maxSanctionLevel)
8 | | not Sanctioned(agent ==$n, $rd:round , $rd > $sanRd)
9 | then
10 | | if(Random.randomDouble () < 0.1){
11 | | | $m.changeBehaviour($i.getMaxSanctionLevel (), ←↩
$s.getLevel ());
12 | | | modify ($m){
13 | | | | setActive(true)
14 | | | }
15 | | }
16 end
A.9. Gatekeeper :: exclude
1 rule "Member exclusion"
2 | ruleflow-group "exclude"
3 | when
4 | | Institution($iid:id, $r:round , pr5== false)
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5 | | $m: Member($n:name , instId ==$iid , active == false)
6 | | Sanctioned(agent ==$n, round ==$r)
7 | then
8 | | retract($m);
9 | | insert(new NonMember($m));
10 end
12 rule "Member exclusion with graduated sanctions"
13 | ruleflow-group "exclude"
14 | when
15 | | $i: Institution($iid:id , $r:round , pr5==true)
16 | | $m: Member($n:name , instId ==$iid , active == false)
17 | | Sanctioned(agent ==$n, round ==$r, level > ←↩
$i.maxSanctionLevel)
18 | then
19 | | retract($m);
20 | | insert(new NonMember($m));
21 end
A.10. Monitor :: monitor / Monitor :: monitor_out
1 public Set <String > monitor(Institution i, CommonPool pool , ←↩
Set <Member > members , Set <Agent > nonMembers) {
2 | Set <String > toMonitor = new HashSet <String >();
3 | monitoring = 0; // counter
4 | outMonitoring = 0;
5 | if (i.isPrinciple4 ()) { // member monitoring
6 | | for (Member ag : members) {
7 | | | if (ag.active && Random.randomDouble () < ←↩
i.getMonitoringLevel ()) {
8 | | | | toMonitor.add(ag.getName ());
9 | | | | monitoring ++;
10 | | | }
11 | | }
12 | }
13 | if (i.isPrinciple1 ()) { // non-member monitoring
14 | | for (Agent ag : nonMembers) {
15 | | | if (ag.active && Random.randomDouble () < ←↩
i.getOutMonitoringLevel ()) {
16 | | | | toMonitor.add(ag.getName ());
17 | | | | outMonitoring ++;
18 | | | }
19 | | }
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20 | }
21 | return toMonitor;
22 }
24 rule "Agent monitoring list"
25 | ruleflow-group "allocate"
26 | when
27 | | $i: Institution($iid:id , $p:pool , $r:round)
28 | | $mon: Monitor(instId ==$iid , pool==$p.id)
29 | | $mL: Set() from collect( Member(instId ==$iid) )
30 | | $nmL : Set() from collect( NonMember(pool==$p.id) )
31 | | not TaskExecuted( $i , "monitor", $round ;)
32 | then
33 | | Set <String > monitored = $mon.monitor($i , $p , $mL , $mL);
34 | | for( String agent : monitored ) {
35 | | | insert( new Monitored(agent , $r) );
36 | | }
37 | | insert( new TaskExecuted( $i , "monitor", $round ) );
38 end
A.11. Head :: call for vote
1 public CallForVote callForVotes(Institution i) {
2 | if (i.isPrinciple3 ()) { // on (head , raMethod)
3 | | return new CallForVote(false , true);
4 | } else {
5 | | return null;
6 | }
7 }
9 rule "Call for votes"
10 ruleflow-group "cfv"
11 no-loop
12 when
13 | $i: Institution($iid:id , pr3==true)
14 | $hd: Head(instId ==$iid)
15 then
16 | CallForVote cfv = $hd.callForVotes($i);
17 | if(cfv != null) {
18 | | modify($i) {
19 | | | setVoteHead( cfv.isHead () ),
20 | | | setVoteRaMethod( cfv.isRaMethod () )
21 | | }
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22 | }
23 end
A.12. Head :: declare
1 rule "Count votes"
2 | ruleflow-group "vote"
3 | when
4 | | Institution($iid:id , $r:round , pr3==true)
5 | | Member($ag:name , instId ==$iid)
6 | | Vote(voter==$ag , round==$r , $b:ballot)
7 | | not VoteCount(inst==$iid , ballot ==$b, round ==$r)
8 | | $votes: List(size > 0) from accumulate( $v: ←↩
Vote($voter:voter , round==$r , ballot ==$b) and ←↩
Member(name==$voter , instId ==$iid), collectList($v) )
9 | then
10 | | HashMap <Integer , Integer > tally = new HashMap <Integer , ←↩
Integer >();
11 | | for( Object o : $votes ) {
12 | | | Vote v = (Vote) o; //(ballot ,value)
13 | | | if(tally.containsKey(v.getValue ())) {
14 | | | | tally.put(v.getValue (), tally.get(v.getValue ()) + 1);
15 | | | } else {
16 | | | | tally.put(v.getValue (), 1);
17 | | | }
18 | | }
19 | | insert(new VoteCount( $iid , $b, $r, tally ));
20 end
21
22 rule "Declare winner and update raMethod"
23 | ruleflow-group "vote"
24 | when
25 | | $i: Institution($iid:id , $r:round , pr3==true)
26 | | $vc : VoteCount(ballot =="raMethod", round ==$r, ←↩
inst==$iid)
27 | then
28 | | Integer forQueue = ←↩
$vc.result.get(RaMethod.QUEUE.ordinal ());
29 | | Integer forRation = ←↩
$vc.result.get(RaMethod.RATION.ordinal ());
30 | | if(forQueue ==null) forQueue = 0;
31 | | if(forRation ==null) forRation = 0;
32 | | if(forQueue > forRation) {
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33 | | | $i.setAllocationMethod( RaMethod.QUEUE );
34 | | } else if(forRation > forQueue) {
35 | | | $i.setAllocationMethod( RaMethod.RATION );
36 | | }
37 | | insert(new Declared($iid , $vc.ballot , $r, ←↩
$i.getAllocationMethod ().ordinal () ));
38 end
A.13. Head :: allocate
1 public Set <Allocation > allocate(Institution i, CommonPool ←↩
pool , List <Demand > demands) {
2 | Set <Allocation > allocations = new HashSet <Allocation >();
3 | double level = pool.getResourceLevel () - monitoring * ←↩
i.getMonitoringCost () - ←↩
outMonitoring*i.getOutMonitoringCost ();
4 | if (level < 0){
5 | | return allocations;
6 | }
7 | switch (i.getAllocationMethod ()) {
8 | case QUEUE:
9 | | Collections.shuffle(demands);
10 | | Queue <Demand > demandQueue = i.getDemandQueue ();
11 | | Set <String > alreadyDemanded = new HashSet <String >();
12 | | for (Demand d : demandQueue) {
13 | | | alreadyDemanded.add(d.getAgent ());
14 | | }
15 | | for (Demand d : demands) {
16 | | | if (! alreadyDemanded.contains(d.getAgent ())) {
17 | | | | demandQueue.add(d);
18 | | | }
19 | | }
20 | | while (! demandQueue.isEmpty ()) {
21 | | | if (level >= demandQueue.peek().getQuantity ()) {
22 | | | | Demand d = demandQueue.poll();
23 | | | | allocations.add(new Allocation(d.getAgent (), ←↩
i.getRound (), d.getQuantity (), i.getPool ()));
24 | | | | level -= d.getQuantity ();
25 | | | } else {
26 | | | | break;
27 | | | }
28 | | }
29 | | break;
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30 | case RATION:
31 | | double fairshare = level/demands.size();
32 | | i.setFairshare(fairshare);
33 | | Collections.shuffle(demands);
34 | | for (Demand d : demands) {
35 | | | if (level >= d.getQuantity () || level >= fairshare){
36 | | | | if(d.getQuantity () > fairshare){
37 | | | | | allocations.add(new Allocation(d.getAgent (), ←↩
i.getRound (), fairshare , i.getPool ()));
38 | | | | | level -= fairshare;
39 | | | | } else {
40 | | | | | allocations.add(new Allocation(d.getAgent (), ←↩
i.getRound (), d.getQuantity (), i.getPool ()));
41 | | | | | level -= d.getQuantity ();
42 | | | | }
43 | | | } else{
44 | | | | break;
45 | | | }
46 | | }
47 | | break;
48 | }//end switch
49 | return allocations;
50 }
A.14. Head :: sanction
1 rule "Sanctioning monitored members (first offence)"
2 ruleflow-group "report"
3 no-loop
4 when
5 | Institution($iid:id, $p:pool , $r: round)
6 | $m: Member($n:name , instId ==$iid , pool==$p.id)
7 | Monitored(agent ==$n, round ==$r)
8 | not Sanctioned(agent ==$n, round ==$r)
9 | (
10 | | (Allocation(agent ==$n, round ==$r, $alloc:quantity , ←↩
pool==$p) and
11 | | Appropriated(agent==$n , round==$r , $approp:quantity , ←↩
pool==$p , $approp > $alloc) )
12 | | or
13 | | (not Allocation(agent ==$n, round ==$r, pool==$p) and
14 | | Appropriated(agent==$n , round==$r , $approp:quantity , ←↩
pool==$pool , $approp > 0) )
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15 | )
16 | not Sanctioned(agent ==$n)
17 then
18 | insert(new Sanctioned($n, $r, 1, $iid));
19 | modify ($m){
20 | | setActive(false)
21 | }
22 end
24 rule "Sanctioning monitored members (repeatedly)"
25 ruleflow-group "report"
26 no-loop
27 when
28 | Institution($iid:id, $p:pool , $r:round , pr5==true)
29 | $m: Member($n:name , instId ==$iid , pool==$p.id )
30 | Monitored(agent ==$n, round ==$r)
31 | not Sanctioned(agent ==$n, round ==$r)
32 | (
33 | | (Allocation(agent ==$n, round ==$r, $alloc:quantity , ←↩
pool== $pool) and
34 | | Appropriated(agent==$n , round==$r , $approp:quantity , ←↩
pool==$pool , $approp > $alloc) )
35 | | or
36 | | (not Allocation(agent ==$n, round ==$r, pool==$p) and
37 | | Appropriated(agen ==$n , round==$r , $approp:quantity , ←↩
pool==$p , $approp > 0) )
38 | )
39 | Sanctioned(agent ==$n, $level:level)
40 | not Sanctioned(agent ==$n, $l:level , $l > $level)
41 then
42 | insert(new Sanctioned($n, $r, $level+1, $iid));
43 | modify ($m){
44 | | setActive(false)
45 | }
46 end
48 rule "Sanction monitored non-members"
49 ruleflow-group "report"
50 no-loop
51 when
52 | Institution($iid:id, $p:pool , $r:round , pr1 == true)
53 | $nm : NonMember($n:name , pool==$p.id)
54 | Monitored(agent ==$n, round ==$r)
55 | not Sanctioned(agent ==$n, round ==$r, inst==$iid)
56 | Appropriated(agent==$n , round==$r , $approp:quantity , ←↩
pool==$p , $approp > 0)
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57 then
58 | insert(new Sanctioned($n, $r, 1, $iid));
59 | modify ($nm){
60 | | setActive(false)
61 | }
62 | modify($p){
63 | | setOutAppropriationFrequency( ←↩
getOutAppropriationFrequency () - ←↩
(getOutAppropriationFrequency () * ←↩
getOutImproveFrequency ()))
64 | }
65 end
A.15. CommonPool :: refill
1 rule "Refill pool"
2 salience -10
3 ruleflow-group "init"
4 when
5 | $t: IntegerTime () //same as round
6 | $pool: CommonPool($t.intValue ()>getLastFilled (), ←↩
getRefScheme ()== RefillScheme.CUSTOM)
7 then
8 | double fillAmount = $pool.getMaxLevel () / 2;
9 | int time = $t.intValue ();
10 | if(time < 50) {
11 | | fillAmount *= 1;
12 | } else if(time < 100) {
13 | | fillAmount *= 0.95;
14 | } else if(time < 150) {
15 | | fillAmount *= 0.87;
16 | } else if(time < 200) {
17 | | fillAmount *= 0.52;
18 | } else if(time < 250) {
19 | | fillAmount *= 0.92;
20 | } else if(time < 300) {
21 | | fillAmount *= 0.97;
22 | } else if(time < 350) {
23 | | fillAmount *= 0.62;
24 | } else if(time < 400) {
25 | | fillAmount *= 0.90;
26 | } else if(time < 450) {
27 | | fillAmount *= 0.50;
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28 | } else {
29 | | fillAmount *= 0.91;
30 | }
31 | modify($pool) {
32 | | setResourceLevel($p.getResourceLevel () + fillAmount),
33 | | setLastFilled( time )
34 | }
35 end
37 rule "Refill pool - HIGH/MODERATE/LOW scheme"
38 salience -10
39 ruleflow-group "init"
40 when
41 | $t : IntegerTime ()
42 | $p: CommonPool($t.intValue ()>getLastFilled (), ←↩
getRefScheme ()!= RefillScheme.CUSTOM)
43 then
44 | double fillAmount = $p.getMaxLevel ()/2;
45 | int time = $t.intValue ();
46 | if(time < 50) {
47 | | fillAmount *= 1;
48 | }else if ($pool.getRefScheme () == RefillScheme.HIGH){
49 | | fillAmount *= 0.95;
50 | } else if ($pool.getRefScheme () == RefillScheme.MODERATE){
51 | | fillAmount *= 0.80;
52 | }else{ // RefillScheme.LOW
53 | | fillAmount *= 0.50;
54 | }
55 | modify($p) {
56 | | setResourceLevel($pool.getResourceLevel () + fillAmount),
57 | | setLastFilled( time )
58 | }
59 end
A.16. Termination criteria
1 // simulation loop
2 while (t.intValue () < sim.finishTime) {
3 | logger.info("Round " + t.intValue ());
4 | session.startProcess("allocation.Simulation");
5 | session.fireAllRules ();
6 | t.increment ();
7 | session.update(session.getFactHandle(t), t);
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8 }
10 rule "Common pool depleted"
11 ruleflow-group "init"
12 when
13 | $p: CommonPool(resourceLevel < 0)
14 | Institution($iid : id, pool==$p)
15 | $mL : List() from collect( Member(instId ==$iid) )
16 then
17 | retract($pool);
18 | for(Object m : $members) {
19 | | retract(m);
20 | | insert(new NonMember (( Member) m));
21 | }
22 end
24 rule "End of the institution"
25 ruleflow-group "init"
26 when
27 | $i: Institution($iid:id)
28 | not( exists( Member(instId ==$iid) ) )
29 then
30 | retract($i);
31 end
A.17. Control loop for CPR testbed
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A.17. Control loop for CPR testbed
Algorithm 4: Control loop for CPR testbed
∃P ∈  ⊆ E : P is pool;
∃I ∈ L: I is institution with P1 ← true;
∀m ∈M ⊆ A: role of m is member ;
∀nm ∈ A \M: role of nm is non-member ;
∃h ∈M: role of h is head;
∃gk ∈M: role of gk is gatekeeper ;
∃mon ∈M: role of mon is monitor ;
r ←− 0; P ←− Pmax ;
while (M 6= ∅) ∧ (P > 0) ∧ (t < FinishTime) do
P ←− min (Pmax , P + Prefill); // refill common pool
if P3 then
h calls for vote on raMethod;
∀m ∈M: m votes;
h counts votes and declares raMethod;
else
automatic choice of raMethod;
if P2 then
∀m ∈M: m places demand;
h allocates resource to all m according to raMethod;
∀m ∈M: m appropriates resource Rm;
∀nm ∈ A \M: nm appropriates resource Rnm ; // only noncompliant nm
P ←− P −∑mRm −∑nm Rnm ;
mon reports offences by non-members at cost Pnonm ;
h sanctions reported non-members: activity←false;
P ←− P − Pnonm ;
if P4 then
mon reports offences by members at cost Pmon ;
P ←− P − Pmon ;
if P5 then
h sanctions reported members at level S (activity←false);
gk includes members with served sentence (activity←true);
else
h sanctions reported members at level 1;
if P6 then
sanctioned members appeal against sanction;
h upholds sanction and gk includes members; // if applicable
gk excludes sanctioned members ← active non-members; // if P5 dep. on S
assign missing roles; // at random
r ←− r + 1; // increment round
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B. Class field values and experimental
parameters
These are the initialisation values and the field values of the classes used in the imple-
mentation of the testbed, see page 84, tables describing the setup for individual runs
with corresponding figures are given after. The roles of head, monitor and gatekeeper
extend the member class and have no additional fields associated with them. Facts that
get inserted into the working memory at start are (missing fields see below):
◦ Time t: counter for the time/round
◦ Pool(id==0,...): one common pool
◦ Institution(id==0,...): one institution associated with that pool
◦ Agent(name=="elf"+i,...): all agents ai ∈M
◦ Agent(name=="outelf"+i,...): all agents ai ∈ A \M
Table B.1.: Initialisation These are the values that are used to initialise the first round
of a testbed run.
variable value
int pools 1
int institutions 1
int agents 100
int numCheat 0
int outAgents 20
int outNumCheat 0
double greedMax 0.2
int finishTime 500
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Table B.2.: Common Pool These values initialise a common-pool object.
field name field value
final int id 0
double initialLevel 2*standardRequest*agents
final double maxLevel 2*standardRequest*agents
double outAppropriationFrequency 0.1
double outImproveFrequency 0.1
RefillScheme refScheme CUSTOM
boolean unintentionalError false
final double noisePercentage 0.05
final double noiseLevel 0.1
Table B.3.: Institution These values initialise an institution object.
field name field value
final int id 0
final int initialAgents agents
CommonPool pool pool0
final boolean principle1 true
boolean principle2 false
boolean principle3 false
boolean principle4 false
boolean principle5 false
boolean principle6 false
final double monitoringLevel 0.1
final double monitoringCost standardRequest
final double outMonitoringLevel 0.1
final double outMonitoringCost 0.1*standardRequest
final int appealtime 30
int samplingrate 50
int maxSanctionLevel 3
int excludetime 5
double applyPercentage 0.1
boolean voteHead false
boolean voteRaMethod false
Phase state Phase.CFV
int round 0
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Table B.4.: Member Note that either of the two fields initialCompliancyDegree is
chosen, depending on whether i < numCheat (2) holds for the member counter
i ∈ {0, . . . , agents− 1}, or not (1).
field name field value
final String name "elf"+i
final int pool 0
final double initialCompliancyDegree (1) 1.0
final double initialCompliancyDegree (2) 1.0 + sim.greedMax * rand()
double compliancyDegree initialCompliancyDegree
final double standardRequest 50.0
boolean active true
int institutionId 0
double noRequestPercentage 0.1
int sanctionLevel 0
double changeBehaviourPercentage 0.3
double improveBehaviour 0.5
double preferredRequest standardRequest*compliancyDegree←↩
*(1 + (0.2 * rand() - 0.1))
Table B.5.: NonMember Depending on whether i < outNumCheat (2) holds for the
non-member counter i ∈ {0, . . . , outAgents− 1}, or not (1), either of the two
fields initialCompliancyDegree is chosen.
field name field value
final String name "outelf"+i
final int pool 0
final double initialCompliancyDegree (1) 1.0
final double initialCompliancyDegree (2) 1.0 + sim.greedMax * rand()
double compliancyDegree initialCompliancyDegree
final double standardRequest 50.0
boolean active true
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Table B.6 mentions how the parameters of individual runs are set up for experimenta-
tion, referred to by the label they have in the corresponding figure, see Section 4.4 and
Appendix C. Only parameters that deviate from the default are given, and X refers to
a particular refill scheme mentioned in Table B.7. The number in the first column each
refers to the set of experiments:
1 Existence and Management Principles
2 Protection Principles
3 Alternatives (‘good’ population)
4 Alternatives (‘bad’ population)
For each refill scheme, the same measurements are taken for all runs, which are resource
level per active cluster, active agents per active cluster, and active clusters. When com-
paring the refill schemes the measurements taken are remaining agents per remaining
cluster, remaining clusters and appropriated resource per cluster.
Table B.6.: Experimental parameters of individual runs
Brute Facts Institutional Facts Label
1 outNumCheat=10
refScheme=X
Pr1h
pr2=true, outMonitoringLevel=0.01 Pr1l/2
pr2=true Pr1h/2
pr2∧pr3=true Pr1h/2/3
2
numCheat=50
outNumCheat=10
unintentError=true
refScheme=X
pr2∧pr3=true Pr1-3
pr2∧pr3∧pr4=true Pr1-4
pr2∧pr3∧pr4∧pr5=true Pr1-5
pr2∧pr3∧pr4∧pr5∧6=true Pr1-6
3 outNumCheat=10
refScheme=X
pr2∧pr3=true Pr1-3
pr2∧pr3∧pr4=true Pr1-4h
pr2∧pr3∧pr4=true, monitoringLevel=0.01 Pr1-4l
4
numCheat=50
outNumCheat=10
refScheme=X
pr2∧pr3=true Pr1-3
pr2∧pr3∧pr4=true Pr1-4h
pr2∧pr3∧pr4=true, monitoringLevel=0.01 Pr1-4l
Table B.7.: Figures for sets of runs according to refill scheme
CUSTOM HIGH MODERATE LOW Comparison
1 4.6 C.1 C.5 C.9 4.10
2 4.7 C.2 C.6 C.9 4.11
3 4.8 C.3 C.7 C.11 4.12
4 4.9 C.4 C.8 C.12 4.13
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C.1. Refill scheme: HIGH
0 100 200 300 400 500
time
2
4
6
8
10
re
so
u
rc
e
 /
 a
ct
iv
e
 c
lu
st
e
r 
[x
1
0
0
0
]
h h h h h h h h h h
(a) Resource Level --- Principles 1, 2, 3 (HIGH)
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(b) Remaining Agents / Clusters --- Principles 1, 2, 3 (HIGH)
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Figure C.1.: P1, P2 and P3, refill scheme HIGH: all members compliant, 50% of non-
members noncompliant, no unintentional violation.
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(a) Resource Level --- Principles 4, 5, 6 UE (HIGH)
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(b) Remaining Agents / Clusters --- Principles 4, 5, 6 UE (HIGH)
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Figure C.2.: P4, P5 and P6, refill scheme HIGH: 50% noncompliant members and non-
members, with unintentional violations.
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(a) Resource Level --- Principle 4h/l Good (HIGH)
Pr 1-3 Pr 1-4h Pr 1-4l
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(b) Remaining Agents / Clusters --- Principle 4h/l Good (HIGH)
A (1-3)
I (1-3)
A (1-4h)
I (1-4h)
A (1-4l)
I (1-4l)
20
40
60
80
100
n
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
a
ct
iv
e
 c
lu
st
e
rs
Figure C.3.: P4 ‘good’ population, refill scheme HIGH: all member compliant and 50%
noncompliant non-members, no unintentional violation.
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(a) Resource Level --- Principle 4h/l Bad (HIGH)
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(b) Remaining Agents / Clusters --- Principle 4h/l Bad (HIGH)
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Figure C.4.: P4 ‘bad’ population, refill scheme HIGH: 50% noncompliant members and
non-members, no unintentional violation.
C.2. Refill scheme: MODERATE
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(a) Resource Level --- Principles 1, 2, 3 (MODERATE)
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(b) Remaining Agents / Clusters --- Principles 1, 2, 3 (MODERATE)
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C.2. Refill scheme: MODERATE
Figure C.5.: P1, P2 and P3, refill scheme MODERATE: all members compliant, 50% of
non-members noncompliant, no unintentional violation.
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(a) Resource Level --- Principles 4, 5, 6 UE (MODERATE)
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(b) Remaining Agents / Clusters --- Principles 4, 5, 6 UE (MODERATE)
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Figure C.6.: P4, P5 and P6, refill scheme MODERATE: 50% noncompliant members
and non-members, with unintentional violations.
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(a) Resource Level --- Principle 4h/l Good (MODERATE)
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(b) Remaining Agents / Clusters --- Principle 4h/l Good (MODERATE)
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Figure C.7.: P4 ‘good’ population, refill scheme MODERATE: all member compliant
and 50% noncompliant non-members, no unintentional violation.
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(a) Resource Level --- Principle 4h/l Bad (MODERATE)
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(b) Remaining Agents / Clusters --- Principle 4h/l Bad (MODERATE)
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Figure C.8.: P4 ‘bad’ population, refill scheme MODERATE: 50% noncompliant mem-
bers and non-members, no unintentional violation.
C.3. Refill scheme: LOW
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(a) Resource Level --- Principles 1, 2, 3 (LOW)
Pr 1h Pr 1l/2 Pr 1h/2 Pr 1h/2/3
0 100 200 300 400 500
time
20
40
60
80
100
n
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
a
ct
iv
e
 a
g
e
n
ts
 /
 a
ct
iv
e
 c
lu
st
e
r
h l l l l l l l l l
(b) Remaining Agents / Clusters --- Principles 1, 2, 3 (LOW)
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Figure C.9.: P1, P2 and P3, refill scheme LOW: all members compliant, 50% of non-
members noncompliant, no unintentional violation.
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(a) Resource Level --- Principles 4, 5, 6 UE (LOW)
Pr 1-3 Pr 1-4 Pr 1-5 Pr 1-6
0 100 200 300 400 500
time
20
40
60
80
100
n
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
a
ct
iv
e
 a
g
e
n
ts
 /
 a
ct
iv
e
 c
lu
st
e
r
h l l l l l l l l l
(b) Remaining Agents / Clusters --- Principles 4, 5, 6 UE (LOW)
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C.3. Refill scheme: LOW
Figure C.10.: P4, P5 and P6, refill scheme LOW: 50% noncompliant members and non-
members, with unintentional violations.
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(a) Resource Level --- Principle 4h/l Good (LOW)
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(b) Remaining Agents / Clusters --- Principle 4h/l Good (LOW)
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Figure C.11.: P4 ‘good’ population, refill scheme LOW: all members compliant and 50%
noncompliant non-members, no unintentional violation.
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(a) Resource Level --- Principle 4h/l Bad (LOW)
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(b) Remaining Agents / Clusters --- Principle 4h/l Bad (LOW)
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Figure C.12.: P4 ‘bad’ population, refill scheme LOW: 50% noncompliant members and
non-members, no unintentional violation.
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D. Testbed extension
D.1. Member :: vote
1 public Vote vote(Institution i, CommonPool pool , String ←↩
ballot) {
2 | if(ballot.equals("head")){
3 | | Member vote;
4 | | List <Member > helplist = new ArrayList <Member >();
5 | | if (! droppedHeads.contains(i.getInstHead ().getName ())){
6 | | | vote = i.getInstHead ();
7 | | } else {
8 | | | for (Object o : i.getInstMembers ()){
9 | | | | Member m = (Member) o;
10 | | | | if (! droppedHeads.contains(m.getName ())){
11 | | | | | helplist.add(m);
12 | | | | }
13 | | | }
14 | | | if(helplist.isEmpty ()){
15 | | | | vote = null;
16 | | | } else {
17 | | | | vote = (Member) helplist.get( ←↩
Random.randomInt(helplist.size()));
18 | | | }
19 | | }
20 | | return Vote.voteHead(vote);
21 | }
22 | return null;
23 }
D.2. Member :: sat evaluation
1 rule "Update satisfaction if head appointed externally"
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2 ruleflow-group "vote"
3 no-loop
4 when
5 | Institution($iid:id, $r:round , pr7== false)
6 | HeadChange(inst==$iid , round ==$r)
7 | $m: Member(instId == $iid)
8 then
9 | modify($m){
10 | | setSatisfaction( $m.getInitialSat () );
11 | }
12 end
14 rule "Update satisfaction if head elected"
15 ruleflow-group "vote"
16 no-loop
17 when
18 | Institution($iid:id, $r:round , pr7==true)
19 | HeadChange(inst==$iid , round ==$r)
20 | Declared(inst==$iid , ballo =="head", round==$r , ←↩
$res:result)
21 | $m: Member(instId == $iid)
22 | Vote(voter==$m.name , ballot =="head", round==$r , $v:value)
23 then
24 | double sat = $m.getInitialSat ();
25 | if ($v!=null && $v==$res){
26 | | sat = 1.0;
27 | }
28 | modify($m){
29 | | setSatisfaction(sat);
30 | }
31 end
D.3. Member :: sample
1 rule "Collect members for sample"
2 ruleflow-group "appropriate"
3 when
4 | $i: Institution($iid:id , $r:round)
5 | $hd: Head(instId ==$iid)
6 | $m: Member(instId ==$iid , $n:name)
7 | $acNames: List () from accumulate( Member(instId ==$iid , ←↩
$n:name , active ==true), collectList($n))
8 | not SampleList(agent ==$n, round ==$r, inst==$iid)
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9 then
10 | insert( new SampleList($n, $r, $m.sample($acNames), $iid));
11 end
13 public List <String > sample(List <String > acNames){
14 | | List <String > copyNames = new ArrayList <String >();
15 | | for(String s : acNames){
16 | | | copyNames.add(s);
17 | | }
18 | | if(copyNames.size() > judgeSize){
19 | | | Collections.shuffle(copyNames);
20 | | | copyNames = copyNames.subList(0, judgeSize);
21 | | }
22 | | return copyNames;
23 | }
D.4. Member :: judge
1 rule "Judge head allocation"
2 ruleflow-group "appropriate"
3 when
4 | $i: Institution($iid:id , $p:pool , $r: round)
5 | $hd: Head(instId ==$iid)
6 | $m: Member(instId ==$iid , $n: name)
7 | $jList: SampleList(agent==$n , round==$r , $acNames:list)
8 | $demands: List() from collect( Demand(pool== $p.id , ←↩
round ==$r, agent memberOf $acNames) )
9 | $allocations: List() from collect( Allocation( ←↩
pool==$p.id , round==$r , agent memberOf $acNames) )
10 | not TaskExecuted(inst==$i , task=="judgeHead", agent==$n , ←↩
round ==$r)
11 then
12 | modify($m) {
13 | | judgeHead($i, $p, $hd , $demands , $allocations);
14 | }
15 | insert( new TaskExecuted($i , "judgeHead", $n , $r) );
16 end
18 public void judgeHead(Institution i, CommonPool p, Head ←↩
head , List <Demand > demands , List <Allocation > allocs){
19 | Norm justiceNorm;
20 | if (p.getResourceLevel () < 0.75*i.getMaxLevel ()/ ←↩
compliancyDegree) {
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21 | | justiceNorm = crisisNorm;
22 | } else {
23 | | justiceNorm = regularNorm;
24 | }
25 | int helpalloc = 0; // possible allocations
26 | if (!i.isPrinciple8 ()){
27 | | helpalloc = (int) ←↩
((p.getStartResourceLevel ()/standardRequest)*(( double) ←↩
judgeSize)/i.getInitialAgents ());
28 | } else if (i.getActiveMemberCount () != 0){
29 | | helpalloc = (int) ←↩
((p.getStartResourceLevel ()/standardRequest)*(( double) ←↩
judgeSize)/i.getActiveMemberCount ());
30 | }
31 | int meritoriousDem = 0;
32 | int needyDem = 0;
33 | int meritoriousAll = 0;
34 | int needyAll = 0;
35 | for (Demand d : demands){
36 | | if (d.getProfile ()== Profile.NEEDY){
37 | | | needyDem ++;
38 | | | for (Allocation a : allocs){
39 | | | | if (d.getAgent ()==a.getAgent ()){
40 | | | | | needyAll ++;
41 | | | | }
42 | | | }
43 | | } else { // profile == MERITORIOUS
44 | | | meritoriousDem ++;
45 | | | for (Allocation a : allocs){
46 | | | | if (d.getAgent ()==a.getAgent ()){
47 | | | | | meritoriousAll ++;
48 | | | | }
49 | | | }
50 | | }
52 | }
53 | switch (justiceNorm){ // demands become simulated ←↩
allocations
54 | case EQUITY:
55 | | if(helpalloc > meritoriousDem){
56 | | | if(helpalloc-meritoriousDem < needyDem){
57 | | | | needyDem = helpalloc-meritoriousDem;
58 | | | }
59 | | } else {
60 | | | meritoriousDem = helpalloc;
61 | | | needyDem = 0;
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62 | | }
63 | | break;
64 | case EQUALITY:
65 | | double demSum = (double) needyDem + meritoriousDem;
66 | | if(helpalloc < demSum){
67 | | | needyDem = (int) (helpalloc*needyDem/demSum + 0.5);
68 | | | meritoriousDem = helpalloc - needyDem;
69 | | }
70 | | break;
71 | case NEED:
72 | | if(helpalloc > needyDem){
73 | | | if(helpalloc-needyDem < meritoriousDem){
74 | | | | meritoriousDem = helpalloc-needyDem;
75 | | | }
76 | | } else {
77 | | | needyDem = helpalloc;
78 | | | meritoriousDem = 0;
79 | | }
80 | | break;
81 | }//end of switch
82 | if (meritoriousAll < meritoriousDem - judgeTolerance || ←↩
meritoriousAll > meritoriousDem + judgeTolerance){
83 | | satisfaction -= satisfaction*decreaseFactor;
84 | | if(! droppedHeads.contains(head.getName ())){
85 | | | droppedHeads.add(head.getName ());
86 | | }
87 | | return;
88 | } else if (needyAll < needyDem - judgeTolerance || ←↩
needyAll > needyDem + judgeTolerance){
89 | | satisfaction -= satisfaction*decreaseFactor;
90 | | if(! droppedHeads.contains(head.getName ())){
91 | | | droppedHeads.add(head.getName ());
92 | | }
93 | | return;
94 | } else {
95 | | satisfaction += (1 -satisfaction)*increaseFactor;
96 | | return;
97 | }
98 }
D.5. Member :: leave
1 rule "Members leave due to dissatisfaction"
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2 ruleflow-group "exclude"
3 salience 10
4 when
5 | $i: Institution($iid:id , $r: round , pr8== false)
6 | $hd : Head(instId ==$iid)
7 | $m: Member(name!=$hd.name , instId ==$iid , ←↩
getSatisfaction () < getLeaveSat ())
8 then
9 | retract($m);
10 | insert(new NonMember($m ,0));
11 end
D.6. Member :: change
1 rule "Members change subcluster"
2 ruleflow-group "exclude"
3 salience 10
4 when
5 | $i: Institution($iid:id , $r:round , pr8==true)
6 | $hd: Head(instId ==$iid)
7 | $m: Member(name!=$hd.name , instId ==$iid , ←↩
getSatisfaction () < getLeaveSat ())
8 | $insts: List() from collect (Institution(round==$r , ←↩
id!=$iid))
9 then
10 | Institution ninst = (Institution) ←↩
$insts.get(Random.randomInt($insts.size()));
11 | modify($m){
12 | | setInstitutionId(ninst.getId()),
13 | | setPool(ninst.getPool ().getId()),
14 | | setSatisfaction($m.getInitialSat ())
15 | }
16 end
D.7. Head :: declare
1 rule "Declare winner head"
2 ruleflow-group "vote"
3 when
4 | $i: Institution($iid:id , $r:round , pr3==true)
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5 | Head($headId:id , instId ==$iid)
6 | $vc: VoteCount(ballot =="head", round ==$r, inst==$iid)
7 | not (Declared(inst==$iid , ballot =="head", round ==$r))
8 then
9 | Map <Integer , Integer > tally = $vc.result;
10 | if(tally.containsKey(null) && tally.get(null) > ←↩
$i.instMembers.size()/2){
11 | | retract($i);
12 | } else {
13 | | tally.remove(null);
14 | | if(tally.containsKey($headId) && ←↩
tally.get($headId)>$i.instMembers.size()/2){
15 | | | Integer hd = (Integer) $headId;
16 | | }else{
17 | | | tally.remove($headId);
18 | | | Integer largestVal=null;
19 | | | List <Entry <Integer , Integer >> largestList = new ←↩
ArrayList <Entry <Integer , Integer >>();
20 | | | for (Entry <Integer , Integer > j : tally.entrySet ()){
21 | | | | if (largestVal ==null || largestVal <j.getValue ()){
22 | | | | | largestVal=j.getValue ();
23 | | | | | largestList.clear ();
24 | | | | | largestList.add(j);
25 | | | | }else if (largestVal ==j.getValue ()){
26 | | | | | | largestList.add(j);
27 | | | | }
28 | | | }
29 | | | Integer hd = largestList.get( ←↩
Random.randomInt(largestList.size())).getKey ();
30 | | }
31 | | insert(new Declared($iid , $vc.ballot , $r, hd));
32 | }
33 end
D.8. Head :: update
1 rule "Update winner head"
2 | ruleflow-group "vote"
3 | when
4 | | Institution($iid:id, $r:round , pr7==true)
5 | | Declared(inst==$iid , ballot =="head", round==$r , ←↩
$res:result)
6 | | $h: Head(instId ==$iid , $hid:id , $hid!=$res)
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7 | | $m: Member(instId ==$iid , $mid:id , $mid==$res)
8 | | not HeadChange(round=$r, inst=$iid)
9 | then
10 | | retract($h);
11 | | insert(new Member($h));
12 | | retract($m);
13 | | insert(new Head($m));
14 | | insert(new HeadChange($m.getName (), $r, $iid));
15 end
D.9. Head :: allocate
1 public Set <Allocation > allocate(Institution i, CommonPool ←↩
p, List <Demand > demands) {
2 | Set <Allocation > allocations = new HashSet <Allocation >();
3 | double level = p.getResourceLevel () - ←↩
monitoring*i.getMonitoringCost () - ←↩
outMonitoring*i.getOutMonitoringCost ();
4 | if (level < 0){
5 | | return allocations;
6 | }
7 | Norm justiceNorm;
8 | LinkedList <Demand > demandQueue = new LinkedList <Demand >();
9 | if (level < 0.75*i.getMaxLevel ()/compliancyDegree) {
10 | | justiceNorm = crisisNorm;
11 | } else {
12 | | justiceNorm = regularNorm;
13 | }
14 | switch(justiceNorm){
15 | case EQUITY:
16 | | Collections.shuffle(demands);
17 | | for (Demand d : demands){
18 | | | if (d.getProfile ()== Profile.MERITORIOUS){
19 | | | | demandQueue.addFirst(d);
20 | | | } else {
21 | | | | demandQueue.addLast(d);
22 | | | }
23 | | }
24 | | break;
25 | case EQUALITY:
26 | | Collections.shuffle(demands);
27 | | for(Demand d : demands){
28 | | | demandQueue.add(d);
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29 | | }
30 | | break;
31 | case NEED:
32 | | Collections.shuffle(demands);
33 | | for (Demand d : demands){
34 | | | if (d.getProfile ()== Profile.NEEDY){
35 | | | | demandQueue.addFirst(d);
36 | | | } else {
37 | | | | demandQueue.addLast(d);
38 | | | }
39 | | }
40 | | break;
41 | }//end switch
42 | int qSize = demandQueue.size();
43 | int qCounter = 0;
44 | while (! demandQueue.isEmpty () && qCounter < qSize) {
45 | | qCounter ++;
46 | | if (level >= demandQueue.peek().getQuantity ()) {
47 | | | Demand d = demandQueue.poll();
48 | | | allocations.add(new Allocation(d.getAgent (), ←↩
i.getRound (), d.getQuantity (), p.getId ()));
49 | | | level -= d.getQuantity ();
50 | | } else {
51 | | | break;
52 | | }
53 | }
54 | return allocations;
55 }
D.10. Gatekeeper :: split
1 rule "Adjust maximum pool level - any refill scheme"
2 salience -5
3 ruleflow-group "init"
4 when
5 | $t: IntegerTime ()
6 | $p: CommonPool($t.intValue ()>getLastFilled ())
7 | $i: Institution(pool==$p , pr8==true)
8 | Gatekeeper($sr:getStandardRequest ())
9 | not LevelAdjusted(inst==$i, round ==$t)
10 then
11 | modify($p){
12 | | setMaxLevel (2* $sr*$i.getActiveMemberCount ())
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13 | }
14 | insert(new LevelAdjusted($i, $t));
15 end
D.11. Agency :: appoint
1 rule "External appointment of head"
2 ruleflow-group "vote"
3 when
4 | $i: Institution($iid:id , $p:pool , $r:round , ←↩
round%samplingrateHead ==0, pr7==false)
5 | $h: Head(instId ==$iid)
6 | $mL: List(size >0) from collect(Member(instId ==$iid , ←↩
name!=$h.name))
7 | not (exists HeadChange(inst==$iid , round ==$r))
8 then
9 | retract($h);
10 | insert(new Member($h));
11 | Member m = (Member) $mL.get(Random.randomInt($mL.size()));
12 | retract(m);
13 | insert(new Head(m));
14 | insert(new HeadChange(m.getName (), $r, $iid));
15 end
D.12. Additional or changed field values
Table D.1 shows the changes or additions that have been made to the testbed values
and field variables for the extended version. Again, some of the member field values
depend on the variables from the initialisation phase. For example, the distribution
norms regularNorm and crisisNorm are chosen according to the values of equityPct,
equalityPct and normTransition. Two random values rand1 and rand2 are chosen to
select one of the three norms equity, equality and need as follows:
◦ regularNorm = equity, if rand1 ∈ [0, equalityPct)
◦ regular = equality, if rand1 ∈ [equalityPct, equalityPct+equityPct)
◦ regularNorm = need, if rand1 ∈ [equalityPct+equityPct, 1]
◦ crisisNorm = regularNorm, unless rand2 < normTransition, then
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◦ crisisNorm = equality, if regularNorm=equity
◦ crisisNorm = need, if regularNorm=equality
The profile of an agent depends on a third ramdom variable rand3:
◦ profile = meritorious, if rand3 < profilePct
◦ profile = needy, if rand3 > profilePct
When P8 is used for experimentation, 3 clusters are initialised and the parameters that
change are:
◦ int pools = 3
◦ int institutions = 3, where
◦ int agents = 100 for Institution(id==0)
◦ int agents = 0 for Institution(id==1 or id==2)
Table D.1.: Extension field values
Initialisation
variable value
int outAgents 0
double equityPct 0.5
double equalityPct 0.33
double normTransition 0.75
double profilePct 0.5
Institution
field name field value
final boolean principle2 true
final boolean principle3 true
boolean principle7 false
boolean principle8 false
final double outMonitoringLevel 0.0
final double outMonitoringCost 0.0
int samplingrate 500
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Member
field name field value
final int pool 0
final double initialCompliancyDegree 1.0
Norm regularNorm see p. 218
Norm crisisNorm see p. 218
Profile profile see p. 218
int judgeSize 10
int judgeTolerance 2
double initialSat 0.8
double leaveSat 0.4
double increaseFactor 0.1
double decreaseFactor 0.25
double satisfaction initialSat
List<String> droppedHeads empty
Agency
field name field value
int samplingrateHead 500
D.13. Control loop for CPR testbed extension
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Algorithm 5: Control loop for CPR testbed extension
∃P ∈  ⊆ E : P is pool;
∃I ∈ L: I is institution with P1 ← true ∧ P2 ← true ∧ P3 ← true;
∀m ∈M ⊆ A: role of m is member ∧ satisfaction sm = 0.8;
∃h ∈M: role of h is head; ∃gk ∈M: role of gk is gatekeeper ;
if P8 : ∃ 3 subclusters C1, C2 and C3 with membersM1 ←M,M2 ← ∅,M3 ← ∅;
r ←− 0; P ←− Pmax ;
while (M 6= ∅) ∧ (P > 0) ∧ (t < FinishTime) ∧ (∃h) do
P ←− min (Pmax , P + Prefill); // refill common pool
assign missing roles; // i.e. gatekeeper
if P8 then
gk splits resource for subclusters Ci: P i ← ∣∣Mi∣∣ / |M| · P ; // i = 1, 2, 3
h calls for vote on head; // ∀Ci if applicable
∀m ∈M: m votes;
h counts votes and declares head; // ∀Ci if applicable
if P7 then
h←− head; // updated according to vote, ∀Ci if applicable
else if r mod rate ≡ 0 then
h←− external appointment; // ∀Ci if applicable
∀m ∈M: m updates sm according to h;
∀m ∈M: m places demand;
h allocates resource to all m; // using internal distribution norm, ∀Ci if applicable
∀m ∈M: m appropriates resource Rm;
P ←− P −∑mRm;
for m ∈M do
m samples allocations; // demand–allocation pairs
m judges fairness of head’s allocation procedure;
if m judges head unfair then
sm ←− sm − sm · 0.25;
else
sm ←− sm + (1− sm) · 0.1;
if P8 ∧ sm < 0.4 then
m joins other subcluster;
else if !P8 ∧ sm < 0.4 ∧ ‘leave’ case then
m leaves;
else
m stays; // ‘no leave’ case ∨ sm > 0.4
r ←− r + 1; // increment round
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E. Supporting material (extension)
E.1. End distribution of single trials
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Figure E.1.: Subcluster change of capitalist population (Pr7 and Pr8, 27 heads)
Table E.1.: End distribution of capitalist population (Pr7 and Pr8 )
equityStay equityChange equalityStay equalityChange need
subcluster 1 · · 1 27 19
subcluster 2 · 26 9 · ·
subcluster 3 16 2 · · ·
total 16 28 10 27 19
223
E. Supporting material (extension)
0 100 200 300 400 500
time
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
a
g
e
n
ts h h m l h h l m l h
(a) Appoint Head (rate=15) --- Capitalist
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Figure E.2.: Subcluster change of capitalist population (rate = 15 and Pr8, 82 head
changes)
Table E.2.: End distribution of capitalist population (rate = 15 and Pr8 )
equityStay equityChange equalityStay equalityChange need
subcluster 1 18 3 · · ·
subcluster 2 1 20 7 11 4
subcluster 3 · 5 1 19 11
total 19 28 8 30 15
E.2. Average end distribution
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E.3. Purity on average and for individual trial
Figure E.3.: Distribution of remaining agents by norm for high refill scheme
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Figure E.4.: Distribution of remaining agents by norm for moderate refill scheme
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Figure E.5.: Purity by distribution norm for high refill scheme
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Figure E.6.: Purity by distribution norm for moderate refill scheme
Table E.3.: End distribution of socialist population (Pr7 and Pr8 ), moderate/high refill
scheme
high equityStay equityChange equalityStay equalityChange need
subcluster 1 8 9 15 17 51
subcluster 2 · · · · ·
subcluster 3 · · · · ·
total 8 9 15 17 51
moderate equityStay equityChange equalityStay equalityChange need
subcluster 1 5 7 15 16 44
subcluster 2 6 · · · ·
subcluster 3 5 · · · 2
total 16 7 15 16 46
Table E.4.: End distribution of socialist population (rate = 15 and Pr8 ), low refill scheme
equityStay equityChange equalityStay equalityChange need
subcluster 1 4 4 12 · ·
subcluster 2 · 1 1 19 45
subcluster 3 5 4 5 · ·
total 9 9 18 19 45
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